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Notes on the Romanization of written-Korean
The Korean government's announcement of a revised system for the 
romanization of Korean in 2000 provoked a heated debate among 
academics in Korean Studies as well as in the attentive public. The official 
revisions are instigated in order to facilitate better applicability for the 
information age, abandoning some breves and the apostrophe for computer 
users and reminding users of romanized Korean of the exact phonetic 
sounds of Korean. In fact, some important differences in pronunciation 
pertaining to the old system could not be properly identified. Korean has 
ten simple vowels and eleven diphtongs, for example. Moreover, due to a 
significant difference in orthography and reading many consonants in 
pronunciation are quite often confused. Critics, including Koreans and the 
foreign community, however, have worried about a serious incompatibility 
of the new system after English pronunciation^*]
The basic principles of the new romanization system are, firstly, that 
romanization is based on standard Korean pronunciation; secondly, symbols 
other than roman letters are avoided as far as possible. The third principle, 
that to write Korean in a romanization that pays heed to pronunciation, 
however, has two exceptions, which must be fully taken into account. 
Firstly, that family names, which have been widely used under the old 
systems, and social customs, could be used 'for the time being' until a 
further decision is taken. Secondly, and of more serious import, for the 
academic purpose of converting romanized Korean back to Hangeul 
(Written Korean), 'romanization is done according to Hangeul spelling and 
not pronunciation'. For this, a hyphen may be additionally used when it is 
necessary to distinguish between syllables. This has major ramifications for
this thesis, in that bibliographical information covering Korean literature 
becomes very difficult to read for those readers who do not have proper 
knowledge of Korean and the revised romanization system, even though the 
new system, 1 believe, would be better for finding Korean literature in any 
comprehensive library research, generating less confusion.
The first decision I made, therefore, was to translate bibliographical 
information on Korean literature into English, immediately followed by the 
original Korean without romanization. This appeared to be the most 
effective and accurate mode of providing a bibliography. Translations from 
Korean titles are mine, except in those rare cases where the authors 
provide their own. Consequently, any mistakes or problems found in 
translation will be due mainly to my lack of competence. The second 
decision concerns the introduction of authors' names in the text. The 
authors' names in the Korean, Chinese and Japanese original are written 
with the surnames first, in order to minimize confusion for readers, faced 
with a lack of consensus on this matter concerning academic publication. 
Provision of quotations is suffixed by the authors' surname and first name 
together in order, due to the possibility that different authors with the same 
surnames - KIM Seung-Kuk, KIM Sunhyuk, KIM Se-Kyun, for example - 
could be variously introduced in a single paragraph. In order to avoid 
further confusion, surnames given with first names, are written with capital 
letters, regardless of their origin: for example, AHN Jee-Won, Perry 
ANDERSON, Karl-Otto APEL. Lastly, the matter of hyphen-use. In general, 
the first names in Korean and Chinese are made of two distinctive parts, 
normally reflected by a hyphen in romanization. However, there seems to 
be no fixed rule, so that each author has his/her own preference for 
romanization and this in one or four ways: for example, Gil-Dong,
II
Gil-dong, Gildong, Gil Dong. I generalize these usages as Gil-Dong, which 
seems more widely used than its counterparts. However, this is only for 
that Korean literature in which there is no contra-indication for an author’s 
preference.
[*] for the overall understanding of the debate, see
- Ministry of Culture & Tourism. 2000. 'The Revised Romanization of 
Korean'.
http://www.kois.go.kr/govemment/issue/Cissue/2000/romanization-0007.html.
- Kim, Myong-sik. 2000. 'In Defense of the New Hangeul Romanization 
System'.
http://www.kois.go.kr/govemment/issue/Cissue/2000/romanization-0007/000721-
KMS.html.
- Kang, Man-Su. 2000. 'The New Romanization Will Result in a National
Crisis', Monthly Chosun. September. / AH jf.
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Summary
This thesis aims to provide a view point from which we can understand the long­
term historical transformations of Korean politics since the late fourteenth 
century. I will attempt to illustrate the overall configuration of Korean politics 
with sociological reference to three questions: what kinds of political events have 
occurred? Which political issues have led to the participation of major political 
actors? How have these actors shown their political orientation in practice and 
how have events and actors determined politics, or, if there is no determination, 
how have they influenced the overall shape of politics?
The concept of modernity in this thesis is mainly used to indicate the embodiment 
of political actors’ alternative visions without necessarily accepting the widely 
acknowledged assumption that modernity is the epochal quality of the 
contemporary period which exclusively enjoy. Some sociologists, especially in 
comparative-historical sociology, since the late 1990s have shown their 
intellectual interest in conceptualizing ‘multiple modernities'. They recognize the 
importance of theorizing the existence of plural forms of societal development for 
the contemporary situation, while some classical ideas on modernity based on the 
European or American experience have been critically evaluated in regional 
studies.
If the Korean experience is regarded as an example of multiple modernities, it is 
not because the political boundary itself -  which has been called Korea, as well as 
Chosun, Koryo, Balhac/Shillu, etc. -, has its own distinctive political and cultural 
color. Rather it is because the actors in Korean history generally, have shown 
themselves to be a good example for evaluating modernity. Regardless of quite 
different historical trajectories, the compatibility of the Korean experience with 
others under the title of multiple modernities, can be adduced both from the way 
in which human practices have emerged in their collective form, with their own 
political orientations, and in the relationship to other actors within a boundary.
Introduction: theorizing modernity in comparative-historical
sociology
1. Modernity and historical sociology in Korean context
This thesis aims to provide a view point from which we can understand 
the long-term historical transformations of Korean politics since the late 
fourteenth century. I will attempt to illustrate the overall configuration of 
Korean politics with sociological reference to three questions: what kinds of 
political events have occurred? Which political issues have led to the 
participation of major political actors? How have these actors shown their 
political orientation in practice and how have events and actors determined 
politics, or, if there is no determination, how have they influenced the 
overall shape of politics? The need to extend the range of historical inquiry 
beyond the so-called modem age to the late fourteenth century - the 
historical period of the emerging Chosun, the new nation-state in Korean 
history - derives from an initial belief that modem Korean history and the 
ways in which modem political actors act, could not be properly 
understood without comparing them to past socio-political issues and events 
as their precursors. The attempt to theorize modem Korean politics without 
considering the precedent seems quite problematic, in that any conceptual 
tools utilized for identifying particular aspects o f modem politics that 
ignore the historical factors contributing to empirical realization of these 
conceptual frameworks, would obviously appear to be deficient.
There have been a number of works on Korean politics, focusing on the 
meanings of major events. However, most fail to provide a theoretical 
account for a grand picture of the dynamics of Korean politics, although 
some plausible clues for theorization are often suggested. In addition, by
-  1 -
neglecting the careful consideration of the history of Korean politics, many 
works produced a limited explanation, due to the lack of a comparative 
investigation of contemporary politics with its traditional counterpart. Such 
narrow research foci mean that some works have even failed to anticipate 
the actual direction of short-term political transformations in contemporary 
Korea. My investigation of the long-term historical transformation of 
Korean politics and the Korean community invokes a fundamental question: 
are there continuous elements in Korean politics over the long run? If yes, 
then what are the underpinning factors for maintaining such a continuity? If 
no, then how are we to understand the political ruptures and the changes 
in major political actors in sociological terms?
Answers to this question cannot be found merely in the objective domain; 
in the observation of historical events and political actors' ideas and 
practices. Rather, they are dependent on the intellectual attitude which 
intends to identify some theoretical implications from history. In the 
practical decision, in which some events are introduced for interpretation 
and others are excluded, i.e., the impossibility of including all events and 
actors in a written account, linking an event and an actor already intimates 
the path of the theory aimed at. What I intend here, however, is to 
provide the theoretical pre-condition for comparing political actors in 
specific situations, in terms of identifying the modes of political activities 
by political actors.1 Firstly, and toward this purpose, the interpretation of 
major events will be understood as political products of actors, rather than 
as derivation of a meta-historical economic law, or sudden contingent gifts 
from the grand dynamics of history itself. This means that political 
processes will be the focus rather than concentrating on the background of
1) See conceptual excursus 1 at the end of this introduction.
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the events undermined by any deterministic attitude. Secondly, in evaluating 
the meanings of events and actors, I will try to minimize the gap between 
different conceptualizations, from the highly loaded modernist idea of 
traditional society and the traditional political system, on the one hand, to 
the revisionist idea of extending modernity into the traditional world, on 
the other. In the latter perspective, tradition becomes the prototype of the 
modem, while the former treats modernity as rootless.
While many debates and their discursive examination in Korean studies are 
introduced in this thesis, their limited theoretical natures are mainly 
highlighted, rather than suggesting any alternative to them. In fact, 
constructing an alternative conceptual framework for understanding Korean 
politics is neither intended, nor within the author's competence. Above all, 
the acknowledgement of the limited nature of this thesis comes from a 
realistic recognition, in the author's own view, that without systematically 
comparing the Korean experience with its counterparts - which are barely 
focused upon here -, Korean politics can never fully be grasped.2 The 
basic intention of the thesis is to reinterpret some of the major political 
issues in terms of their sociological import, which has been more or less 
neglected, despite having been widely dealt with in Korean studies.
The overriding importance of conceptualizing modernity will here be 
supported by a brief review of the development of Korean studies in the 
social sciences and the ramifications of the major social scientific 
discourses adopted therein. It goes without saying that the political and 
economic reasoning adopted by major modem political actors in their 
political discourses has been shaped by their interpretations of 'modernity'
2) See conceptual excursus 2 at the end of this introduction.
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and 'modernization', both of which are seen as the destination for societal 
changes, or the major tool for achieving societal development. Sociology, as 
a modem academic discipline for the Korean situation, has produced many 
intellectual works on modem Korea and its transformative periods since the 
late nineteenth century and the colonial period (1910-1945) (Park and 
Chang, 1999). However, it soon becomes apparent that macro historical 
theorizing in the sociological fields with regard to the long-term political 
transformation of Korea, is impoverished when compared to other 
disciplines dealing with historical resources.3 Despite the existence of many 
sociologically-inspired works on specific political thinkers on the overall 
social hierarchy in the traditional political system and the overwhelming 
influence of Neo-Confucian state ideology on the activities of members of 
Chosun society, the sociological understanding of traditional society and the 
state, especially Chosun, could hardly progress beyond the forms of 
snapshot knowledge and has seldom been developed in a broad theoretical 
framework. Insofar as there are big gaps between the traditional type of 
societal and political model, on the one hand, and the newly introduced
3) To take one example, two publication databases in the social sciences, 
international bibliography o f the social sciences, sociological abstracts, 
which mainly cite English publications, hardly include any books or articles 
dealing with the long-term historical transformation of Korean society and 
its politics. This situation also pertains to Korean sociology, although it is 
noticeable that in some recent works here, we find examples of the 
political, cultural and intellectual particularities of traditional Korea broadly 
compared with the European experience. However, in many instances, this 
new historical approach is linked to a strong relativist idea of culture and 
cosmology, rather than connecting the Korean experience with others in 
order to develop a more general political and social theory.
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modem alternatives, on the other, the conceptual rupture in sociological 
theorizing is too wide to be ignored. One reason for this intellectual 
phenomenon may derive from the difficulty that scholars in Korean studies 
face, in light of the difficult historical trajectory of Korean society, 
compared to the European and North-American experience, that 'textbook' 
o f modernity.
However, it will here be mooted that modem Korean society and its 
traditional counterpart should be interpreted within a broad interpretative 
framework, rather than treated with different methodological tools and 
perspectives. As I mentioned at the beginning, it is only when we place 
them together under the grand historical view, that the correct interpretation 
of current contemporary Korean politics and its societal features can be 
fully achieved. Paradoxically, it is only through the reconceptualization of 
modernity from the comparative-historical perspective, that this task can be 
effected. Although there are many different takes on modernity, at least one 
shared element is visible: the contemporary problématique occupies the 
central place for intellectual inquiry. In other words, understanding 
modernity becomes itself the way of interpreting the agendas of the 
contemporary world, in order to produce better solutions for socio-political 
and economic problems.
The dominant way of dealing with modernity for this purpose in the social 
sciences and philosophy seems to have been to set up an epochal 
relationship between the contemporary world and its counterparts - in most 
cases, the past. As far as one seriously concentrates on the issues of one's 
own historical time and interprets them under an epochal consciousness, the 
rupture between different conceptualizations of historical times becomes
-  5 -
unavoidable. In spite of the fact that intellectuals and political actors 
normally treat others' interpretations and political practices with less weight 
- especially in dealing with the history of ideas and political history -, 
such a process, regarding either the contemporary world, or for previous 
periods, is deeply related to suggesting their own alternative.
2. Disputes on the conceptions of modernity
The concept of modernity in this thesis is mainly used to indicate the 
embodiment of political actors' alternative visions without necessarily 
accepting the widely acknowledged assumption that modernity is the 
epochal quality of the contemporary period which we exclusively enjoy. 
Needless to say, defining a concept - what modernity means -, for which 
arguments could be clearly put forward, is a basic part of the intellectual 
project- on modernity, for example. However, while any intellectual project 
could not go beyond the conditions of its particular historical time in 
which the author develops their ideas, the definition of the concept itself is 
composed of the words of non-temporal meanings, on the one hand, and 
orients itself toward a general explanation of the meanings, with the 
resultant implication for several situations which are temporal and particular, 
on the other. Although the author and her/his socio-political resources - 
which contribute to the construction of conceptions and their related 
intellectual circulation -, are historically situated in a specific time, the 
linguistic expression of the definitions of a concept in the social sciences 
and political philosophy has been quite de-historical in terms of its relative 
freedom from time-based limitation. Consequently, a concept could have 
additional meanings for readers, beyond the author's initial intention to 
define it in a particular situation, when it is reinterpreted in a different 
temporal setting (Friese, 1998).
However, it becomes apparent that many social scientists conceptualize 
modernity in time-bounded perception, which limits modernity to a 
particular historical milieu. Anthony GIDDENS, for example, defines 
modernity thus:
'In this book[Modemity and Self-Identity] I use the term 'modernity' 
in a very general sense, to refer to the institutions and modes of 
behaviour established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but which in 
the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in 
their impact. 'Modernity' can be understood as roughly equivalent to 
'the industrialised world', so long as it be recognized that 
industrialism is not its only institutional dimension.' (1991: 14-15)
'What is modernity? As a first approximation, let us simply say the 
following: "modernity" refers to modes o f social life or organisation 
which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards 
and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their 
influence. This associates modernity with a time period and with an 
initial geographical location, but for the moment leaves its major 
characteristics safely stowed away in a black box.' (1990: 1)
Whereas the purpose of defining modernity is to distinctively construct its 
conceptual space in order to clearly show more fruitful meanings of it, the 
historicized definition does not fully allow its abstract meanings - even 
though one could argue that all meanings are abstract - to be understood 
in its diversity. It becomes impossible - and this for Giddens's 
understanding especially - to apply modernity to multiple historical times. 
Ever since particular historical origins and particular institutional contents 
came to embody the core meanings of modernity (for example, see 
Toulmin, 1990), modernity has become the concept for evaluating different 
historical periods and different institutional settings. In becoming such, 
however, modernity has been exclusively limited to a particular historical 
period, with fixes its meaning. Illustrating non-European modernities as 
deviations, or the suggestion of them as alternatives by some comparative 
social scientists, fails to evade this problem, which emanates from the 
assumption that the core of European modernity was already given and its
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forms and contents are already fixed in history - such discourses viz., the 
Korean case are introduced in chapter 2.
Above of all, the problem of the historical definition of modernity - a 
temporal one - does not seem to be critically appraised by many social 
scientists alongside of intellectual interests in the institutional development 
of politics since the French revolution, on the one hand, and the research 
methods dealing with epochal characteristics as a whole, on the other, 
which have deeply influenced comparative-historical sociology. For example, 
a mixed type o f both the evolutionist idea and the chronology-oriented 
categorization in theorizing modernity, is not able to suggest any new 
political project without dividing the epochal perception of modernity into 
several stages. The periodization of modernity, a way of making several 
modernities in a sense, by Alain TOURAINE (1997) - haute, moyenne et 
basse modernités - ultimately neglects the tension between different epochal 
perceptions for competing actors and implicitly constructs the genuine view 
of the periods for the symbolized 'modem' subject. Treating a period in 
this manner, by distinguishing it from other periods under the big epochal 
umbrella of the modem era, reveals the conceptual rupture between the 
modem era and its counterparts, which cannot be bridged by a 
reconstruction of epochal perception or through the radical rejection of an 
epochal understanding of history. If the institutional form of modernity is 
limited to that of the nation-state and modernity is understood as the era 
of nation-states, one could raise a question as to how the emerging 
Pan-European state could be understood. As the second stage of political 
modernity? Or the rise of a post-modem political project? The current 
process of European integration in relation to the conceptual question of 
modernity, will be investigated in chapter 6.
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In fact, the history of the social sciences shows that an epochal 
consciousness was deeply rooted in intellectual projects, many of which 
were actively engaged in political transformation. Contemporary historical 
sociologists in the theory of modernity, in many respects, represent the 
succession to this tradition: the reinterpretation of European intellectual 
history on the eve of the era of the nation-state and on the further process 
of nation-building, in order to grasp valuable lessons for current European 
integration process (Wagner); the proposal to reconceptualize global history 
beyond the functionalist and narrow-minded imperialist view (Wittrock); the 
critical appraisals of 'the clash of civilizations' and of the 'end of history' 
in terms of the exhaustion of new proposals for modernization and 
suggesting a perspective on multiple modernities (Eisenstadt), for example. 
However, many intellectual projects for the conceptualization of modernity 
accept time - and space-oriented categories in developing their comparative 
analyses. In so doing, they become overdependent on the construction of 
conceptual equivalents and counterparts to be compared, which could lead 
to the asymmetric interpretations matched with particular normative claims. 
In spite of the fact that conceptualization of historical facts has been the 
very purpose of comparative-historical sociology, many sociologists, from 
time to time, ignore the historical fact that the meanings of these concepts 
are historical products, pragmatically introduced in order to clearly indicate 
certain distinctive features of particular phenomena. Modernity, for example, 
which has become one of the major concepts in the social sciences and 
political philosophy, has its own conceptual history which shows that it 
was loosely defined by intellectuals in order to describe their contemporary 
agendas, rather than seriously defined in the de-historicized abstraction. To 
begin with, let us assume that the historical origin of modernity began at
around the eighteenth or nineteenth century. For the assumption to have 
validity, it should illuminate the connection between its historical and 
linguistic origin. 'The word "modemus" was first used in the late fifth 
century to distinguish what had become a "Christian" present from a 
"pagan" Roman past' (Jauss, 1970:11 cited in Habermas, 2001: 131). In the 
writings of a religious school of the twelfth and thirteenth century, the 
words "modemorum, modemi(s)'' were used as a comparative; as a way of 
distinguishing from 'the ancient'.4 In The Prince, also, Machiavelli subtly 
but clearly, used own 'modem' for indicating the political and administrative 
agendas of his time (i.e., the beginning of the 16th century).5 In the 
English world, the first recorded use of the word 'modem' is in 1585, and 
'modernists' in 1588; 'modernity' in 1627, and 'modernism', 'modernness', 
'modernizer', 'modernize', are all in use by the first half of the eighteenth 
century (King, 1995: 108). The conceptual shift from these loose meanings 
here to more concrete and sharply defined usages for exclusively describing 
the grand historical transformation since the nineteenth century, coincided 
with this historical transformation (Koselleck, 1985). In other words, the 
common idea of modernity indicating particular epochal phenomena in this 
social sciences itself could be understood as a part of this particular 
epochal phenomena.
4) As an example: "Nec dedignatus sum modemorum proferre sententias
quos antiqui s in plerisque praeferre non dubito" (Jean de Salisbury, 
1159/1929: 3-4 quoted in Jeauneau, 1973: 57) and "Licet itaque
modemorum et veterum sit sensus idem, venerabilior est vetustas" (p.136 
quoted in p.56).
5) "una lunga esperienzia delle cose moderne e una continua lezione delle 
antique" (1992: 257) and "quegli esempli che dalle cose antiche e 
moderne" (290).
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2.1. Actors and boundary: subjectification o f modernity 
One of the common conceptions of modernity is that modernity is 
understood on a rupture; one which historically differentiates it from 
counter-categories, viz., the pre-modem, traditional, or even the
post-modem. When the influences of the grand socio-political and economic 
transformation around the 1800s fundamentally shaped the way of the
social sciences and political philosophy, the overwhelming intellectual 
interpretations of these transformations produced, in most cases the 
perception of epochal differentiations for human history. Regrettably, while 
the founding fathers in the social sciences tried to respond to these changes 
with their own interpretations, many of them were led to suggest also the 
idea of historical progress for explaining the detachment from the past. 
Once they had formulated their own views of history and had identified 
the grand transformations, they tended to explain the sources of the modem 
take-off through cross-national European comparisons, as well as in
inter-civilizational terms also. These intellectual expansions into the global 
realm may have been necessary for them to more clearly identify what 
they observed for their own periods.
The identification of the emerging new world was conditioned by an
understanding of a new human agency. In fact, studies on political and 
economic transformation in the 19th century always include the explanation 
of modem actors as the driving force of transformation. In so far as
historical research was limited to the European experience, the political 
tension among human agents was always there to be explained. The history 
of Marxian ideas, for example, clearly shows how important the role of the 
modem actor was for intellectual inquiry. However, when classical
11
sociologists tried to explain the emergence of new actors in terms of the 
historical process, they had to implicitly and explicitly accept the 
assumption that Europe, as the boundary of interaction for European actors, 
is distinguished from other regions. In fact, this appeared the only plausible 
way to genealogically explain the emergence of new actors replacing old 
powerful classes in the (West) European context. However, the problem 
with this comparative idea was that its proponents could not account for 
what they observed- in terms of the tension that existed between modem 
actors- when they proceeded to cross-boundary research between Europe 
and others. While the existence of political and economic actors 
differentiated along the line of economic interests has become the essential 
assumption of theories of capitalism, the participation in common cultural 
heritages from the past has been presupposed in theories of boundary 
politics. The existence of diverse actors within a given boundary became 
less important for comparative-historical works. Rather, it was the boundary 
itself that came to have its own meaning as the place providing 
overarching resources for each actor. From here, it was one small step to 
construct a totalized symbolic actor for representing the boundary. The 
development of the nation-state system, nationalism and wars among states 
in Europe would be a good example of this process.6 In other words, 
comparison itself includes the conceptual expansion of subjectivity, from 
particular economic and political interests, to a broader conception of 
'cultural heritage'.
6) For Lyotard, the universal claim for local legitimacy in the nationalist 
idea means to degrade humanity to a second level below that of the 
nation-state: ' ... a universal import:'We, the French people'. ... As the 
current slogan of the far right in France has it: French first (which implies 
that freedom comes second).' (1989: 322) (Italics by the author))
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Apart from the asymmetric formulation between modernity and its historical 
counterparts, the comparative understanding of modernity in a number of 
cases displays the irony that, whereas the subjectivity of modernity is never 
clearly mentioned within one collective boundary, it is firmly presupposed 
in comparative analyses among several bounded entities. The big macro 
terms - religions, civilizations, regions for example, - which are quite 
common for regional studies in modernity, seem to have an autonomy of 
conceptual power for regrouping actors. For many social scientists and even 
philosophers, the boundary is understood as the container of different 
characteristics which provides meaning for any comparison with others. 
Under the immediate perception of the existence of several religious, 
cultural and political boundaries, which have existed and been practically 
utilized over a long period of time, many intellectual works have neglected 
the potential danger of configuring rigid boundaries, which become actual 
when the assumption is transformed into the factual premise for 
comparative research. When scholars implicitly conclude that the boundary 
exists, not as the situational theatre, but as the disciplinary space to teach 
conventional historical wisdom to members within the political and cultural 
boundary, ultimately they cannot avoid a deterministic interpretation of 
human practices.
To depend on the power of the boundary, while assuming that it is filled 
with specific characteristics, enables historical sociologists to operate with 
the strong assumption that the subject of the given boundary lasts as long 
as the boundary itself. The assumption of the long-term existence of 
representative subjects of boundaries over several historical periods 
conceptually occurs when qualified, either positively or negatively, by
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cultural backgrounds that are deeply and exclusively involved in the process 
of the identity formation of members of the boundary.7 At the same time, 
whenever the reclassification of human practices within the grand categories 
related to boundaries is effected in comparative-historical analysis, 
sociologists as participants in the public sphere, irreducibly contribute to the 
maintenance of political actors' immediate perception of the rigidity of 
boundary politics.
The problem of that subjectification in theorizing modernity can also be 
identified in that conventional sociological method - still influential in the 
field - through which the totalized view of long-term historical process is 
implicitly constructed. While the boundary - cultural or political - is at the 
centre of research interests, some sociologists do not proceed to further 
investigate whether or not the historical characteristics they observe are 
fully shared by every individual and collective actor within the boundary. 
Even though human practices at the micro level cannot be fully dealt with 
by macro historical analysis, the macro description of the overall view 
covering the boundary always contains a risk of constructing a totalized 
subject, or representatively symbolizing a few subjects in historical analysis. 
In fact, even if we accept this as an objective view of history, a way not 
only of linking the past to the present, but also of relocating and reviving
7) When he investigates the history of table manners and eating cultures 
for the upper classes in the West since the Middle Ages, Elias rather 
cynically reveals the dilemma behind the subjective idea of 'we' over 
several historical periods: 'It is sometimes said, "How far we have 
progressed beyond this standard", although it is not usually quite clear who 
is the 'we' with whom the speaker identifies on such occasions, as if he or 
she deserved part of the credit.' (2000: 59)
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the past for the contemporary agenda, such a position leads inexorably to a 
subjective idea of history, a representative view of the contemporary on the 
past
2.2. The moment o f recognizing the historical time
How many different perceptions of time exist in modernity? This question 
has been rarely broached and then only indirectly answered as the form of 
assumption underpinning a manner of arguing distinctive qualities for 
modernity, compared to its counterparts. While it is argued that time and 
space in modernity is differently perceived by individuals and quite 
differently conceived in actual practices, compared to those in traditional 
and premodem times (Giddens: 1990), the presupposition of one authentic 
perception of modernity as a grand time-zone remains, implicitly assuming 
an objective time shared by peoples.8
While the scholarly recognition of modernity itself necessitates a historical 
explanation of its origin, developmental process and long-term 
transformation, many historical analyses do not clearly acknowledge the fact 
that the conceptual transformation of modernity has implicitly occurred in 
the process of explaining these changes. Two characteristics are observable: 
a flourishing epochal consciousness in the way of exclusively concentrating 
on the contemporary historical agendas and an emphasis on the implications 
of historical agendas for 'History'.
8) Friese clearly shows that some major sociologists in structuralism and 
functionalism fail to recognize the existence of plural perceptions of time 
by diverse subjects when they try to interpret socio-political agendas within 
the framework of societal time by means of an objectivist attitude. See, 
Friese (1997).
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Treating an epoch as a whole, and identifying the comparative
characteristics of an epoch, have been the common characteristic of
historical analyses for the social sciences and philosophy. Instantiation from 
the past and a newly distinctive embedded quality of contemporary agendas 
in human histoty have been basic intellectual attitudes (Habermas, 2001). 
Under the influence of an increased epochal consciousness of intellectuals 
around 1800, which paved the development of social science and
philosophy, classical comparative-historical sociology became accustomed to 
dealing with epochal categories. Despite the fact that historical analysis has 
discovered, from the long-term configuration of societal movements, crucial 
elements for understanding contemporary features, many works still operated 
under the assumption that it was the epochs themselves that provided
different qualities for human lives. The manipulation of epochal differences 
was very important for drawing the characteristics of one's own historical 
situation in several ways. However, the asymmetric distribution of values in 
the highlighting of contemporary agendas was an implicit attitude, even 
though the grand shape of epochal qualities was a simple by-product in the 
process of arguing the necessity of new political agendas.
The construction of different epochal qualities went together with the strong 
idea of history in the mixed form of teleological and evolutionist thinking.9
9) While Sewell's exemplary critique of Wallerstein and Tilly as trapped in 
'teleological temporality' highlights how their views on History seriously 
influence their research on the history of capitalism with the world-system 
theory, for Wallerstein's case, and on comparative analysis of some French 
actors' different involvements in the French revolution, for Tilly, in some 
aspects the evolutionist attitude is also identified within their rigid
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The conceptions of history in the evolutionist/teleological idea have not 
been entirely excluded from the sociological theory of modernity and its 
loose form is still quite apparent. An increased interpretative capacity that 
could evaluate one's own contemporary agenda within history, was 
combined with the imagery of the desirable future, couched in a normative 
basis. Even though one could correctly argue that the problem-solving 
process is always connected to the actors' own normative foundation, there 
is yet no reason to presuppose the final destination for the normative 
journey and no need to evaluate each short journey as work in progress 
toward this end. In other words, fidelity to contemporary agendas does not 
necessarily come from meta-historical tasks. Individual actors' radicalized 
historical awareness of their own projects, which encourages their 
subsequent practice, in many cases is based on their own subjective 
perception of history, which, it is not doubted, is expressive of their 
authentic Subjectivity. Modernity becomes subjective through the practical 
visions of actors and their realization in practice.
3. Multiple modernities in comparative-historical sociology
Whereas some philosophers still inquire about the conception of modernity, 
on the presupposition that modernity is a legitimate topic for philosophy 
(Habermas, 2001: 130, 1987), some sociologists, especially in comparative- 
historical sociology, since the late 1990s have shown their intellectual 
interest in conceptualizing 'multiple modernities'. They recognize the 
importance of theorizing the existence of plural forms of societal 
development for the contemporary situation, while some classical ideas on 
modernity based on the European or American experience have been 
critically evaluated in regional studies.
construction of long-term historical process. See, Sewell (1996).
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'The notion of "multiple modernities" denotes a certain view of 
the contemporary world - indeed of the history and 
characteristics of the modem era - that goes against the views 
long prevalent in scholarly and general discourses. It goes 
against the view of the "classical" theories of modernization and 
of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s, 
and indeed against the classical sociological analyses of Marx, 
Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in 
one reading of his work. They all assumed, even if only 
implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed 
in modem Europe and the basic institutional constellations that 
emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and 
modem societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would 
prevail throughout the world.' (Eisenstadt, 2000b: 1).
In Japanese Studies, for example, scholars have raised questions concerning
the contribution of a pre-modem Japanese heritage to the modernization
process, in order to explain Japan's rather exceptional performance in world
politics and its economic growth. Eisenstadt (1996b), in particular,
highlights Japanese culture as continuously developing civilizational
heritages from outside, and modifying them for its own purpose. Amason,
more broadly, introduces civilizational heritages in the sociological
theorizing of several political projects of modernity, including the Russian
communist one (Amason, 2000, 1999, 1998 and his additional explanation
on Byzantium, 2000a). At the same time, extended inquiries on non-West
European historical paths to modernity and a broad reinterpretation of the
historical development of the European and American experience, have
produced a new mode of historical inquiry on modernity as plural.10
'One of the most important implications of the term "multiple 
modernities" is that modernity and Westernization are not 
identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only 
"authentic" modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence 
and continue to be a basic reference point for others.' 
(Eisenstadt, 2000b: 2-3).
10) Two issues from Daedalus (2000, 1998) can be understood as examples 
of the burgeoning sociological interest in the historical development of 
modernity for regional studies.
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In spite of the fact that different theoretical ideas coexist with the broad 
framework of multiple modernities, a theoretical question still remains 
concerning the overall direction for theorizing multiple modernities. And 
this especially when the theory of multiple modernities is mapped onto 
comparative-historical sociology, a problem - or dilemma - of the 
boundary-oriented conceptualization of modernities and their comparisons.
3.1. The space in which modernity gains historicity 
Many of the empirical examples of multiple modernities introduced under 
the rubric of the comparative-historical perspective, ultimately suggest that 
the existence of cross-national, regional differences constitute the crucial 
element of multiple modernities. Additionally, this attitude in most cases 
maintains the idea of 'bounded politics' and the strong view on culture 
heritage. The temporal agendas have been considerably informed by the 
territorial range covered by the influence of socio-political and economic 
agendas. Even though all analyses of multiple modernities neither 
presuppose a national setting as the unit of multiple modernities, nor fully 
intend to reshape national settings within more grand civilizational units, 
the overall configuration of multiple modernities is not entirely free from 
the mixed form of certain qualities of cultural influences and territorial 
units.11
11) Most of all, the culture-centered idea for the understanding of multiple 
modernities can be found: 'The idea of multiple modernities presumes that 
the best way to understand the contemporary world - indeed to explain the 
history of modernity - is to see it as a story of continual constitution and 
reconstitution of a multiplicity o f cultural programs.' (Eisenstadt, 2000b: 2) 
The territorial idea for understanding multiple modernities implicitly occurs 
when the culturalist view seeks empirical examples of the cultural programs
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The existence of several boundaries, which have been maintained mainly 
through their own socio-political mechanisms and which have been rather 
independent from external influences in developing their own socio-political 
and cultural models, has influenced comparative-historical sociology in 
accustoming it to produce research questions for historical analysis of 
particular features of these collective boundaries. While many modernization 
theorists indulged their ambitions as social engineers in dealing with each 
national and regional issue of economic developments and democratization, 
some of them looked to the historical and cultural foundations of spatial 
objects. In many non-European regional studies, the alternatives from the 
European and North-American experiences are assumed to have the same 
qualitative meanings for those indigenous regions. However, such a 
transplantation process has not been always peaceful and productive.
Some approaches in multiple modernities focus on the non-linear process in 
which historical and cultural backgrounds are introduced as major elements 
in the pursuit of plausible explanations for the reaction of indigenous 
cultures to modernization agendas and of the particular formation of 
inter-subjective relations between the modernizing agencies and other 
members of society. However, at the same time they observe that these 
alien institutional models began to take firm root in those societies and to 
have an important place for many actors here. For the theorist of multiple 
modernities under the legacy of modernization theory, multiple modernity is 
nothing but the multiple forms of modem society, of which major kernels 
are imported institutional models of politics and economic activities, which
of modernity from the collective geo-political units which have their own 
boundaries.
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enabled these societies to communicate with their Europeanized or 
Americanized cousins.
Increasing the number of institutional modules with which each collective 
unit could be compatible with another, must, in fact, be understood as the 
important contribution of European and American modes of modernization, 
so to speak. However, the neo-modemist idea of multiple modernities 
neither fully questions the problems of globalized institutional modules in 
the economic and political spheres, nor shows a great concern in modifying 
or improving them. Except for a few reappraisals of modernity in 
historicizing political projects in Europe - in which the history of 
institution-building processes in the nation-state system are radically 
evaluated and regional identity is carefully reformulated beyond 
fundamentalist views the institutionally-centered and culturally-oriented 
views of multiple modernities do not seem to be well linked to any 
political project which could be potentially understood as a new modernity.
3.2. The civilizational analysis o f  multiple modernities
Comparative-historical approaches to multiple modernities in most cases 
exist as macro analyses of historical processes for particular communities. 
Discovering the crucial elements that are assumed to determine the 
direction of societal and communal developments and describing long-term 
historical processes with a series of empirical examples of multiple 
modernities amount to the functionalist mode of narrating history in order 
to identify cultural factors for maintaining structural stability.12 When the
12) Although it looks like an out-of-date mode of descriptive comparison, 
Abrams (1982: 128) clearly points out the problematic aspect of the
functionalist perspective for historical analysis: "for functionalists the
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causes for the long duration, gradual transformation or radical emergence of 
political rupture need to be explained, macro analysis tends to look for 
answers either from the system itself, or from the circumstantial factors, 
rather than from the inter-active process among political actors.
The civilizational analysis in comparative-historical sociology has been 
dominated by the research focus on socio-political systems and grand 
circumstantial factors. One of the problems of civilizational analysis is that 
it could not move beyond presupposing the existence of the proprietary 
boundary for particular civilizational influences. Even though in many cases 
sociologists do not explicitly apply civilizational categories to particular 
regions, the certain combination between regional identity and civilizational 
characteristics is the implicit assumption for starting comparative research. 
Thereby, the space for inter-civilizational influences becomes fragmented in 
categorical separation and treated as the marginal place of each 
civilizational characteristic. Another problem of civilizational analysis is the 
consequent construction of the stereotype for socio-political and economic 
forms of human activities under the influence of grand civilizations, while 
implicitly intending to develop cross-civilizational typology. Questioning the 
long-term transformation of major religions and their genealogical 
development has not become a major theme of multiple modernities, while
identification of function explains why things happen with such power that 
examining how they happen comes to seem quite unimportant. Historical 
analysis, by contrast proceeds on the assumption that the explanation of 
why things happen is inextricably contained within accounts of how things 
happen. Functionalist historical sociology cannot simply impose the former 
procedure on the latter but has to coordinate and combine them." (Abrams, 
1982: 128, italics by the author)
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civilizational analysis tends to focus on the cultural power of great 
religions. Assuming the long-term maintenance of civilizational influences 
across different historical times and their involvement in the emergence of 
multiple modernities, does not seem helpful for describing the history of 
inter-subjective tensions within a particular civilizational boundary.
Even though it is empirically true that the contents of religious and 
civilizational agendas became the reference points for political and 
economic actors, and even though it is possible to argue that they have 
significantly shaped actors' interpretive capacities for cosmological issues 
and human relations, it remains unpersuasive as the ultimate conclusion. 
What remains unexamined is its deep immersion in the premise of its own 
research agenda: it is only through the civilizational background, only 
within the civilizational legacy, that actors become actors and that they are 
understood as counter-actors by the other actors. While it is also irreducibly 
true that major religions in world history engage in socio-political and 
economic agendas to varying degrees and in different ways, the 
comparative evaluation of religions with their functional contribution to 
societal transformations, in many cases only partially highlights the power 
of religions in terms of encouraging and discouraging actors' particular 
practices. Only thus can actors' practices be understood as a representative 
form of religious influence. It is quite rare to find comparative-historical 
analysis in the converse mode of inquiry: how have political and economic 
actors found their own pragmatic reasons and ways for justifying their own 
activities from these religions in order to accelerate their own practices?
In fact, it is still questionable whether or not comparative-historical 
sociologists could formulate an alternative methodology for new ways of
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comparison in which civilizational heritages are not treated as the po\ 
source determining human practices, but as available resources for part
human practices within practical reasoning. At any rate, however, it w uuiu 
be better to develop the theory of multiple modernities in order to dissolve 
rigidly constructed civilizational boundaries, for which classical sociology is
'  Il l
If the purpose of comparative-historical sociology could be acknowledged as 
the identification of broad meanings for the collective form of human 
practices within particular historical situations, it is suggested that assuming 
the long-term maintenance of something crucial in a given politico-cultural 
boundary, be replaced by the contingent; the long-term accumulation of 
which would be highly influenced by the interactions between actors on the
historical stage. The recognition of the difference between the former
assumption and the latter is inevitable for reconstructing the history of a
collective boundary in multiple modernities. While the purpose of thi ^  ~2£(j 
thesis is to investigate the long-term political transformation of Korea in 
the broad sense, by introducing several cultural elements which are quite 
heterogeneous with those of other regions, I do not intend to introduce the 
Korean experience if jin J  a ample uf nmttiple modernities that would argue 
Korea's different historical path to modernity compared to other regional
experiences. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to investigate how such a 
historically different political path has been wrought over the long-term 
the political tensions among major political actors in each historical per 
Nevertheless, I do not implicitly argue that the historical process
political tensions and related intellectual dehates them selves are examples 
Korean modernity. They are simply resources in the political sphere wl
itself largely responsible. ■" 1 C /  U '1
---- - V^.
help reconstruct modernity for the contemporary Korean context.
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What Norbert ELIAS (2000) assumes, like many other major historical 
sociologists, is the 'West' - Western Europe - as the given boundary in which 
distinctive elements can be illustrated. Even though he adroitly explicates the 
civilizing process for this region, the construction of the idea of the West has 
already been accepted in his conceptualization. Despite the fact that he correctly 
points to the problem of the Parsonian idea of 'the normal state of social 
equilibrium and its violation' by way of arguing that the concepts of the 'long-term 
historical process’ and 'social development' were marginalized by statically- 
oriented sociology of the 1950s and 1960s (pp.449-483), Elias does not clearly 
notice the danger of utilizing concepts such as society and western Europe as 
boundary concepts. While his major foci are the continuous 'internal' changes of 
western Europe, which were used to broadly identify major historical 
configurations of western Europe, he had to implicitly rely on the assumption that 
western Europe is a historical entity that deserves an investigation of its own 
legitimate history. Could western Europe be accepted as a subject in this sense? If 
the answer is yes, is it a temporal agent or permanent one? If no, how is it possible 
to understand the history of human beings in the region without making strong 
boundary distinctions? Such questions generate puzzlement as to his rationale for 
western Europe being treated as an historical entity that could be contrasted with 
its counterparts. More seriously, his analysis gives an impression of constructing a 
history of a European people over long historical periods. In what way can people 
of the twelfth century and of the twenty-first century be seen to have shared 
elements upon which the history of the European people could be constructed? If 
Elias's intention was not to build the history of the European people, but only to 
describe historically the past of European civilization, he should have made more 
explicit the fact that the boundary, western Europe, has been a continuously 
constructed political and cultural entity, in which many elements supporting its
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particular characteristics, have displayed uneven developments in western Europe 
so that their generalization becomes a formidable task. It is also noticeable that his 
way of introducing major civilizational elements is undermined by a kind of 
centre-periphery distinction of influence and expansion. Even though the 
expansion of civilizational elements from one central area or a few multiple 
centers to other peripheries is empirically provable - Elias clearly shows this 
civilizational expansion there is no a priori reason to assume that this process 
should be investigated under the heading of western European civilization. The a 
priori setting of the boundary for civilizational influence, is a very different matter 
from the historical investigation of the civilizing processes. In other words, the 
idea of western Europe is not justifiable from what Elias proves in his empirical 
research. Rather, the idea of the existence of western Europe is the driving force 
of his research.
For the purpose of this thesis, Korea as a nation, or a nation-state, is not treated as 
a historical entity or the Subject of history. One of the reasons for this reservation, 
is to avoid the problems of by-products that occur when it is treated as a territorial 
entity and a political and cultural subject. It is within the relationship with its 
neighbouring states and within the global nation-state system, that Korea unveils 
its meanings, compared with its counterparts. The historical track of political 
tensions among major Korean actors should not be equated with the history of 
politics in Korea. Because as soon as this is assumed, the comparison of Korean 
political actors with those from other regions and states, becomes a comparison 
between Korea and its counterparts. This would mean that boundary-oriented 
theorizing for the historical process could not be fully overcome and the question 
of how to dissolve rigid boundary politics could not be properly dealt with. In 
other words, in order to achieve a proper comparison for political activities among 
collective actors in different contextual backgrounds without depending on the
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investigation of typological collections of cultural elements, itself dependent on a 
strong perception of the existence of the boundary, regarded as the container of 
homogeneous elements for internal members and thereby highly heterogeneous 
for others, should be deconstructed.
4. The place of Korean experience in multiple modernities
The major research trend in regional studies is boundary-oriented. Japanese 
studies, for example, has been considerably shaped by the implicit assumption of 
the existence of Japaneseness. In the same way as French upper class culture was 
implicitly identified as French culture itself in Elias's work on the history of 
manners, many sociologists look to identify certain peculiar characteristics from 
the activities of some Japanese actors so as to identify them as authentic features 
of Japanese modernity. By using the heavily loaded a priori assumption of the 
distinctive character of 'Japan', 'the Japanese' and 'Japaneseness', some scholars 
fail to recognize the existence of diverse political orientations among Japanese 
actors. Needless to say, this intellectual phenomenon has been influenced by 
historical research on Japanese civilization. On the opposite side of this trend, 
there is another perspective on 'modem Japanese society'. Some sociological 
research spotlights contemporary Japan rather than its long-term civilization, in 
the observation of Japan as a highly industrialized society and its social strata as 
similar to European and American societies (Sugimoto, 1997). In a sense, this 
perspective intends to find some compatible elements from modernized Japanese 
society, in order that Japan and other industrial countries could be situated on the 
same level of societal configuration. It goes without saying that boundary- 
centered or society-centered theorizing undermines any research for possible 
conceptual resemblance between the Japanese experience and its European and 
American counterpart (SHIN Jong-Hwa, 1999). Even though the investigation of
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the contemporary stratification of Japanese society is one way of pursuing 
plausible comparisons, it does not clearly provide alternative answers to the 
Eliasian idea o f the consequences of the civilizing process in Japan when the 
causes of modem rupture becomes the theme of inquiry. In other words, internal 
features of contemporary Japanese society for some scholars could only be 
investigated in a way of either to some extent ignoring the particular historical 
backgrounds o f modem Japanese society or implicitly depending on the 
civilizational and cultural backgrounds for the identification of its long-term 
societal transformation. What kinds of theoretical lessons for multiple modernities 
can we learn from the overall historical transformation of Japan? Once the 
comparison based on the assumption of collective boundaries is considerably 
dismissed in this thesis, this question remains open.
If the Korean experience is regarded as an example of multiple modernities, it is 
not because the political boundary itself - which has been called Korea, as well as 
Chosun, Koryo, Balhae/Shilla, etc. -, has its own distinctive political and cultural 
color. Rather it is because the actors in Korean history generally, have shown 
themselves to be a good example for evaluating modernity. There have been a 
number of political actors who have dealt with their own political agendas within 
their world views, knowledge systems and political orientations. Regardless of 
quite different historical trajectories, the compatibility of the Korean experience 
with others under the title of multiple modernities, can be adduced - but should be 
further supported by continued research - both from the way in which human 
practices have emerged in their collective form, with their own political 
orientations, and in the relationship to other actors within a boundary. Korea 
should be identified by actors as their primary political theatre in which to present 
their own visions. In this sense, the so-called Korean experience, Korean 
modernity, Korean history and even Korean actors are no more than simply
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metaphors introduced for describing some historical phenomena in the implicit 
comparison with its counterparts. Hence, the investigation of some influential 
elements for cultural resources in Korean history is beyond the aim of this thesis.
4.1. Korea as the political theatre and Korea as the political project 
Chapter 1 is basically concerned with the development of Confucian ideology, 
which reshaped the traditional Korean state, Chosun, in considerably different 
ways to the precedent states. A group of Neo-Confucian politicians and literati 
gained an alternative political orientation in relation to the preceding aristocrats of 
the Koryo state. Even though Confucianism in the history of the states in the East 
Asian region covering the 'Chinese, Japanese and Korean world'13 was deeply 
involved in state affairs and a number of high bureaucrats could broadly be 
categorized as Confucian literati, the history of the rise of each state in 
dynasty-form includes little contribution from the Confucian literati. Once 
established, however, the role of Confucians in administrative affairs, the 
education of upper classes including royal families and management for 
socio-ethical and politico-cultural issues in the state becomes apparent. It is 
necessary here to note that their roles are limited under the power of kingship and 
aristocracy. In many cases, it can be argued, aristocrats with Confucian 
knowledge had these roles in the state. In other words, their roles mainly occurred 
after the state had been established, once its predecessors had declined through 
military conflicts. The rise of Chosun in regional history could be understood as 
an exceptional case for Confucians. What they achieved is more than 'successful 
management of bureaucratic affairs'. Neo-Confucian literati at the end of Koryo 
and at the beginning of Chosun, for the Korean context, took the role of changing 
the state itself as much as of providing new political visions for the state. In order
13) See conceptual excursus 3 at the end of this introduction.
-  29
to understand the political activities of the Neo-Confucian literati, it is necessary 
to know not only the contents of Neo-Confucian doctrines in general, but also the 
actual process of realizing Neo-Confucianism within the politics of the new state.
In chapter 1 I intend to take distance from the mode of inquiry relating to 
Confucianism in general and Neo-Confucian doctrines in particular as providing 
political motives for Neo-Confucian political literati as their intellectual resource 
for dealing with socio-political agendas. Rather, I try to provide a answer to 
another mode of inquiry as to how the Neo-Confucian literati politically utilized 
Neo-Confucian doctrines as the method of presenting justification for their 
political activities. In other words, Neo-Confucianism as a whole, for example, 
which has been understood as the key element with which the characteristics of 
the traditional nation-state, Chosun, should be distinctively grasped, is not the 
purpose of the first chapter. Accordingly, the explanations of the initial 
development of Neo-Confucian thought in Song China and its introduction in 
Koryo via Yuan China will not be my concern. Rather, I will investigate the 
powerful representation of Neo-Confucian thought by actors in relation to their 
involvement in politics in late Koryo and the whole period of Chosun in order to 
overcome the problem, as evidenced by some sociologists, of constructing 
symbolic actors for representing a political class, a religious group, or a nation in 
describing the long-term historical process. If I followed the lead of earlier 
sociology of'Korean modernity', I would accept the categories, the yangban class, 
the Confucian class, or the Korean, in contrasting them with the aristocrats, the 
Buddhist, the Japanese or the Chinese. It would be problematic to make an unified 
category, around which the existence of strong political tension between several 
Confucian literati, aristocrats, and Koreans is ignored. As an example, the fact that 
Confucian literati broadly who shared the basic idea of political and economic 
reforms finally fragmented in the face of the issue of abolishing Koryo and
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building Chosun, could indicate that there were some crucial elements for their 
own political decisions beyond the political essence of Neo-Confucian doctrines. 
At the same time, some aspects of the power struggles among the state elite at the 
beginning of Chosun, through which the power balance between the kingship and 
the Confucian bureaucrats was inverted gradually, unveils the existence of diverse 
political interpretations of Neo-Confucian doctrines.
The overall relationship between the kingship and the Confucian bureaucrats and 
literati, needs to be investigated in order to fully understand the particular 
characteristics of Neo-Confucian politics in the Chosun context. The aristocratic 
tradition in the previous states changed considerably in Chosun. While the 
importance of familial lineage in socio-political life for the Yangban class was 
still maintained, the economic and rather absolute physical power in local areas 
and partly in central politics disappeared once Neo-Confucian doctrines became 
powerful tools, determining the direction of socio-ethical issues. The 
Neo-Confucian bureaucrats and literati instigated their own political roles within 
the state and for the nation, developing an institutional framework of instructive 
recommendation for kingship and a guideline for bureaucrats themselves. It is 
within this process that the power of the kingship over bureaucrats and literati was 
diminished. Due to the established ethical codification of the role of kingship for 
the nation, the kingship in most royal and state affairs had to follow the 
bureaucrats' proposals and advice based on customized Neo-Confucianist rules of 
the state. At the same time, the overall stabilization of the political structure was 
accompanied by continuous political confrontation among several factions of 
Neo-Confucian literati, who intellectually and politically reinterpreted any minor 
agendas in state affairs according to their knowledge of Confucianism.
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These particular processes of Confucian politics, which were more distinctively 
institutionalized in the late Chosun period, have been investigated in Korean 
studies as a historical origin of 'civil society' for the Korean context. The debate 
on civil society with a Neo-Confucian style of politics in Chosun suggests once 
again the reconsideration of two important theoretical questions for a comparative 
understanding of political culture. Firstly, how could diverse political 
developments in different regions be meaningfully made compatible from the 
comparative perspective, using a the conceptual tool initially developed from one 
specific example? How could theoretical concepts maintain their explanatory 
power when they are introduced in different contextual situations? Secondly, if 
this is impossible, what kinds of data should alternatively be considered for a 
comparison between the Korean case and European ones? In order to provide 
plausible answers to these questions, I will broadly describe in the first chapter, 
the development of Neo-Confucian politics and will point to its particular 
characteristics, including its consequences in the war with the Japanese state and 
the change of the Chinese states.
If the first chapter is written with the purpose of reconsidering the meanings of 
Neo-Confucian politics in Chosun, the second chapter is mainly concerned with 
its transformation and subsequent break-down in the Korean context. Two 
different intellectual and political flows are introduced: one outcome derives from 
the Confucian heritage in replacing Neo-Confucian doctrine; the other, from a 
non-Confucian tradition of religious and political movements. Intellectuals in 
Chosun were subject to the Neo-Confucian environments existing in politics and 
philosophical knowledge systems.14 While the basic requirements for the
14) The introduction of the concept of the intellectual in the Korean 
context, would be problematic if a European origin, with particular English,
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intellectual life of any thinker in Chosun period were to have their own views on 
Neo-Confucianism, any new philosophical and cosmological view received 
serious evaluation from the literati class and political elite. The production of an 
alternative paradigm beyond the orthodox views, on Confucianism in general and 
Neo-Confucianism in particular, had to be accompanied by a radical change of 
social ethics. Under this intellectual condition, no scholars or intellectuals were
French, German or Russian connotations, were to be transposed without 
consideration of the particularity of the Korean situation, but will be 
loosely used for indicating some intellectual terrain in Korean history: see, 
Charle (2000); KANG Soo-Taek (2001). Most of all, the contemporary 
Korean translation of the intellectual - *| ^  ■?] or *] ^  'J] - cannot be 
found in any political discourse or actual political disputes in Chosun. 
Besides, compared to their European counterparts, the socio-political groups 
who raised their voices in the traditional Korean context had different 
social bases, but also quite different political orientations and a different 
idea of politics and social ethics. As some of the major political conflicts 
show, the conflict itself was not differentiated from philosophical and 
ethical views. For this reason, the categorical distinction between state elite, 
bureaucrats, scholars in the state institution, and ordinary literati situated 
outside of the state, was unclear when political disputes occurred. Also, 
there was no clear antagonism between the state and intellectuals, because 
almost all major debates were concerned with certain policy orientations 
toward state affairs. However, both the practice-oriented interpretation of 
political and ethical agendas, and the highly loaded moral ideas in dealing 
with public issues meant that traditional Korean intellectuals were not an 
organized group but rather maintained tensions in diverse flows with other 
competitive actors, i.e., the kingship, other Confucian bureaucrats or 
political factions.
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successful at inaugurating the representation of their political - which had to be at 
the same time philosophical - projects in Chosun, even though a number of 
reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals endeavored to introduce alternative policy 
agendas and to formulate their own philosophical paradigm. Unlike the 
well-educated literati and experienced bureaucrats, the peoples' movements for 
socio-political reform in the nineteenth century were mainly sustained by religious 
ideas and cosmological views different from Confucianism. While the economic 
and political reasons for some revolts against the local administrative structure 
were flamed by antagonism to the yangban class, these revolts became more 
powerful when the leaders raised the issue of a new state, religion, class liberation 
or nationalism, especially when the state elite could not secure the future of 
Chosun at the end of the nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, the process of producing an alternative political and intellectual 
paradigm against Neo-Confucianized societal rules was finally broken without 
changing Chosun. This, was mainly because the objects of abomination, 
Neo-Confucian doctrines, Confucianized Chosun society, the yangban class and 
kingship eventually disappeared in the colonization by the Japanese empire, a 
newly emergent regional power for the first time. The tension between Korean 
actors on conventional socio-political issues and the possible transformation of 
Chosun as the consequence of their power conflicts, were transformed as a result 
of the crisis of state sovereignty, which introduced alternative modernization 
paradigms from the European world. The socio-ethical issues dominated by 
Confucian vocabularies were radically replaced by political and economic 
agendas for the modernization of Chosun. The reformist policies for the abolition 
of the traditional class system, gender discrimination and the constitutional 
reshaping of the state, which would normally occur after conflictual intellectual 
debates and even political conflicts in the national level, were treated as mere
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by-products of emergency measures for the state crisis. The second and following 
chapters will aim to show how the Korean community itself became fragmented 
into diverse orientations with rigid antagonistic standpoints, despite the 
all-pervasive state- and nation-centered attitude of political actors, current since 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Chapter 2, especially, will describe the 
illusion of the homogeneous community, in face of the crisis of state sovereignty 
and the genesis of modernist alternatives.
The colonial experience in the first half of the twentieth century facilitated strong 
modernist inclinations for political actors. Increased role of the state, especially, 
for reorganizing society, conspicuous in the economic and political activities of 
the colonial state, became the central issue for Korean actors. While political 
suppression by the colonial state led to a strong reaction from many Koreans - but 
not all! economic transformation proceeded under Japanese military 
expansionism, which not only accelerated industrialization of the economic 
structure, but also changed the class structure from the traditional status hierarchy 
to that of capitalism. The symbolic power of kingship and the ethical codes from 
Neo-Confucian doctrines in Chosun were replaced by the power of the state itself 
and newly established modem laws. The colonial state could not control society 
without a new legal apparatus and institutional settings, including an 
administrative structure.
Research on what occurred and what changed in the colonial period has been one 
of the most sophisticated themes of Korean studies. In short, two modernist views 
- the nationalist and the developmentalist • have shaped the basic interpretation of 
historiography for the colonial experience, especially the impact of the colonial 
state as the symbol of Japanese influence. These views maintain two extremes
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based on different methodological standpoints. For instance, the nationalist 
perspective based on the binary opposition between we, the victims, Koreans and 
they, the aggressors, the Japanese has a rigid idea of national community. At the 
same time, strong counter-factual claims on what could have occurred, if Japan 
had not occupied Korea, increased the nationalist idea. Of course, the emphasis on 
the early modernization process effected by Korean actors in the pre-colonial 
period had a strong input. Consequently, such theorizing cannot be excluded from 
the critique of developmentalism. The developmentalist view clearly assumes the 
existence of an asymmetric difference of institutional qualities between what 
could be found in Korea under the Japanese influence, on the one hand, and what 
had already existed and what was introduced, but never fully practiced, before 
Japanese occupation, on the other. Economic developmentalism was deeply 
influenced by the assumption of 'what the modem is', as the foundation for 
comparison. The historical models with which the Korean example is compared in 
many cases are European and Japanese. For that reason, in spite of their 
non-nationalistic temper, boundary-oriented typological comparison for different 
economic structures under modernist orientation is subject to a normative critique 
of developmental nationalism in Korean and Japanese studies. Chapter 3 
introduces some debates on economic transformation related to the colonial 
policies for re-evaluating modernist discourse in Korean studies.
The overall conclusions from the colonial experience - making a strong 
nation-state with economic prosperity within the republican fotm of the state, 
rather than either constitutional monarchy, on the one hand, and radical political 
alternatives to bourgeois democracy, on the other - were accepted by major 
Korean actors. However, the ways in which Korean actors pursued an independent 
nation-state in new international circumstances were firmly linked to the new 
Western and Japanese solutions for modernization that criticized the
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Neo-Confucian past of the state. Although many intellectuals and even the 
political trajectories of the transformative period of Chosun before colonization 
included the themes of the restructuring of the state and national economy as well 
as universal freedom and a civilizational alternative, these political orientations 
were mobilized by knowledge systems that were under the influence of the 
Neo-Confucian socio-political matrix. Thus, it can be argued that Korean actors 
interpreted newly introduced alternatives under the traditional knowledge system, 
and that, in the process of identifying similar political and ethical elements, many 
Koreans welcomed the modem alternatives without fully rejecting the former. In 
the same vein, one could argue that a mixed form of political and ethical 
framework occurred from the combination of the two, rather than privileging the 
latter over the former. In contrast, the fact that concrete solutions for the emergent 
political and economic agendas of the state and nation were sought in the Western 
and Japanese experience, may point in another direction. The change in the tools 
for justification in intellectual debates and public discourse was more clearly 
observable when major political actors criticized their political counterparts. The 
occurrence of military conflicts between socialist and communist groups, on the 
one hand, and the proponents of Korean participation in the colonial state and 
other nationalists of the right, on the other, was driven by their antagonistic 
interpretations of the other side, due to accumulated negative imageries which 
occurred in practice once they had developed their own political and economic 
alternatives for the future of Korea. While chapter 3 partly illustrates the 
transformation of major political actors in terms of their constructive ideas for the 
political and economic agenda, chapter 4 is mainly concerned with their 
ideological and military clashes within the actual process of building an 
independent nation-state.
The division of the Korean peninsula and the emergence of two Korean states in
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the South and North and their conflict known as the Korean war can be 
understood as the main events in the post-colonial historiography of Korea in the 
1940s and 1950s. Also, while the Korean situation considerably fuelled the 
ideological tension of the cold war, the rationale based on antagonism in the 
Korean peninsula has shaped the current status of two Korean states and peoples' 
lives. Regrettably, it is still an on-going process in Korea. The investigation of the 
influences of the Korean war in the socio-political development of South Korea 
and the process of its economic modernization should start from the question of 
how two Korean states were established before the Korean war and of how the 
Korean war changed the political situation for the states. In short, without an 
understanding of the political origins of the Korean war as the legacy of the 
colonial experience, the nature of the military conflict could not be correctly 
understood. While it should be acknowledged that the Korean war in some cases 
includes elements of the international war in which a number of states were 
involved, it should be recognized that the Korean war was the main phase of a 
broader civil war in Korea. If any historiography ignores the character of civil war 
in investigating the Korean war, then, it would be classified as an inter-state war. 
In extending this perspective, the political situation in South Korea at that time 
would be ignored as a non-significant variable for understanding the Korean war. 
In chapter 4, I raise the issue of the tension in the historiography of the Korean 
war by unveiling the existence of the dilemmas in interpreting the actual process 
of the post-colonial politics. Even the recognition of the day the war began and the 
day it ended is shaped by a subjective position. The issue of responsibility for the 
occurrence of the Korean war is a subjective judgement for major political actors 
including the states involved.
While chapter 4 investigates the role of the war in symbolically transforming the 
ideology of some mere political actors to that of the South Korean state itself,
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chapter 5 elucidates the process of how the state became the main force for 
modernization in South Korea. Treating the state as an independent political actor, 
in reality the most powerful actor, in the Korean context requires the critical 
evaluation of a basic premise of the theory of civil society: the relationship 
between state and society. A predominant interest of the political sciences in civil 
society in the 1990s derives from global political changes. The fragmentation of 
the former-soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and flourishing democratic movements 
in some countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and South America, for 
example, meant that civil society as a political theme highlighted the democratic 
alternative to an authoritarian state, whereas the regulation of the market was the 
focus for the North American debate on civil society. The theoretical construction 
of the existence of (civil) society outside the state and the market in the political 
theory of democracy of the 1990s, in many cases ignores two facts. Firstly, civil 
society cannot be fully organized as one political society with diverse political 
orientations. Secondly, and more seriously, the anti-thesis, the state, has been 
developed within the societal environment where some groups of political actors 
within the boundary are in charge of state power. In other words, the conflict 
between civil society and state is in fact the conflict between political actors 
within society. While the identification o f democratic actors finds the subject for 
political development in civil society, the problematic political actors, who 
initially arose from society and subsequently transformed themselves into the state 
elite, assume to be independent of societal influences.
The contemporary history of democratic movements in South Korea and the 
state-centered modernization process illustrate how the state gained power over 
society and how a few political actors enjoyed state power within the construction 
of the authoritarian state. The particularity of the Korean situation could be 
explained by the historical observation that the process of making a new
-  39 -
nation-state after the colonial experience did not proceed on the basis of an overall 
consensus of major political actors, without which the creation of state legitimacy 
was at stake. Such a consensus was not possible when some political groups 
transformed themselves into state power and others disappeared. The initial 
problem of state legitimacy occurring in the 1940s and 1950s and the 
undemocratic maintenance of state institutions by a military elite and technocrats 
until 1980s, could be taken to show how the South Korean state has become 
alienated from societal influence. However, political actors including democratic 
movement groups in that period have focused on the power of the state in order to 
achieve their own political and economic visions. The binary opposition between 
state and society cannot fully explain the formation of the state-centered idea of 
politics for counter-state actors' political alternatives, as well as how the major 
state-elite and a supportive conservative network treated the state, in order to 
maintain or extend their own political power over counter-state actors.
The relationship between the state elite and counter-state actors became the 
political background for the growth of the South Korean economy. State-centered 
economic modernization in South Korea was the consequence of the conflictive 
political process of the post-war situation. Political suppression of democratic 
movements and systematically organized industrial policies for development 
occurred as the realization of political justification of the lack of legitimacy for 
maintaining state power. In short, economic growth has been the source of 
political legitimacy for the Korean context. At the same time, faced with 
economic crises, the state responded with severe political suppression of 
democratic movements.
Since the late 1980s, there has been a significant socio-political transformation in
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South Korea, in which the relationship between political actors is undergoing 
radical change. The tension between the state and counter-state actors has changed 
to a state of multiple tensions among political actors. While the state has lost its 
physical power over democratic actors, counter-state actors have also become 
disunited in fragmentation. An analysis of the changing relationship between 
democracy and economic development, needs to explain the way in which the 
political structure under the influence of the authoritarian state is changing and 
what kinds of new qualifications for leading the public sphere are now required. 
The existence of a deep correlation between democracy and economic 
development replaced earlier debates on the implications of religion and the type 
of state for economic development and political democracy (Lipset, 1959), 
although it did not adequately address the effect of cultural influences on 
economic and political activities. Even though some scholars in this field have 
argued that the driving force of democratization is the working class, rather than 
other economic actors, they do not clearly foresee the direction of democratization 
because they fail to address the question of what kinds of new political agendas 
will replace the conventional ones of welfare and political freedom based on legal 
status. The Korean situation in the 1990s and onwards, for example, as the period 
for a new political configuration, shows the rise of local issues, based on local 
historical and cultural experiences, as well as the global issues of economy, 
ecology and the human rights movements. In other words, the correlation between 
economic development and democratization could not comprehensively account 
for the on-going transformation in the political and economic sphere including 
changes of political actors themselves.
It is arguable that South Korea has become democratized. However, it is not due 
to the transformation of the economic sphere including economic development, 
even though strong workers movements have made a big impact on politics. It is,
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rather, peoples' increased political consciousness through the observation of or 
participation in, a series of political conflicts and disputes over political issues and 
their increased role in the decision making process in the political sphere that 
enables the tensions between state and society, or between political actors to 
change direction. The state elite's ultimate acknowledgement of the impotence of 
their previous measures - physical suppression for example - in dealing with 
democratic movements at the pivotal point of political tension could be 
understood this way. At the same time, the incompetence of both state elite and 
the conservative network as against counter-state actors, in dealing with newly 
emerging economic and political issues could also be interpreted likewise. 
Chapter 6 looks at major political phenomena after the collapse of the 
authoritarian state, where this dynamic of South Korean politics, saw the 
emergence of many political actors unwilling to compromise with competing 
actors. Even though the observation that South Korean politics has been 
democratized is acceptable - as long as there would be no serious objection the 
problematic tradition of antagonism against other political actors is still 
maintained while the political structure and power relations have changed. Given 
the fact that rigid political tensions among political actors are seldom solved, the 
future of Korean politics seems uncertain in terms of anticipating the further 
progress of democratic achievements, as well as economic developments under 
the conventional standpoint of the economic theory of democracy.
4.2. Changing political tensions and the transformation o f political actors
The overall structure of this thesis is configured so as to make a historical map of 
political tensions, significant ruptures and major political actors over the last six 
hundred years of Korean history. In such a schematic approach, many events and 
related political actors and intellectuals may be excluded. The North Korean
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experience is barely included in this thesis. This is, above all, due to the lack of 
materials available to me, supplying condensed descriptions of long-term 
development of political tensions for the North Korean state. However, it should 
be acknowledged that this is not fully justifiable and privileges the South Korean 
experience in the last four chapters: without a balanced investigation of the North 
Korean experience for the comparative perspective, the South Korean counterpart 
could not be properly understood. In mitigation, I direct the readers attention once 
more to the aim of my thesis which does not intend to introduce the Korean 
experience as a boundary-based example of multiple modernities, but rather, to 
reconsider the meaning of long-term political transformation and societal changes, 
driven by the consequences of inter-subjective relationships among political actors 
in particular situations.
The basic assumption underpinning this thesis is that many ^orks—in—the-^
comparative-historical field are shaped by two problematic attitudes which are not
generally dealt with by comparative sociologists in a critical way: firstly, the
influence of classical sociology, emphasizing//epochal rupture^and ^boundary- j  /
oriented theorizir\g/of collective identity; secondly, the implicit acceptance of a ' 
--------------------- ----------------------------- --------------------------- -------------------------
long-term continuity of collective identity under the power of the socio-£ultural 
matrix, rather than highlighting the diverse presentations of the capacities of 
human beings dealing with their necessary agendas and their own normative 
orientations toward particular situations. In the first chapter I introduce Chosun as 
a new nation-state, different from previous states in the Korean context, in order 
to argue that political transformation determining the path for a national 
community has occurred, not only on a different time-scale, but also in a different 
direction from other regional examples. In this way, I introduce, in chapter 2 and 
3, the imagery of modem rupture in the Korean context which was shaped by 
Korean actors' experiences, even though major political actors welcomed new
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alternatives from the European and North American experiences. Chapter 4, 5, 6 
show how competing political and economic ideas have together shaped Korean 
politics, while chapter 7 opens new possibilities for the coming political project, 
the (re)unification of Korea. Needless to say, political actors and their antagonistic 
attitudes have made for a dynamic political transformation, as well as related 
societal changes. The remaining questions concerning the evaluation of boundary 
politics, for a sociological view beyond civilizational analysis and 
boundary-oriented comparative sociology, could only be answered by way of 
identifying the directions of some discourses on regional integration and on-going 
national developments. In chapter 7, I introduce the necessity of historical 
reasoning for how boundary politics should be treated in the new political project. 
In spite of the fact that Korean (re)unification is de facto nothing other than the 
national project, the unification of the two Korean states could fundamentally 
change the political geography, and thereby increase geometrically freedom and 
democracy, which has been restricted because of the hostility between the two 
states. The democrats' advocacy of unification and their reasoning for the national 
project provide an example of the particular political implication of boundary 
politics, through which a rigid political boundary is itself deconstructed. At the 
same time, the socio-political integration of European nation-states could be 
recognized within the extension of the Korean implication of making new 
boundary politics. European integration for the democratic vision, not as the idea 
of restoring civilizational heritages or extending them into the new borders, but 
with the idea of dissolving national boundaries through overcoming several 
political and economic problems, also provides a good example of the historical 
understanding of boundary politics. In short, if European integration is to proceed 
further and if Korean reunification is to be achieved in the near future, it is 
necessary to be aware of the status quo of boundary politics for the double 
identification of the remaining role of boundary politics for democracy, on the one
hand, and its possible danger in being open to nationalist or regionalist perversion, 
on the other.
Conceptual Excursus»
1. It seems necessary to clarify what I mean by political actors in order to 
understand the process o f political transformation. In fact, for a reader who 
has followed the debate on the relationship between 'agency' and 'structure' 
in sociology - for an understanding of this debate, see Archer (1995) -, the 
conceptual tools of political actors need to be explained in terms of the 
conceptual relationship between 'agential power1 and 'overloaded structural 
influence' in the actual process of practice by actors. Insofar as one is not 
concerned with constructing a general theory of action covering all human 
activities - which is not the intention of the thesis there is a practical 
way of recognizing actors' practices. Significantly, except for some 
phenomena regarded as natural events, the actors' 'track of practices' are 
discovered through political events as the relational form of practices 
linking actors within a particular situation. Even though there must be 
enough room for interpreting their activities as 'role plays', and in this 
sense, of recognizing the given power of the structural element, there is 
also the space for identifying their treatment of structures by way of an 
instrumental orientation as a possible resource for actors' purposes. The 
theoretical tension between these different interpretations of human action 
becomes serious only when confronted by the following type of question: 
why did it - an event, for example - happen through them at that time 
rather than through others in a different place and in a different time?; 
how is it possible to make it - an institutional model, for example - 
applicable for different places? While the former mainly concerns
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particularity and specificity, the latter highlights generality and commonality. 
At the same time, whereas the former is intended to produce the 
interpretation of the event which had already occurred, the latter is intended 
to extend its applicability for further practice. However, they are of course 
intertwined with each other in many practical ways. None of these question 
types are seriously dealt with in this thesis, even though some causes for 
the occurrence of events are introduced and some experiences from the 
transformation of Korean society may provide some meaningful lessons.
There are some theoretical merits in ignoring those questions. First of all, 
in so doing, the strong assumption of the existence of cultural 
particularities and civilizational heritages, or of any structural causes, partly 
loses its ground. Consequently, rather than identifying detailed causal 
backgrounds in the investigation of how political actors achieved or failed 
to attain their political ambitions in face of other actors' interventions, such 
an approach requires the dynamic explanation of several elements for the 
occurrence of political events. From the point of view of the actor, the 
recognition of pressure from any external causes - enforced particular 
response modes from given rules, for example - other than own 
self-disciplined decision, is largely dependent on the actor's own
interpretation o f the gap between the normal relationship - the acceptable 
one, provoking no special consideration by the actor; voluntary 
embodiments and given instructions, and the abnormal relationship - the 
emergent tension between the actor's personal judgement and required 
actions.
This thesis tries to show that the political actors are continuously 
influenced by political events, and that contradictions arise in their
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transaction with different political agendas - one could understand this 
either as the incomplete role play of agents, or disorganized practices by 
autonomous actors. Political actors are flexible and at the same time not 
fully controllable by any instruction. At least, it will be shown that the 
grand classificatory titles - Neo-Confucian literati, for example - given to 
some political actors are not comprehensively explanatory for the 
investigation of specific events in which they take part An advantage 
gained from this would be a possible openness when comparing different 
political actors and their different forms of institutional practices in a broad 
comparison concerning their historical necessities justified by the actual 
practitioners in the particular historical period.
In order to formulate a proper comparative tool for diverse political actors 
in different political periods, there seem to be several theoretical 
requirements for answering the three questions which are very generally 
raised for comparative-historical sociology. Paraphrasing for the Korean 
experience, these questions are: first, how is it methodologically possible to 
compare the Neo-Confucian political elite in the late fourteenth century and 
modernists in the late nineteenth century or socialists in the 1940s?; 
second, although it is possible to utilize a comparative tool for this 
purpose, is the comparative tool contributive to understanding their different 
political ideas and different piactical modes in different circumstances?; 
third, what is the basic purpose of mapping those historical actors with the 
comparative tool, or for which theoretical reasoning can they be taken as 
examples? - Sewell introduces similar questions for doubting the validity of 
a comparison between different historical actors and different historical 
phenomena in his critique of the teleological understanding of historical 
sociology. See Sewell (1996).
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While it is a truism that political actors are temporal and situated in a 
specific phase of history, the way of comparing them should not depend on 
an asymmetric balance in which one actor's ideas and practices become the 
basic standard for comparison. In other words, neither the modernist idea in 
the late nineteenth century nor Neo-Confucian thought of the fourteenth 
century, nor the socialist visions of the 1940s should be used as the 
standard for comparison imposed on the others. A comparative tool should 
be created to some extent by the author's own will, which would provide 
the freedom for conceptualization of empirical-historical examples under the 
awareness of its historical necessity for certain political projects of her/his 
own time- Wagner introduces some examples of intellectual intervention in 
the transformative period in the history of the social sciences and of a new 
necessity of renewing the intellectual tradition in the current European 
situation (see, Wagner 1996, 1994). It is also possible to link some works 
distancing one's own position from the dominant intellectual circumstances 
in order to critically evaluate them, so as to suggest a new 
conceptualization for interpreting historical phenomena (see, Husserl 1997, 
for example). Historically, most political actors in the Korean experience 
have been shaped by strong political orientations based on their own 
normative foundations, even though their cosmological views diverge. 
Because actors faced strong reactions by counter-actors to their political 
orientations and underpinning normative foundations with regard to their 
concrete political agendas, most political confrontations show a serious 
conflictive character rather than compromise-oriented negotiation. This thesis 
mainly focuses on how the political relationship between Korean political 
actors has been shaped in this way. Such a primary observation on some 
basic elements of political actors in different political situations, despite its
48 -
very low level of theorizing, enables social theorists to rethink the 
meanings of modem political actors in the Korean context under the 
awareness of their historical predecessors. This does not directly mean that 
modem political actors are still influenced by civilizational heritages or that 
they share cultural elements with traditional political actors. Rather, by 
arguing the existence of similar modes of political activities - deliberately 
drawn in conceptualization their differences in political visions and their 
detailed agendas are more distinctively understood.
2. This problem could also be understood in the broad sense as the 
dilemma of the academic discipline of comparative-histoncal sociology in 
general.
"Comparative sociology refers to cross-cultural and/or cross-national 
research, and also includes comparisons of civilizations, historical 
periods, regions, communities, and institutional sectors. Historical 
sociology refers to studies that examine processes over time and that 
describe and explain social phenomena that have been delimited 
historically. Comparative-historical sociology is thus interpreted to 
encompass a wide variety of theoretical positions, methodological 
styles, and substantive topics.”
The above definition of the disciplinary field of comparative-historical 
sociology provided by the American Sociological Association - see, 
Comparative and Historical Sociology Homepage:
http://www.sla.purdue.edu/academic/soc/comphist/sectionpage.html - reflects 
the general research approach in that field. Widely assumed comparative 
methods and the objects of comparison and their temporal presentations are 
encompassed within the ambit of the broad disciplinary framework. 
However, if there is a problematic aspect to the above understanding, it is 
the constructionist attitude towards making ideal-types for defining its tasks. 
Methodologically, if any researcher accepts the comparative idea as outlined
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above, he/she would have fixed conceptions on culture(s), nation(s) and 
civilization(s) before a comparative work is undertaken. One would think 
that to have knowledge of these objects of comparison could only be 
attained by historical research on them. However, empirical research on the 
historical formation of these cultures, nations and civilizations does not 
necessarily guarantee the required factual evidence that each has its own 
distinctive features for comparison, unless the factual evidence does not 
itself rely on conceptual tools or strong assumptions for conceptualization. 
Of course, the validity of conceptual tools is verified by the empirical 
research. The problematic relationship between conceptual tools and their 
objects is that at the deep level they are both inter-dependent and at the 
same time inter-supportive for the production of comparative knowledge. In 
short, in order to facilitate research on cross-cultural, cross-national or 
cross-civilizational comparison, there are two prerequisites: empirical 
knowledge of the objects of comparison; and a conceptual assumption. 
However, what is the purpose of comparative sociology? Is it not to gain 
advanced knowledge of the objects of comparison? Ironically, it means that 
comparative sociology in the above definition depends on the validity of a 
prerequisite, which it intends to get in advance.
Often, comparative works of sociology are accustomed to producing 
typological comparisons, or at least, many sociologists do not fully exclude 
the possibility of situating their works within a typological comparison. 
Needless to say, in order to make a typological comparison, any object of 
comparison should have its own categorical place. Ironically, however, 
making a categorical place for objects of comparison should necessitate the 
factual conclusion that such objects exist as empirical entities rather than 
abstract concepts. Cultures and civilizations, not as abstract concepts, but as
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empirical entities, are dependent on other entities in either a negative or 
positive way and on different levels of comparison. While the typological 
comparison itself is intended to produce advanced knowledge for the items 
in comparison, the items gain their distinctive meanings within the 
typological comparison. Regrettably, the general argument that the existence 
of the objects' distinctive features is the precondition for comparison, does 
not secure the validity of comparison once it occurs unless the conceptual 
precondition has already been established. What, then, are the sources of 
conceptual differentiation for the objects of comparison? Only an empirical 
evidence provided by the objects themselves?
It seems considerably problematic to argue that many concepts in 
comparative historical sociology have been introduced in the full awareness 
of their conceptual limits. Culture and civilization, for example, have had 
different connotations for different academic environments which have been 
influenced by particular class and national cultures. Many works on the 
historical development of these concepts and their different usages, at least 
indirectly, show how often the concepts for describing the collective 
features including members within a boundary have been introduced via 
strong political assumptions - and here there are some exemplary works on 
the genealogy of the concepts of culture and civilization (see, Elias, 2000; 
Anderson, 1996; Eagleton, 2000). In fact, sociological works rarely treat the 
concepts as the independent objects of inquiry. Rather, culture and 
civilization normally unveil their meanings when they are matched with a 
boundary-type of object- nations, regions etc. -, or certain social strata with 
class-oriented or any collective form of human activities - religion, for 
example. As the objectives of comparative-historical sociology enunciated by 
the American Sociological Association show, it is cross-national
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comparisons and cross-regional comparisons that better reveal the contents 
of cultures and civilizations.
In how many sociological works in the comparative-historical field have the 
contents of cultures and civilizations been problematized without depending 
on counter-examples from other cultures and other civilizations? Are what 
have been explained and described as the expressive forms of culture and 
civilization persuasively satisfied by the conceptual requirements of those 
concepts? For example, is the required element of a shared commonality 
for the concept of culture really shared by all members of a collective 
organization? Or is a civilizational heritage really shared by all members of 
the civilization? Comparative sociology does not fully investigate its 
research object unless and until it inquires in the validity of cultures and 
civilizations and comprehends the incomplete nature of these concepts, 
largely ignored or by-passed in the field. In a sense, in order to develop 
comparative research, comparative sociology should be dependent on other 
disciplines with regard to the validity of concepts such as culture, nation, 
civilization, institutions, community and regions. In fact, however, is it not 
comparative sociology itself that is the academic discipline which has been 
dedicated to the validity of these concepts and their historical- viz., their 
temporal- forms?
3. It seems necessary to clarify the practical usage of the term, 'Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean world' rather than China, Japan and Korea in this 
thesis. The latter usage is based on the implicit acceptance or the advocacy 
of presentism in the idea of (nation) states in the East Asian region: the 
current status of Chinese, Japanese and Korean states as the narrative 
subjects of political and cultural history. In spite of the fact that there have
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been fewer ethnic states in East Asian history than in European history, the 
history of states in the region shows an uneven development of power 
relations and territorial changes as particular characteristics of regional 
politics, which should not be neglected in regional history, but which are 
normally marginalized in long-term historical analysis.
Whereas pre-modem Japanese history hardly shows any impact for regional 
political order, despite many military conflicts between local semi-state 
powers and some territorial change within the Japanese islands, the history 
of Chinese and Korean states has been deeply related to the rise and fall 
of military semi-states in the Manchu region and in Mongolian
territories. While the Chinese states, in an ethnic perception which is 
widely acknowledged in the region - the Han were twice razed
by Mongolians and Manchurians and ruled by them for nearly four hundred 
years in the last millenium, Korean states had to follow their regional 
political hegemonies. Also, the long-lasting conflicts between Korean states 
in the Korean peninsula and the eventual disappearance of the political 
influence of Korean states in Manchu and the inner-Mongolian area are 
recorded in the regional political history of the first millenium. In other 
words, when the history of the Chinese states is investigated, it is 
impossible to ignore the political occupation by Mongolians and 
Manchurians, while the history of Manchu and Manchurians necessitates the 
consideration of Korean involvement. However, the disappearance of the 
Manchurian state in Manchu and the inclusion of ethnic Manchurians in 
current China, also raise some important questions on the history of 
Chinese states, as well as regional political history. Most of all, the current 
Chinese state itself has a multi-ethnic composition, in spite o f ethnic Hans' 
influential domination of state affairs. Therefore, one could
-  53 -
claim that the collapse of Ming China by Qing in the
seventeenth century and the current occupation of Manchu and the 
inner-Mongol region by the People's Republic of China are political issues 
within China, rather than one of China's relation to other ethnics and their 
previous state - even though there must be different historical 
interpretations for the territory beyond the great-wall, that symbol of 
territorial division between China and other Northern Asian ethnics.
Further, the existence of two separate Korean states in the contemporary 
situation and their rather different construction of historiography concerning 
ancient Korean states, leave unresolved issues for interpreting regional 
history in the intellectual world. The current division of Korea is more 
than the political separation between socialism and anti-communism. The 
capital of South Korea, Seoul, has been regarded as the symbolic centre of 
Korean politics since the fifteenth century, when it was decreed as the 
capital of Chosun. Also, in spite of several territorial changes in northern 
Korea, the states established within the Korean peninsula have been 
regarded by many historians and the political elites for a long time as the 
authentic Korean states which have maintained the genuine Korean culture 
and territory. The northern Korean peninsula, Manchu, inner-Mongol have 
been not only politically and culturally, but also historically marginalized in 
the dominant historiography. However, through the recent development of 
historical and archeological research on northern Korea, Manchu and 
inner-Mongol, especially on the capital of North Korea, Pyongyang, many 
historians began to argue revisionist ideas on the history of Korean states, 
focusing on northern states over the border of the Korean peninsula and 
the current Northern Chinese territory. Available historical resources for 
evaluating the history of the Korean states, historical documents,
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archeological ruins, for example, could prove that the civilizational flow 
before the second millenium came from the North and spread to the South. 
In a sense, the ancient history becomes one of major historical nodal points 
with which the current political situation is reinterpreted. Also, one could 
argue that the current political division provokes radical reinterpretations of 
the history of the Korean state. See, AN Cheon (1995).
The ancient history of Japan and Southern Korea is also contestable. As 
the debate among Japanese and Korean historians over the issue of history 
textbooks in Japan shows, the lack of historical documents and other 
resources have enabled historians in the two countries to interpret their 
national histories in different ways. While some Japanese scholars argue 
that the ancient Japanese state in the first half of the first millenium had 
its own governing territory in the Korean peninsula and its own influential 
power over a Korean state, Baekje («¡Ml many Korean historians and
some Japanese scholars have contradictory claims about how ancient Japan 
was politically and culturally influenced by ancient Korean states, 
especially, Baekje ( SiSf) and Shilla (-Jl 2}$?)$)• Moreover, a few 
historians argue, from historical records proving significant movements of 
peoples between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese islands, that the 
national identities, Korean and Japanese, should be reevaluated for that 
time. See, YEON Min-Soo (1998); CHOI Jae-Seok (1997a, 1997b).
Unlike the strong national historiography of the three nations in Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean studies, the genealogical investigation of the history of 
the states, regional politics and civilizational backgrounds in East Asia 
reveals that the theory of the nation-states in three regional studies have 
their own conceptual problems for these regional studies in explaining own
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national identities and political representations. Consequently, and in order 
not to simply ignore the existence of different ideas for the histories of 
current China, Japan and Korea, the loose expression of 'Chinese, Japanese 
and Korean world' is used for the practical purpose of this thesis.
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1. Neo-Confucianism and the nation-state: modernity and ethics
Introduction: Neo-Confucianism in the political project
Confucianism in Korean studies has been seen as the main civilizational factor for 
Korean history that constructs the overarching framework of social relations in 
general, and economic and political activities in particular. Within the broad 
classification of civilizational boundaries in the classical social sciences, 
Confucianism has been commonly assumed as the image maker of East Asia 
where Korea is geo-culturally located. The two extreme poles of Confucianism; a 
normatively established, negative traditional resource, and the valuable heritage, 
have appealed not only to comparative culturalists in anthropology, but also to 
institutionalists in political economy. These observations for the comparative- 
historical point of view, in fact, are neither true nor false for several reasons, 
depending on how Confucianism is treated in specific research foci. If one wants 
to take the mirror effect from European civilization which developed under the 
influence of'Christianity', it must be possible to similarly consider Confucianism 
for East Asia. However, if it is important to separately identify the contribution of 
Protestantism from that of Catholicism and the Orthodox Church over the last five 
hundred years of European history, the social scientist should be aware of the 
emergence of Neo-Confucianism as a variant of classical Confucianism in China 
in the twelfth century, and its introduction to Korea at least in the early the 
thirteenth century.1 If Judaism ought not to be forgotten for the development of 
Christianity in Europe, its counterpart would be at least partially found in Taoism 
and the Buddhism of East Asia. However, these three ways of comparing 
European history to East Asian history may not be fully acceptable for more
1) The term, Neo-Confucianism, is understood as the translated name of 
Hsing-li hsueh (Sung-Li Hak^ s\ which could literally be taken
to mean "learning of human nature and principle".
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careful scientific inquiries, insofar as these measure the degrees of influence for 
the institution building process of ordinary peoples' epistemological views on the 
universe and overall human relations. At least as far as religion is concerned, the 
broad influence of the coexistence of plural religions for making specific 
characteristics of human relationships in East Asian history in general and the 
Korean one in particular, seems extremely difficult to find in its European 
counterpart (YOON Yee-Heum, 2001). At the same time, however, we still cannot 
avoid introducing Confucianism, in order to grasp something crucial that is 
supposed to exist in East Asia. This ambivalent position should be seriously 
considered, even before the social scientists begin any comparative research. And 
this, because some methodological tools and major concepts developed in the 
social sciences could possibly overinflate an institutional phenomenon which was 
marginal, or could neglect a culturally particular way of political practices which 
was central.
Max WEBER's work on China (1951) seems to straddle the problematic aspects 
of the sociology of religion in the comparative-historical perspective: 
presupposing the autonomous realm of religion for socio-economic activities and 
assuming an implicit connection between religion and geographic boundary. 
Weber does not provide a full explanation for the social process in which certain 
religious ethics are mobilized for providing economic justifications from 
economic actors' points of view: Why were particular religious ethics rather than 
others more welcomed by economic actors? This problem could be extensively 
interpreted. To put it in the form of an opposition of extremes: that Weber ignores 
economic actors' autonomy for promoting capitalism via the secured justificatory 
tools of Protestantism, because he wants to identify the significant influence of 
Protestantism on economic lives, as that which led economic actors to capitalism. 
Within these two opposite theoretical attitudes; the premise of the infinitude of
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human creativity for the former and of the powerful influence, if not determinacy, 
of certain religious ethics for the latter, Weber's writings on the relationship 
between religion and capitalism is open to different theoretical reviews (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 1999). It is also interesting to read Richard H. TAWNEY's (1938) 
understanding of the historical contribution of Puritanism to the rise of English 
capitalism for a comparative understanding of Weber's theoretical assumption: 
"The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.” (Weber, 1996: 
181) "'The capitalist spirit" is as old as history, and was not, as has sometimes 
been said, the offspring of Puritanism. But it found in certain aspects of later 
Puritanism a tonic which braced its energies and fortified its already vigorous 
temper.' (Tawney, 1938: 226)
However, Weber's problem could also be seen in the context of the observation 
that his theoretical interests were to discover a new ethical rupture in the 
economic sphere for his period. While he sees capitalism as producing its own 
economic motives and rationalized justifications for the further process, he 
definitely wanted to grasp what kind of social mechanism had operated at the 
early stage of capitalism, which in his view was now already exhausted (Weber, 
1996). The implications of Weber’s strong assumption that religious ethics 
becomes a dominant social force, raise some problematic aspects for the 
contemporary sociology of religion which became one of the major 
institutionalized fields for comparative-historical sociology. While Weber 
conceptually accepted the historical rupture between the rationalization of 
capitalism and its religious predecessor, at the same time he left the future open, 
in spite of the rise of rationalized capitalist institutions and of a secularization 
process for dealing with overall social agendas in human relations. Because he 
investigated the past as the original formation of capitalism and suggested certain 
linkages between Protestantism and the acceleration of capitalist development.
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some contemporary sociologists of religion seem to be lured by the assumption 
that the past is, or should be, clearly understood in sociological reasoning as the 
foundation of the present condition, while the future is opened as dependent on 
the on-going practices of the present. This becomes a serious problem when they 
are confident in explaining the history of capitalism in Europe, following Weber, 
and have a profit in pursuing Weber's thesis on the historical process of economic 
development for other regions. The common way of developing comparative 
research on the history of economic activities in non-European regions is to build 
theoretical comparisons among different religions, as Weber himself investigated 
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism in the Chinese world. In order to do this, he 
had to formulate the ethical frameworks for these religions so as to enable their 
comparison with Protestantism. However, what Weber partially fails to describe 
for the religions of China is, unlike his writings on European history, particular 
aspects of Chinese politics and its overall social environments. These are difficult 
to compare to the European counterpart, but are crucial for understanding the 
historical setting of the religious realm in the Chinese world. Even though Weber 
does not need to introduce a particular historical setting for Protestantism in 
northern Europe, he should have explicitly introduced this dimension in his study 
o f  the Chinese world. At the same time, while Weber's introduction of Protestant 
ethics into the social and economic sphere was theoretically plausible, in the sense 
that his present was already undermined by the existence of a significant rupture 
in the motivation for economic lives, he sees a rather underdeveloped rupture in 
China in the epochal sense, so that his investigation of Eastern religions becomes 
theoretically less distinctive.
Weber's rather 'unclearly' drawn methodology in his historical research, due to his 
primary interest in the comparative studies on world religions, has been 
reintroduced in the rise of regional studies, where religions become tied to the
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geographical idea of boundary. For early modernization theorists in the 1950s and 
1960s, who exclusively accepted the idea of the universal project of societal 
development, the different states of industrial development could be explained by 
cultural elements, including religions. Some contemporary sociologists of 
religion, who follow Weber, commit a serious error in interpreting Weber’s initial 
idea that identifies the contribution of religions in developing capitalism, in that 
they exclusively accept, in an ahistorical perspective, the power of Protestantism 
beyond its historical conditions in which the religious doctrines and applied 
socio-economic ethics inescapably respond to other realms in solving epochal 
issues, while they implicitly assume other religions in other regions are not 
similarly well bound.
Thus, Weber's problem does not arise from his interest in finding a certain linkage 
between Confucianism and Taoism, and the socio-economic conditions for 
improving economic activities in China. Rather, it comes from his failure to 
examine the particular Chinese situation in which several religions co-existed 
together, their connection with political authority and their influence on the 
individual's identity formation. This problem also appears when interpreters 
attempt to 'correct' Weber.
For contextual reasons we took the liberty of substituting the title "The 
Social Psychology of the World Religions" for the original heading "The 
Economic Ethic of the World Religions, Comparative Essays in the 
Sociology of Religion, Introduction." We have named this volume The 
Religion of China in order to avoid the isms.(ix) (emphasis added)
In spite of a certain overlap between ethics and the cultural domain, on one side, 
and Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, on the other, cultural boundaries and 
religious logics should be separated. In the Chinese context, competing relations 
between several religions - none of these three religions has unilaterally
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dominated religious activities in China - which concern rather different political, 
personal and natural worlds, provided different relationships between religions 
and peoples. Therefore, there was a degree of choice for belief, through which 
people could enjoy rather autonomous religious lives. The predominance of a 
strong national identity for China above that o f  religions could thereby be seen.
Weber further commented on East Asian religions and the futures of the 
Chinese and Japanese economy - 'The Chinese in all probably would be 
quite capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating 
capitalism which has technically and economically been fully developed in 
the modem culture area. It is obviously not a question of deeming the 
Chinese "naturally ungifted" for the demands of capitalism.(p.248)' 
However, it will be beyond my remit to delve further into this aspect of 
Weber's work. My dominant research direction will be based mainly on a 
typological comparison between civilizational elements in the sociology of 
religion and a comparative-historical sociology that draws on Weber's 
contributions.2
This chapter describes the overall role of Neo-Confucianism - which heavily 
informed the political and intellectual world in Chosun3 - rather than investigating
2) Spickard (1998), for example, summarizes the dominant theoretical 
concerns in the sociology of religion under the influence of the Weberian 
tradition: on religious authority, secularization and rational choice. He 
further draws a conclusion that these three paradigms operate within a 
narrow sociological understanding of Confucianism as religion. For earlier 
and broader review on critical appraisals o f  Weber’s sociology of religions, 
see Eisenstadt (1971).
3) 'Chosun (3i'id§i],ti)' as the name of the state of the Korean nation has
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its ethical contribution to economic development, despite its influence on 
economic activities. Its protagonists engaged in political discourses on the subject 
of state reforms for economic policy and regulated and deregulated economic 
policies by putting forward their own alternatives within the broad framework of 
Neo-Confucianism. When dealing with the collapse of 'Koryo (aiej 
(918-1392), the emergence of 'Chosun' in 1392 and its early state formation 
process until the early sixteenth century, it is important to identify how the 
political elite in these periods of the Neo-Confucian world developed the state 
system, one with quite different characteristics from previous states. Since the 
mid-sixteenth century, Chosun entered a stage of long-term political stability, with 
a well-structured state ideology, in spite of a few wars with neighboring states
been used for a long time by several states in different historical time 
periods: (? - 108); (1392-1897); (1948 - ?). One of the reasons why the 
new state in the fourteenth century used Chosun for its name was to 
declare its succession to political authenticity from the ancient state, Chosun 
(ô)-Al-Ô?), which had been widely mentioned as the first state in Korean 
history (HAN Yeong-U, 1989). Chosun, as the official name of the state is 
also being used by the North Korean state in the contemporary political 
scene for the same reason. In order to minimize confusion in indicating 
one of the states from the three above, scholars in Korean studies have 
widely adopted the different names for them: Ancient Chosun ( ü - î d i f  
$!jSi); Chosun/Yi Dynasty/ Yi Chosun; Chosun/North Korea (-” tH fcil). 
These different usages would raise a hermeneutical problem when the 
conceptual clarification between the state and the forms of state are 
confused, when the subjective categorization conflicts with an objective/non 
subjective one. In this thesis, Chosun is only used to indicate the state that 
was built in 1392 and abolished in 1897. See AHN Cheon (1990) for a 
discussion of this issue.
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and the ideological and political conflicts among Confucian literati in domestic 
politics. Finally, the political protagonists of Neo-Confucianism in Chosun were 
confronted by a number of philosophical, political and socio-economic challenges 
from critical Confucian literati and the common people, a situation that became 
critical when confronted with the new international circumstances of the 
nineteenth century.
1.1. Neo-Confucianism as the driving force of building the new nation­
state, Chosun
1.1.1. (De)Contextualization o f  the nation-state system fo r  Korean 
experience
It has been suggested that for the social sciences, the emergence of the 
nation-state and its status for international relations constitute the 'modem' 
phenomena originating in Europe, that have expanded to other regions of the 
world. Giddens (1985), despite his clarification of the European/Westem 
nation-state as the object of historical inquiry, distinguished it from other forms of 
nation-state, and his comparative interpretation of the characteristics of the 
modem state and its traditional counterparts barely touches upon the question of 
what the particular historical circumstance of Europe was in which the 
nation-state phenomenon became a 'modem' one. The importance of the new 
nation-state system in Europe - at least since the French revolution which deeply 
influenced the development of the social sciences and vice versa - is generally 
recognized, but is it not also important to know what kinds of state system had 
been developing in other regions until the European one(s) reached to them? Can 
they be easily included in the category of 'the traditional state' as against the 
'modem nation-state'?
Although Korea had no distinctive city-states comparable with German and
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Italian counterparts, it could be argued that Korea has had the tradition of 
one nation-state since Koryo became the unique Korean state after the 
collapse of Balhae located in the northern part of the Korean
peninsula and Manchu in 926 and the collapse of Silla ('ilHj-lfr
IS) in 935. In spite of the fact that Koryo was a sovereign state - or 
perhaps semi-sovereign state or satellite state of Yuan, since the Chinese 
world was dominated by the Mongolian empire. Yuan - for more
than four hundred years, Koryo's political system shared greater similarity 
with previous states than did Chosun. A lthough the Koryo state could be 
classified as a sort of nation-state, in terms of the representation of ethnic 
Koreans, its political characteristics were based on the aristocratic style of 
central politics. As the primary social class, the aristocrats dominated the 
highest levels of the state, a few powerful families practically ruled over 
an unstable regional political situation with their own military power. 
Economic devastation caused by a number of wars was long-lasting, due to 
the lack of reformative vision by the ruling class. The latter constituted the 
local power with their own military and economic resources which were 
relatively independent from the central state. The kingship was powerless 
for a long time in the face of several military coups. The administrative 
power of Confucian bureaucrats was only significant when connected with 
other political actors, the military elite, aristocrats, Buddhist priests or the 
kingship.4
During its late fieriod from the twelfth to fourteenth century, Koryo was shaped by 
a series of unstable political situations in regional politics as well as domestic 
politics from which the Neo-Confocian Literati class
4) For an understanding of the overall political situation in the Koryo 
period, see KIM Jong-Seo et al. Koryosa Jeolyo (1442/1977).
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emerged. As the administrative class in the state, they confronted the aristocrats 
over state affairs dealing with Buddhism and economic reform. This political 
tension became more serious around the time of the emergence of the new 
regional political situation in East Asia - the contraction of Yuan ( ^  x ) ,  the 
Mongol empire, and the emergence of Ming(Tj Ujj) in the Chinese world. The 
unstable political situation in the East Asian continent had a big impact on Koryo 
in turn. Since Tang (^ /K ) collapsed in 907, the Northern Chinese region and 
Manchu were shaped by the rise and fall of several states. For example, Liao (_ft_ 
2 )  (916/946-1125) and Jin (^ -^ ) 's  enlargement and decline, Song (4r5t?)'s 
construction (960) and collapse in 1127 (North Song), and in 1279 (South Song), 
the emergence of the Mongol empire, Yuan (^} x )  and its collapse (1271-1368), 
Ming ( ^  m)'s construction in 1368 and so on.5 Alongside this international 
situation, domestic politics was also shaped by several political upheavals. Such 
as several revolts and coups in 1009, 1126, 1135, 1170, 1198, a number of wars 
within the territory and near the border with Liao (JLig) in 1019, with Jin (-ff^ ) 
in 1107, with the Mongols over the period 1231-1274, with Japanese pirates (s)j t1 
iSnS.) over 1376-13896, with the Red Turban bandits (^ i l^ if f r f J f t i )  over 
1359-1361, and so forth.7 As a consequence of Ming's demand for northern areas 
that had been occupied by the Mongol empire, a group of the military, loyal to 
general CHOI Young (a| ^ ), decided to conquer LiaoDong (iL-^-Jgili), over the 
border from Koryo. However, an opposing group around LEE Sung-Gye (°1
5) For an understanding of the history of the states in the Chinese world 
and their relevance to Koryo politics, see Franke and Twitchett (1994) and 
Mote and Twitchett (1988).
6) For an understanding of the issue of Japanese pirates ( sHt1® ^ )  for 
diplomatic relations between Japanese and Korean states in the fourteenth 
century, see Kawazoe (1990).
7) See, BANG Dong-In (1995) and KIM Wi-Hyun (1995) for Liao in 
Koryo politics; YOON Yong-Hyuk (1995) for the Mongol empire.
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7)]), who controlled the field troops, finally rejected the conquest plan in the 
Wehwa 4)-) island and succeeded in attaining political power, having gotten rid 
of the opposing state elite. Having gaining political power, the military group 
together with Neo-Confucian bureaucrats focused on domestic economic issues 
concerning the reform of agricultural lands they introduced a new
cadastral survey, established rights for farmers, and changed tax rates, and so on. 
The return of the army from Wehwa island in 1388 should be seen as a turning 
point for the enlarged political activities of Neo-Confucian Literati in the state. 
For the economic reforms, some of the radical Neo-Confucian literati, who had 
suffered from strong aristocratic dominance in the state and who were ranked as 
second class, now became part of the new political order. The emergence of a new 
state power and the introduction of a new administrative and political vision 
through economic reform policies must be regarded as the epochal demand for 
Neo-confucian visions (HAN Yeong-U, 1989).
In spite of the introduction of Confucianism over a long period in the Korean 
political world, it had mainly functioned as the overall guideline for dealing with 
political matters of the administrative elite. It was rather Buddhism that 
predominated. Since its introduction in the fourth century it had spread widely as 
the religion with the clear idea of 'this world', 'other worlds' and ultimately 
nirvana. Koryo, especially, supported Buddhism with the national ceremony, 
Palgwanhoe (S fijS ]) (AHN Jee-Won, 2001), and some Buddhist priests were 
heavily involved in politics; SHIN Don (>i!^-), for example. One characteristics 
of Buddhism was the trans-ethical attitude on mundane issues, which was 
criticized by the Neo-Confucian literati, whose main intellectual interest was to 
reconstruct the state and social relations among the people based on a strong 
ethical system. Chou Hsi's original Neo-Confucian project was one of distancing 
himself from Buddhism and Taoism and restoring a discipline-oriented individual
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ethics, through the reinterpretation of classical texts dealing with philosophy, 
ethics, etiquette and education. JEONG Do-Jeon the leading light of the
Confucian political group advocating Chosun, tried to criticize Buddhist doctrine, 
pointing to their philosophical contradictions (JEONG Do-Jeon, 1397/1977; HAN 
Yeong-U, 1989). A number of anti-Buddhist policies were also introduced by 
Neo-Confucian bureaucrats at the beginning of Chosun. The new kingship and 
Neo-Confucian bureaucrats displayed different attitudes to Buddhism, however. 
Unlike the Neo-Confucian bureaucrats and literati, the kingship of Chosun 
understood some Buddhist ceremonies for the royal family as disabolishable royal 
rituals. The disagreement on Buddhism between the kingship and Neo-Confucian 
bureaucrats from time to time became a source of political conflict between them.
The emergence of Chosun was also an important event for regional politics. The 
Chinese state, Ming, and the Korean state, Chosun, began to have a peaceful 
relationship after the fifteenth century. In fact, before the emergence of Chosun in 
Korea and of Ming in China, the relationship among several states of both ethnics 
were considerably conflictive. Their predecessors before the tenth century had 
fought each other several times over territorial interest in Manchu, LiaoDong and 
the Korean peninsula. Ming's demand for the northern area of Koryo, and the 
counter-response from Koryo to conquer Liao-dong were the final part of the 
story. After small disputes, Ming and Chosun finally agreed to a peaceful 
co-existence through the symbolic acknowledgement of an asymmetric 
relationship between them: Ming as the empire for the region, Chosun as the 
kingdom of the peninsula. This relationship reached its zenith in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century with the invasion of Chosun by Japan, and the collapse of 
Ming by Q ing(^j^) in China. The intellectual discourse in seventeenth-century 
Chosun in relation to the above will be introduced in the later part of this chapter.
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Chosun, as the nation-state, has at least two characteristics - both institutional and 
constitutive - which require it to be treated differently from previous states in 
Korean history. Above all, the political authority of the central state successfully 
extended its administrative power into the provinces. The formation of a strong 
central state was possible because the political elite of Chosun intended to totally 
change the power base of the previous state, which meant the end of the 
aristocracy and of local powers who could tackle monarchical power. 
Additionally, while the leading military group around LEE Sung-Gye formed the 
central power in the state, supporting Neo-Conftician bureaucrats initiated 
administrative reforms rather than making their own military and economic power 
base. The dual forces of building Chosun - military power and Neo-Confucian 
bureaucrats - later built a political structure of royal power and ministerial power 
in tension.
Above all, ... , the establishment of the Chosun dynasty was a moral and 
intellectual venture that set out to prove itself by articulating a sociopolitical 
program that would give the new dynasty a firm Confucian basis. It 
signified a felicitous conjunction between the ideological orientation of 
progressive reformers on the one hand, the pragmatic aims of the military on 
the other. In a true sense, it was the Korean rendition of the celebrated 
Confucian concept of "renovation" (Yusin). (Deuchler, 1992: 92)
Further, the political elite of Chosun declared the relevance of socio-economic 
agendas to solve moral issues, in order to gain political justification for the 
revolutionary change of state ^  HIÉÍSíffr) - in some ways comparable to
the concept of a successful revolt or coup d'etat. Political upheaval provoked an 
intense debate among the Neo-Confucian literati. Chosun was the first state which 
emerged as an alternative to the previous state that was devoid of territorial 
conflict or (civil) wars among the states. It can be understood as the replacement 
of one state by another, rather than conquest, victory, enlargement, absorption or 
unification by one state. In spite of the fact that Chosun's emerging process also
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demonstrated a political elimination of members of the previous ruling classes, 
including royal families, it also forced Neo-Confucian literati to 'intellectually' 
respond to the issue of the change of political authority. It was the ethical issue 
that was of overriding importance for the Neo-Confucian literati, who were taught 
to act as a sort of political advisor to kingship, rather than participating in any 
political activities against kingship. The provocative debate by bipolarized 
Neo-Confucian Literati between advocacy of the reform of Koryo with a securing 
of its political authority and the change of the state authority itself for more radical 
policies, led to the development of ethics and moral codes for the literati, both for 
and against political participation, rather than any military idea of a coup, etc. 
Besides, this experience for an intellectual group founded upon an intellectual, 
and at the same time, political tradition, resulted in both a political activism with 
'moral' justification and distance from central politics with 'moral' criticism. The 
origin of the 'political' spectrum for the Neo-Confucian literati, which 
fundamentally determined the direction of Chosun's politics also began with the 
issue of how a new state, Chosun, could be built.
1.1.2 An origin o f Korean civil society?: the relationship between 
kingship and the Confucian literati
What is the nature of East Asian politics? For some social scientists and 
philosophers oriented toward identifying particular political characteristics of the 
East Asian world, such a question has been partly answered through the 
observation of a political system centered around kingship and the lack of 
constitutional elements, which had emerged in Europe from the seventeenth 
century onwards. Also, they saw a rigid social hierarchy, which was reminiscent 
of a political system of absolute monarchy that Europe had already overcome, or 
at least a particular type of '(Oriental) despotism'. Many of them could not find 
any form of democracy in the East Asian context. The elements of 'civil society'
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ranged against the 'authoritarian' state that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, seemed to have no equivalents in East Asia.
However, CHO Hein (1997) refutes this conventional view on 'oriental' despotism 
in Confiician political history for Chosun. For Cho, while the development of the 
'check and balance' system among political parties is crucial for understanding the 
origin of English civil society, and the role of Bildungsb,rgertum rather than the 
bourgeoisie, for understanding the German version, the Confucian literati in 
Chosun represent the same political force for Korean civil society. He argues that 
the Confucian literati class as bureaucrats, local influentials. the 'backwoods 
literati' (A)^  ±#C), critics of state policies and monitors of the kingship, had 
autonomous political power in the pursuit of righteousness in moral terms rather 
than rights in legal terms. In addition, the diversification of political and ethical 
visions within the literati class contributed to forming party politics from the 
sixteenth century on. Cho's introduction of the traditional form of Korean civil 
society from the comparative perspective as a corrective to the common view on 
Confucian politics is widely accepted in Korean Studies.
In fact, it was usually the king who obeyed the officials rather than the other 
way around. Confucian officials were actually rendering the kingship 
obedient to them; they were doing the opposite of "obedience" to the king. 
One thing that most Western observers of Confucian thought have failed to 
recognize is the precept of remonstrance, which is linked to the precept of 
loyalty in Confucian tradition, (p. 29)
In fact, it would not be incorrect to identify the relationship between the kingship 
and the Confucian literati class as a whole, on the one hand, and the internal 
conflict among several groups of Neo-Confucian bureaucrats and literati, on the 
other, as the key for understanding how Neo-Confucianism was practiced in 
Chosun politics. However, in spite o f  Cho's assertion of them as the historical 
origin of civil society in Korea, it remains questionable whether one can
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conceptually reconstruct these traditional features within the theory of civil 
society in the social sciences.8
It is misguided to suggest that the Confucian literati are more important than the 
military group around LEE Sung-gye for the political destruction of Koryo and 
the building of Chosun. The military group needed intellectual support, without 
which their political revolt could not be justified. At the same time, the Confucian 
Literati - who wanted a discipline-oriented social ethics based on Neo- 
Confucianism, having distanced themselves from the Buddhist and Taoist ways of 
social interpretation - also needed new power for the state. Thus, at the time of the 
emerging Chosun, new political power .was wrested by the combination of 
military power and intellectual knowledge. However, while the territorial 
expansion to the North, the maintenance of a well-organized military power, the 
development of a central administrative system, the full institutionalization of 
bureaucracy, and the stability of kingship, emerged and considered in the 200 
years after the emergence o f Chosun, the balance of power among the two groups 
began to shift to the Neo-Confiician group of high bureaucrats, despite their 
involvement in several struggles over the succession to the throne in the fifteenth 
century. At the same time, military power became subsumed under the kingship 
and the Neo-Confucian bureaucrats.
Ironically, this political tension between kingship and the Confucian bureaucrats 
led to a much more symbolic role for both political actors within the 
Neo-Confucian paradigm. This indirectly means that in any political debate on 
state affairs, including royal rituals, the protagonists should present their 
arguments according to Neo-Confucian principles in order to justify their claims.
8) For an understanding of the debate on civil society in Korean studies, 
see SHIN Jong-Hwa (2000).
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The king and members of the royal family had to have a comprehensive 
knowledge of the Confucian Bibles - the sage kings of ancient China and their 
achievements were regarded as the ideal prototype - upon which they should base 
their political and ethical behavior, and according to which, the objections o f 
bureaucrats and local literati could be refuted. Without this, they would be 
subjected to a serious monitoring and interference regarding the 'ethical codes o f 
kingship'. In the name of a better moral politics by the king for the people, the 
literati also risked death in submitting any criticism on kingship. The political 
clash at the same time meant an intellectual conflict with the Confucian text, with 
kingship, the bureaucrats, and the backwood literati. The idea of the state as the 
symbolic center of politics for the people, however, was never contested by them. 
Political authority, which forced political actors to obey, came neither from the 
physical power of the state, nor from the present form of kingship, nor from 
economic power. Rather, it derived from ethical codes and taught morality for 
disciplining individuals. In other words, all major political actors were trapped in 
self-imposed values and disciplines. This meant that bureaucrats with a more 
extensive knowledge of Neo-Confucian doctrines were more readily promoted in 
the state. The later entrance ofthe backwoods literati - Sarim(A\ ¡¿1 -\-kk1 - in the 
central state around the end of the fifteenth century, reflects their positions q,s 
descendents of the Neo-Confucian Literati who had rejected participation in the 
political revolt for Chosun at the end of Koryo, and who later turned their backs 
on the central politics of the new state. They had economic backgrounds in the 
Southern and Middle provinces, influenced Confucian ethics in their local areas, 
and received wide normative support, especially when central politics was in 
crisis. After a series of intellectual and political conflicts with the dominant
political chain of high bureaucrats - Hungu-pa - on ethical issues,
royal ceremonies and other policy issues, they finally became the main political 
and intellectual group from the late sixteenth century onwards.9
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One of the most common criticisms of Chosun politics has been that the monarchy 
system was the source of rigid class hierarchy. It is certainly true that autonomous 
political activities with a democratic orientation could not be fully developed 
towards a politics of the democratic constitution. For the Neo-Confucian literati 
class, in order to make their own political roles, they had to limit their status 
below that of the kingship. Above all, in the (Neo-)Confucian doctrines, the
----------- C-------------------1----- —^ .
kingship should be firmly based on peoples' support, and the kingship was never 
free from a dutiful contribution to the improvement of peoples' lives. The role of 
the Confucian literati was that o f advisors, to deliver peoples' voices to the king 
and to guide the kingship toward a moral politics. The literati and the people 
accepted the higher political authority of kingship, but also expected and 
demanded a 'qualified' political contribution for them. For the kingship, this 
relationship could also be interpreted as a give-and-take process for receiving 
fidelity from subjects, on condition that he should accept the premise that the 
ultimate foundation of kingship comes from the people: his obligation is to 
improve their lives. In spite of restricted political power, kingship was the symbol 
of the state itself, which could not be doubted by any political actors until the late 
nineteenth century. Some critical literati concluded that political problems in the 
state did not arise from a monarchy that was too powerful, but rather, from the 
lack of power of kingship in the face of serious factional politics and a disordered 9
9) HAN Yeong-U (1989: 258-262) differentiates Neo-Confucianism for 
landowners from Neo-Confucianism for farmers. The Sarim group, is 
regarded as for the former, while JEONG Do-Jeon, the leading political 
intellectual for the building o f Chosun state in the late fourteenth century, 
is understood as the most prominent Confucian literatus for the latter. 
Further, Han understands Silhak tradition in the late Chosun period as the 
extension of Neo-Confucianism for farmers.
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social hierarchy. For example, Chung yak-yong (^j ^-§-) (1762-1836) proposed a 
direct return to the ancient classics, rather than following the interpretation of the 
Neo-Confucian tradition, so as to identify the genuine role of sage kings in ancient 
China, and in order to improve the rigid bureaucracy and to end the factional 
politics of the Confucian class (CHONG Yag-yong, 1997; KIM Tae-Young, 1997; 
BAE Byung-Sam, 1996b, 1993). Also, many in the alternative intellectual flow, 
the so-called practical learning school ('Jl - which will be dealt with
in chapter 2 - emphasized the economic contribution of kingship to peoples' lives, 
distinguished from an idealized formality and social ethics, as the solution for 
rescuing a kingship surrounded by Neo-Confucian adherents. Local people 
directed their spleen toward the administrative officers and (Confucian) yangban 
class in their community, rather than toward the kingship - one important 
exception being the HongKyongnae Rebellion (1811-1812) - this political event 
will be investigated in chapter 2.
1.2. The sources of long-term political stability of Chosun
Chosun lasted for 506 years (1392-1897).10 The long duration of Chosun is rather 
an extraordinary case compared to any nation-state in Europe, and even in the 
East Asian context (Deuchler, 1997; Woodside, 1998). After two hundred years 
Chosun had stable political structures with a rigid social hierarchy, had firmly 
rooted central politics into the local area with an administrative structure, 
introduced a number of economic policies on property, augmented land for 
cultivation, reformed old tax rates for farmers, changed the currency, and so forth. 
The political authority that the kingship of Chosun was endowed with, which had
10) The empire of Great Korea (c|) (1897-1910), the self-
transformed state from Chosun, should be treated as a different political 
system, otherwise the modernity discourse in Korean studies would lose a 
major element.
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initially been rejected by some Confucian Literati and some of the common 
people, was no longer a crucial political issue. Despite several military conflicts 
with the Jurchen (Yeojin°:| i l i r t t l )  tribes near the northern border, and Japanese 
pirates in the southern ports, Chosun did not experience war on a national scale - 
which had quite frequently occurred in Koryo - until the end of the sixteenth 
century. However, at the same time, the stable economic and political structure 
began to encounter new problems. As already mentioned, the intellectual and 
political conflicts among the Neo-Confucian bureaucrats and literati were at first 
very serious, but became less so, as the issue of the legitimation of the state 
gradually moved toward policy issues. Secondly, the domination of economic 
power by the (Confucian) yangban class, thanks to the extension of hereditary 
lands for bureaucrats, was also internally criticized by new bureaucrats, as a 
negative symbol of strong class hierarchy. In spite of the existence of dissatisfied 
political groups, a serious crisis of the state, which should be differently 
understood from a crisis of royal affairs, never occurred.
Through the observation of previous cases of crisis of the state in Korean history, 
we see that war had been the main factor in the change of state. Even when war 
did not change the political authority, it quite often produced a change of 
hegemonic group, which accelerated the collapse of the state. However, in 
Chosun's case any crisis of state provoked by war with its neighbors did not lead 
to the replacement of state authority. The lack of an alternative political power to 
kingship was the reason for this stability. The consequence was rather a 
strengthening of the authority of Chosun, aided by many Neo-Confucian 
intellectuals' contribution, although kingship began to lose power in post-war 
faction politics.
At the end of the sixteenth century (1592-1599) and the early seventeenth century
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(1627, 1636), Chosun experienced invasions by the Japanese and Manchurian 
states. The wars with Japan (1592-1599) and Post-Jin (^ n " ^ ^ ) /Q in g  (^ (S )  
(1627, 1636) made significant impacts not only on politics and the economic 
situation, but also on the intellectual geography. The wars produced two 
consequences for politics: increased internal conflict among political factions, but 
also emerging strong national identity with pride in the civilizational superiority 
over neighboring (barbarian) states. In economics, the budget crisis of the state 
caused by the loss of tax revenue - due to the destruction of records and related 
documents in the wars - had the long-term consequence of motivating 
productivity, which ultimately caused economic and social transformation in the 
late Chosun period, while introducing several reformative policies for taxation. 
The influences of the wars on the intellectual world could be largely understood in 
two ways: firstly, central politics came to be dominated by factions of strong 
normativists as a consequence of political disputes among the Neo-Confucian 
literati; secondly, new interpretations of economic issues in Confucianism and the 
emergence of the practical learning school, silhak-pa The
political and, at the same time, intellectual debate on the conquest of Qing (4) i|!j) 
and the debate on the royal ceremonies ended with the victory of the normativists, 
who argued a moral politics based on Neo-Confucian principles. Politically, they 
dominated major ministries including the chief committee for the military ( h] 
•'■l-), and produced strong faction politics based on their intellectual ties. Many 
literati became the victims o f  political practices instigated by the advocates of 
Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Eventually some literati began to doubt 
Neo-Confucian politics and the corruption amongst the ruling yangban class. The 
gap between Confucian norms in theory and their vulnerability in practice, was 
highlighted as the problem o f  faction politics. For the post-war economy, the 
literati as bureaucrats, local community leaders or exiled intellectuals, produced a 
number of plans and policies for land, taxes, social classes including slaves,
- 77 -
domestic commerce, foreign trade and so on. Around these economic and social 
issues, some reformative literati identified serious differences between the 
normative framework and practical solutions (Palais, 1996).
The flow of dominant political factions in central politics from the late sixteenth 
century to the late eighteenth century shows how Chosun's Confucian world 
maintained orthodox Neo-Confucianism through several internal struggles 
(CHUNG Man-Jo, 1994). Firstly, the emergence of the Northern Faction (^ -<t!) 
after seven years of war with Japan, which included a number of leaders of the 
righteous armies. Then, the Western Faction (*1 <?1) - the protagonists of pro-Ming 
against post-Jin/Qing in regional politics - after a royal coup ( ?! S  'it ) in 1623. 
Here, thirdly, is found the overall dominance of the Old Doctrine (ic-i?-), that 
emerged from the 1680s on and from which the so-called 'theory of little China' 
developed. As CHO Hein argued, the emergence, change and separation of 
Confucian political actors could be understood as the particular expression of 
Chosun's party politics. On a comparative view of Chinese, Japanese and Korean 
politics at that time, the long duration of conflictive Confucian politics in Chosun 
could be understood as the unique phenomenon through which Neo-Confucianism 
maintained, not only its political influence, but also its intellectual power, while in 
China and Japan, Neo-Confucian doctrines began to lose their philosophical 
interest in the intellectual world.
1.2.1. Civilization, Barbarianism and the formation o f national identity
One of the oldest asymmetric counter-concepts in the tradition of historical- 
political semantics in European thought is 'Hellenes versus Barbarians' 
(Koselleck, 1985). For ancient Greek thinkers, this dichotomy was used to 
identify the existence of spatially separated groups - the members of the polis and 
others - and to highlight the distinctiveness of Greek culture from others at first.
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but later, to develop a cosmopolitan idea of'the Hellenes', until it was replaced by 
another dichotomy, 'Christians versus Heathens'. A similar conceptualization also 
existed for a long time in the Chinese world- surrounded by the Barbarians in the 
East (-g-°lSH ), West H  South and North (-§M i t iX )  - for
which the Korean world was understood as Eastern Barbarian.11
Both the Western and Eastern idea are based on an asymmetric relationship that 
qualifies one and disqualifies the other. The ancient Korean perception until 
Koryo - and whether it was singular or plural - of themselves and even the 
Chinese world and others is unclear. It is no doubt true, however, that Chosun, 
since its emergence in the fourteenth century, had limited its own political 
position to one standing behind Ming, which it accepted as the hegemonic power 
for the region, but also as the country with a superior cultural and intellectual 
heritage for the Confucian idea. This became even more evident after the failure 
of the political literati to conquer LiaoDong jfi). Through several
symbolized diplomatic rituals, this asymmetric relationship between Chosun, as a 
king's state and Ming as the empire of the region, was maintained until Ming 
collapsed and was succeeded by Qing.
However, the relationship between Chosun and the political powers in the 
Japanese islands and Manchu had not been fully customized as a formal 
diplomatic relationship between states. Rather, it was mainly maintained as an 
economic relationship between Chosun and local powers in southern Japan, and 
Chosun and some tribes in Manchu. Above all, this limited economic relationship 
expressed the fact that these counterparts - the Japanese state and Manchurian 
semi-states - suffered from internal political crises and had underdeveloped
11) For an understanding of the political relationship between the Hans and 
northern nomads in Chinese history, see Waldron (1990).
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central state structures in the early Chosun period. Besides, for Chosun, Japan and 
Manchu had no significance for the Confucian literati's intellectual and cultural 
interests. While Chosun enjoyed close ties with Ming, with relatively frequent 
delegations, it merely maintained an underdeveloped formal relationship with 
Japan and Manchu, with economic trade in selected areas on the coast and near 
the border.
For Chosun, the emergence of the Tokugawa Bakufu (sf-T-HHf) in Japan at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century was regarded as the emergence of its proper 
diplomatic counterpart, which would leave Chosun's coastal areas undisturbed, 
while the Tokugawa Shogun, as the rising dominant power in Japan also looked 
for international recognition so as to maintain its political stability. The 
relationship between Chosun and Tokugawa Bakufu was peacefully maintained 
for about two hundred years, with a number of visits of official delegates. 
However, whereas Chosun's delegates could arrive at Edo, with a journey that 
passed through southern Japan, Japanese delegates were prevented from reaching 
Seoul (?!-'#) in Chosun. The latter’s journey in land was restricted, in order to 
prevent them from collecting information that may possibly be useful for another 
military campaign. The diplomatic convention insisted upon by Chosun was that 
trade exchange took place in the coastal region. For the state elite in Chosun, 
economic trade and formal delegations to Japan were a necessary measure for 
minimizing the risk of another war (LEE Jin-Hee, 1986).
In 1623, a Neo-Confucian group, the Western faction •?]) installed a new king
through a coup. They revolted against KwanghaeKun who had sought a
balanced position for Chosun between Ming and Post-Jin (-^ia $£ ^ )(that later 
became Qing ( ^  /#)), criticizing his amoral behavior in some royal affairs and his 
poor post-war policies. The new king and his network of bureaucrats, however,
- 8 0 -
failed to achieve peace for Chosun, because their support for Ming led to two 
invasions by Post-Jin and Qing. The disappearance of Ming and its replacement 
by the superior force of Qing, forced Chosun to accept a new asymmetric 
relationship between Qing and Chosun.
Peoples' memories of the war with Japan and Qing, at the end of the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth century, contributed greatly to the hostile attitude toward these 
countries.12 The dichotomy of Chosun and Ming as against Japan and Qing was a 
significant effect of the wars.13 The discriminative mode of narration can also be 
discovered in intellectual discourses on history, culture and ethics. Such racism 
cannot be explained purely in terms of a revengeful response to political 
aggression. By siding with Ming in its war with Japan, many Confucian literati 
asserted the moral response as compensation for Ming's previous military aid, and 
thus rejected Qing's demand for alliance, planning instead a war with Qing for the 
restoration of Ming. Both a shared intellectual inclination to Confucianism and its 
related political and ethical claims, and the evidence of this in Ming's military aid, 
meant that the dichotomy between the 'cultured' state and the 'barbarian' state was 
reinforced in intellectual discourse. The replacement of Ming by Qing in the 
Chinese world was understood by Chosun's Confucian literati as the collapse of
12) See Haboush (2001) for a literary discourse on the memo.nL of the 
wars in the seventeenth century.
13) In fact, ethnic racism against the Japanese and the Jurchen (Yeojin°l 
?!) - later the Manchurians - who built Qing, had a long history. It seems 
to have been an inescapable byproduct of a number of territorial conflicts 
with Jurchen (Yeojin°j 3l), and the exposure to Japanese pirates. However, 
it is necessary to mention that racism toward other ethnics, the Mongols 
and the Hans - known as 'the Chinese' to the Western world for 
example, had also existed for the same political reasons.
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the civilized world into barbarianism. This new political situation provoked them 
to reinterpret the idea of China as the center of the world which had been based on 
a territorial, cultural, and to some extent philosophical claim. The thinking of 
Chosun as little China at that time was based on the
idea of a cultural civilizational form, now transferred from the Chinese world to 
the Korean. The philosophical response from the conservative Neo-Confucian 
thinkers was thus to more firmly embed Neo-Confucian ethical doctrines14 and 
national policy agendas became strictly focused on the realization of Neo- 
Confucianism in the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century. The 
disappearance of Ming acted as a catalyst, encouraging a renewed interest in the 
history of the Korean nation and national culture throughout the eighteenth 
century.
Until Chosun revised its diplomatic relations with Japan in 1876, it maintained a 
minimalist position in international relations with the seclusion policy ^
While 'westerners used the word "secluded" to describe a country that 
lacked foreign relations in the modem sense' and 'the word had a negative and 
anti-foreign connotation which implied an unenlightened view of the outside 
world' (Deuchler, 1977: 1), for Chosun's state elite, who regarded Chosun as the 
successor of Chinese cultural civilization, the seclusion policy was not only an 
important political instrument but also a cultural one. Although the sadae (*)• cfl 'Jf 
3:) - literally: serving a superior - relationship to Qing in political affairs, was 
effected in a ritualized diplomatic manner, in order to minimize political 
instability in the region, Chosun did not welcome any cultural influence from 
Qing. For this reason, excepting the state envoys who visited Qing two or three 
times per year, Chosun discouraged people from visiting Qing (Cumings, 1997).
14) See, Yang and Ahn (1998) for SONG Si-Yeol's case.
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In the debate on Japanese seclusion policy in the Tokugawa period, Kato (1981) 
argues that it is a seclusion policy that paved the distinctive path Japan followed 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, compared to the European one, whereas 
in his earlier comparison he sees a similar path for some of the West European 
countries and Japan in the first half of the second millennium, which could be 
extensively understood as a version of the Jasperian idea of historical synchronism 
over different civilizational boundaries (Jaspers, 1953).
'The contrast between East [Japan] and West [western Europe] fell out 
along the following lines: the social energy of the westernmost 
extremity of Eurasia directed itself toward unending expansion, while 
the easternmost extremity suddenly turned itself toward contraction, 
but maintaining an unlimited possibility for expansion. In my 
opinion, the essential point of departure between modem Europe and 
Japan is to be identified in the way each elected to go down opposite 
paths-one toward expansion, the other toward contraction.' (Kato,
1981) (emphasis added, quoted from the internet version)
In spite of the fact that his conclusive claims for what Japan achieved in the 
Tokugawa period - which are understood by himself as the foundation of Japanese 
culture and the collective mentality in modem Japan - can be criticized, both 
empirically and normatively, the seclusion policy maintained by the Tokugawa 
Bakufu, in terms of founding the long-term political stability of the state, could be 
helpful for understanding the political and cultural orientation of Chosun in its 
reluctance to engage in extensive international relations with Qing and Tokugawa 
Bakufu, above all, in its single-minded application with a view to advancing 
national culture and concentrating on domestic socio-political agendas.
However, the dual development of the idea of civilizational superiority and of 
deep concerns in the national identity did not always coalesce. While anti-Qing 
bureaucrats intended to minimize cultural influences from Qing, some anti- 
Neo-Confucian literati began to show a deep interest in material civilization, as
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well as in the rediscovery of the ancient history of the Korean nation. Besides, in 
intercourse with Qing some literati in the eighteenth century, on discovering 
advanced means of production and agricultural tools, had to solve the dilemma of 
choosing between the practical interests of economic development and a 
normative distancing from the 'barbarian' state. For PARK Je-Ga (*iM] 7}) and 
Park Ji-Won -%}), for example, Qing came to be regarded as the new 'China' 
that had an advanced economy from which Chosun had to learn: they 
even began to doubt the idea of the center o f the world and a hierarchical order for 
it (PARK Je-Ga, 1971; PARK Ji-Won, 1977; KANG Don-Ku, 1992).
In fact, the intellectual dilemma over Confucianism was clearly reflected in 
different self-interpretations of Chosun's ideological and historical foundation in 
the late Chosun period. Despite the different roles assigned to Confucianism by 
various political elites, it had been ingrained as the state ideology since Chosun's 
conception. Initially, the fundamental limitation of Confucian ideology existed 
through the Neo-Confucian doctrines that unquestioningly accepted Chinese 
hegemony for Chosun's political and intellectual world. The political and 
intellectual history of China was the only 'reference point' and available source as 
'promissory note' (see, Wittrock, 2000, 1998 for an explication) for Chosun's elite. 
Ironically, this dependence was firmly rooted in Chosun's intellectual world after 
the disappearance of the Chinese state. However, when the thought of little China 
encouraged the Confucian world to rethink Chosun's ideological foundation, the 
work of actual description of the historical foundation of Chosun could not fail to 
identify the long-lasting political tension between the Chinese world and the 
Korean and the existence of independent Korean states in history.
Conclusion: Intellectual bureaucracy in Chosun
Compared to the history of states in the Chinese world, most states in Korean
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history endured, spanning a period of more than four hundred years - excepting 
Balhae's case of 229 years. The overall cycle of the rise and fall of the Korean 
states does not exactly coincide with the fate the Chinese and Japanese states, 
even though regional politics accompanied by the occurrence o f  wars, in many 
cases seriously provoked a crisis of state sovereignty. Although the reasons for the 
long duration of the Korean states need to be investigated, this would be 
complicated comparative work, in which geographical, political, economic, 
military and intellectual elements would have different repercussions, according 
to the location of states in the East Asian region. Accordingly, once the focus is 
narrowed to the Korean context, it becomes possible to see the transformative 
relation between the state and major political actors in terms of the rise and fall of 
Chosun.
This chapter dealt with transformation from a state-perspective, the next, will be 
considered from an actor-perspective. The emergence of Neo-Confucian 
bureaucrats as a new political power, coinciding with Chosun's genesis, and their 
continuing hegemonic dominance of the political world has already been argued. 
This was accompanied by the disappearance of Buddhism in the political sphere. 
Classical Confucian ideas became a more practical doctrine for state affairs and 
social ethics under the Neo-Confucian paradigm. Among the three major 
ideal-types of human beings in Confucian discourse - sage king #/■?!&;£/ 
S ), sage person (ISA ) and loyal courtier ('fr'iLli’.gl) the Neo-Confucian 
bureaucrats and literati only assumed the role of loyal courtiers who should 
dutifully help the king with the sage persons' word. In reality, however, helping 
the king, in many cases, turn into a limiting of the king's power, because the 
Confucian bureaucrats and literati had enough knowledge to directly mobilize 
Neo-Confucian doctrine for state affairs.
- 8 5 -
S. N. EISENSTADTs brief description of the Confucian intellectual world in 
Chosun and its relationship with the ruling aristocracy, compared to its Chinese, 
Japanese and Vietnamese counterparts, barely succeeded in grasping the essence 
of Confucian politics in Chosun:
In Korea, by partial contrast, Confucian elites have never 
achieved the kind of autonomy and independence that 
characterized the Chinese empire. Aristocratic and patrimonial 
tendencies remained very strong. The Confucians encountered 
strong Buddhist opposition, in alliance with large sectors of the older 
aristocracy and some of the rulers. Once the Confucian institutions and 
elites became predominant, however, even the aristocracy was 
"Confucianized". True enough, aristocratic families and lineages 
continued to be much more important in Korea than in post-Tang 
China. But their importance was manifest in their success in 
monopolizing, at least in part, the Confucian bureaucratic 
literati positions - but not in abolishing these positions - and in 
reverting to a distinct "semifeudal" aristocratic type of polity, 
(emphasis added) (Eisenstadt, 1996a: 176)
I have argued here that the breakdown of the aristocratic system in Koryo and the 
emergence of Chosun were the political products of Confucian intellectuals and 
politicians and therefore, that Chosun should be treated differently from previous 
states. Besides, the internal conflict within the Confucian literati and bureaucrats 
was another feature of Neo-Confucian politics in Chosun and because of this, the 
stable settlement of the aristocracy was fundamentally impossible. Eisenstadt 
argues, however, that the long-term maintenance of aristocracy and the political 
dominance of aristocrats occurred through the institutionalization of 
Confucianism in Korea - it is unclear whether he refers to Koryo or Chosun. In the 
next chapter, the dynamics of Confucian politics in Chosun will be compared to 
the Japanese example. Even though it is true that many 'descents in the aristocratic 
families' - Deuchleris expression - in Koryo were deeply involved in introducing 
Confucian-style reformative policies, it should be noted that the Koryo aristocracy 
collapsed and pro-Mongol and pro-Buddhist aristocrats gained pre-eminence, 
only to be ousted with the advent of Chosun: they were forced to accept
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Neo-Confucianism. More importantly, there is neither clear evidence for a 
specific class interest for the aristocracy as a whole, nor for any dominant 
economic interest of the acting Confucians. The merit subjects of Chosun were the 
qualified Confucian politicians and political intellectuals who were driven by the 
need to propose and practice reform-oriented policies, while criticizing Koryo for 
poor socio-economic and ethical conditions.
The term aristocracy has been commonly accepted as a description of the 
traditional political terrain in Chosun, as a way of indicating the dominant power 
of the yangban class in the social status system, on the one hand, and of pointing 
to the problem of a strong social hierarchy, on the other. In fact, it is undoubtedly 
true that the hierarchical social order and the power of the ruling class determined 
the direction of socio-economic, political and ethical discourse. However, 
remarking on the problem of a traditional dynasty and the class system does not 
fully explain the idiosyncrasy of Confucian society and the state. I suggest here an 
auxiliary concept, 'intellectual bureaucracy' rather than 'Confucianized 
aristocracy', in order to grasp Chosun's political characteristics. Chosun's 
bureaucracy was maintained through an exacting examination system for the 
Confucian literati. While the examination system had a long history, it was in late 
Koryo and over the whole period of Chosun, that it became the main method for 
promulgating the study of Confucian doctrines, which were adopted for higher 
civil exam agendas. Although there were several professional exams for experts, 
passing the exams in humanities and Confucian doctrines - cH ^ ( ^ 4 )  - was 
crucial for obtaining a prestigious academic title and similarly, to become part of 
the state elite. Accordingly, high bureaucrats in the state were not simply 
professionals or experts in their own fields. Rather, they were also the most 
excellent literati and intellectuals. Therefore, they were accustomed to interpreting 
state affairs with Confucianist ethical insight. For example, newly introduced
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political and cultural programmes for early Chosun; renovation of the state and 
society, were firmly based on Neo-Confucian doctrines, referring to ancient 
Chinese models, said to have been operative in ancient Kija (?] ) Chosun
(Deuchler, 1992). This is also the reason why major political conflicts among 
Confucian bureaucrats introduced a change of dominant intellectual views and 
why different interpretations of Confucian rituals and royal affairs frequently 
provoked political confrontations. In a sense, Chosun's political culture produced 
many Machiavellian-type politicians, bureaucrats and (exiled) intellectuals, rather 
than intellectuals outside of the state.
Chosun had an underdeveloped separation between state and religion. For this 
reason, one could make a comparison between Chosun and pre-modem European 
states, in terms of underdeveloped secularization. Such a construction of Chosun 
as a mirror, which was conceptually viable for nineteenth century Protestant 
missionaries, however, fails to take into account the specificity o f  Chosun. Firstly, 
Confucianism in Chosun did not have the professional priests o f  Christianity and 
Buddhism to exclusively organize religious rituals. Secondly, the idea of religion 
in which Confucianism and others religious forms are comparatively understood, 
and with which religious authority could be located outside o f  the state did not 
exist at all. The conceptual vocabularies for identifying diverse religious groups 
were based on common asymmetric counter-concepts: 'the grand teaching' versus 
'harmful heresy'. Thirdly, and most importantly, if I utilize the concept hegemony 
for understanding power relations between state and religion in Chosun, it is the 
state that enjoyed power over religion in the political sphere. However, it is true 
that the conceptual formulation of a politics that is autonomous from religion and 
vice versa, did not exist in the Confucian world - this will be further discussed in 
the next chapter. Accordingly, intellectual bureaucracy in Chosun, in a sense, 
could be regarded as the political instrument of Confucianism which enabled the
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2. The crisis of modernity in Chosun: modernity and the cosmological
turn
Introduction: Modernity in a pre-modem state?
Chosun, in the conventional view for Korean Studies, has been understood 
as a pre-modem state, as much as the social and cultural elements of 
Chosun society have been regarded as pre-modem. In distinction to the 
conceptual rupture with which 'modem' counterparts are understood, Chosun 
has been mapped as 'the last period of pre-modem time' in Korean history. 
If this overarching view is accepted - in contrast to my suggestions in
chapter 1 that the conventional view should be critically evaluated and my 
contestation of the epochal concept in the introduction as militating against 
an investigation of modernity in the sense of varieties of radical projects 
for overcoming given political problems in a pre-modem world - then 
Chosun must immediately fall into an interpretive antinomy. An empirical 
overview of what happened in the political sphere during the nineteenth 
century, undermines the validity of conventional time-zones for the 
compartmentalization of Korean Studies, within which the epochal
distinction of modernity is unquestionably located. Thus, the crisis of
modernity in Chosun contains the irony that Chosun is understood as
nothing but the pre-modem state.
The crisis of Neo-Confucian politics and its related socio-ethical agendas, 
had been fermenting in Chosun for some time. Indeed, an argument that it 
had already begun with the emergence of Chosun would be supported by 
the political clashes between the kingship and major Confucian bureaucrats 
that occurred at the end of the fourteenth century: King Taejong ( eH# °1
versus JEONG Do-Jeon (''j 5.^1); King Sejo (*l| jfc) versus KIM 
Jong-Seo The long-term process of maintaining the
Neo-Confucian political structure, also reveals remarkable internal political 
and intellectual tensions. This chapter will investigate the political and 
intellectual flows which might be understood as the source of alternative 
projects to Neo-Confucian Chosun. These began within the Confucian 
paradigm, in many cases utilizing Confucian vocabularies, but later 
absorbed knowledge imported from European and North American 
civilization, largely under the Chinese and Japanese filtered-lenses of the 
late nineteenth century. Significantly, the implementation of the Confucian 
and other traditional projects mainly failed to resolve the political crisis, 
whereas the implantation of Western projects was highly successful for 
dealing with the crisis of state sovereignty. In other words, indigenous 
alternatives were replaced by imported ones that faced little competition 
under the condition of state crisis and the related radical transformations of 
Chosun society. However, the rapid expansion of Western projects for a 
new civilization in Korea was only possible when they appealed to a 
widely spread and already matured societal mood for criticizing 
Neo-Confucian social and political structures. Further, the collapse of 
Chosun under colonization finally rendered several political projects 
deficient and so they became transmuted into a nationalistic representation 
in the colonial period - this will be analyzed in chapter 3.
2.1. The development of the discontents of the Neo-Confucian world
2.1.1. The Limits o f  intellectual challenge: on Silhak and Silhak-pa 1
1) For an understanding of the political situation of early Chosun, see LEE 
Geung-Ik (1966).
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For scholars in Korean studies, late Chosun had an intellectual undercurrent 
that was extremely critical of mainstream Neo-Confucian thought and to the 
reality of the Confucian yangban class. Silhak and the Silhak-Pa, which 
have been commonly translated in English as the practical learning, and the 
practical learning school each, have been the categories that characterized 
the intellectual flow of late Chosun. In fact, many works on the intellectual 
history of Chosun have highlighted Silhak and Silhak-Pa as anti- 
Neo-Confucianism or post-Neo-Confucianism, while 'the Neo-Confucian 
disabilities' were blamed for the loss of state sovereignty and the failure of 
the autonomous realization of modernity. Moreover, Silhak and some of the 
Silhak thinkers have been recognized as an important influence and 
background for the reformative ideas and radical politicians of the late 
nineteenth century (CHO Min in Group o f  Early Modem Korean Society, 
1998; LEE Sang-Ik, 2000). Last but not least, many Silhak thinkers are 
importantly appraised for their strong national identification and their 
critique of China-centered ideas of the world (JON Ha-Chol, 2001).
There have been a number of debates in Korean Studies on how to 
conceptualize the meanings of Silhak and how to categorize Confucian 
intellectuals around the Silhak-Pa (for example, BAEK Nak-jun, 1975; 
PARK Jong-hong et al.,1975; KIM Young-Oak, 1995, 1990; Ogawa, 1995). 
One o f the interesting debates on Silhak in Korean Studies is related to the 
scholarly situation in which many contemporary scholars have
predominantly understood Silhak as the counter-thesis of orthodox Neo- 
Confucianism. KIM Young-Oak (1990) argues against the common view, 
however, that Silhak, as the alternative intellectual flow to Neo- 
Confucianism, is the constructive work of contemporary Korean intellectuals 
under the influence of the colonial experience and a model of modernity
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imported from the West.
Silhak is not an historical fact. It is an interpretation for linking 
isolated events in the past, an historical product of an historiography 
constructed by future commentators in their historical situation. The 
interpretation is necessarily subordinated to the epochal consciousness 
that produced it. It is directly related to the structure of modernity as 
influenced by the unfortunate historical process in the twentieth 
century... .(p. 26) (Italics added)
He argues that the vocabularies of major Confucian literati who belonged 
to the practical learning school - Silhak-Pa - and their thoughts, were still 
under the Confucian paradigm. A serious misunderstanding, therefore, is 
widely rooted in the common idea that the practical learning school 
promoted their interests on economic issues and social reforms for the 
people, while conservative Neo-Confucianists at that time still indulged in 
metaphysics. According to Kim, the project of rediscovering Confucian 
intellectuals as members of Silhak-Pa, itself discloses the changed nature of 
the concept, Silhak, that becomes something like a 'modem concept of 
movement' (see, Koselleck, 1985 for embedded new meanings in European 
history).
In order to clarify the concepts, it is necessary to investigate their literal 
meaning. Generally speaking, each syllable in written Chinese - under the 
Roman lettering - has its own meaning, so it is better to treat them as 
independent words. To begin with, the second word, hak (®|-#I), could be 
understood directly as 'learning' in the modest attitude under which 
intellectuals identify themselves as students of what they study and work 
on, or as 'study' in general. The third word, pa (B i^lR), literally means a 
flow of water, and could be translated as 'school' or 'scholarly group' in 
which members share a distinctive intellectual element, although their
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particular interests and arguments could be differently interpreted. Sil ('ll 
H ), as noun, could be extensively rendered as ’true facts' and 'truth of 
spirit or value' (BAEK Nak-jun, 1975). The Neo-Confucian paradigm in 
which self-discipline bred supreme morality could not be separated from the 
order of the universe, emphasizes Sil ( 'llI f ) , while Heo (£| J®) is 
problematized as the counter-concept- in fact, the conceptual dichotomy of 
Sil and Heo has its root in the major ancient Chinese classics. CHU Hsi 
(^r^t-^tei), who is commonly understood as one of the founders of Neo- 
Confucianism, wrote the term, Silhak, at the end of his introduction to the 
Doctrine o f the Mean For him, Silhak must have
been the valuable and, for that reason, real and true learning.
This book [the Doctrine o f the Mean] speaks at first of one 
reason/Reason, which disperses and becomes the middle of all matters, 
and at last is reunited as one reason/Reason. It fills the universe 
when manifested from within and is conserved in the secret place 
when taken inside. Taste is endless, infinite. All are true and 
valuable learnings. (KIM Young-Ok, 1995: 52-56) (own English 
translation with emphasis added)2
However, at least for CHU Hsi, Silhak was neither an independent 
intellectual flow nor a particular disciplinary field in the academic world, 
nor again a major conceptual tool. The fact that CHU Hsi's commentaries 
of four ancient classics (A|-Aj $  were accepted by Chosun's
Neo-Confucian literati as the authentic interpretation of those books, means 
that the term, Silhak, was a very familiar one to the literati, not as a
2) '<>} *1£al| - & *  g ^ sa a l, 4 4 4  Sjal
-15. ^ ¡844. £ -f ^
<H| 7 }^ * }5 L ,  ^ - g -  £ « ¡1 $  *<H!
4®1 814. SL*r- 4414  4*®14. « » t e S - a ,  **« 1 * * . *
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distinctive conceptual tool, but as a broad idea of value orientation. In 
other words, for many Confucian literati following CHU Hsi's doctrines, 
Neo-Confucianism itself was the umbrella of Silhak, rather than Buddhism 
or Taoism.
It is also true that when economic and social matters in the situation after 
the war with Qing - but beginning from the eighteenth century - were 
more considerably the purview of the Confucian literati who worked on 
state affairs, some began to raise critical views toward Neo-Confucianism 
and CHU Hsi philosophical system. However, their critical
views were in general expressed only indirectly against Neo-Confucianism, 
as their critique of the actual representative forms of Neo-Confucian 
doctrine in Chosun society. I will narrowly use the category, the Silhak-Pa, 
in this thesis, for the critical intellectuals who simultaneously expressly 
distanced themselves from the main stream of Neo-Confucianism in the late 
Chosun period, and who tried to suggest alternative policy directions, while 
acknowledging the fact that it is clearly risky and problematic to use the 
category to separate the intellectual world into the Silhak-Pa and the 
Orthodox Confucian group. The categoiy, the Silhak-Pa, so to speak, can 
be usefully mobilized to indicate the existence of active intellectuals who 
problematized Neo-Confucianism and its representation in public affairs as 
well as in individual ethics. Some of them explicitly intended to create a 
new conceptual space of Sil ('MU), in order to propound their practical 
alternatives within the asymmetric relationship between Sil (-MH) for truth 
and real values and Heo for error and unusefulness.3
It is important to acknowledge the broad spectrum that existed in critical
3) See Hojil in PARK Ji-Won (1977).
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intellectual circles. Predominantly, most critics of Neo-Confucianism were 
engaged with reforming practical agendas towards new policy orientations. 
They more or less directly criticized the problematic socio-economic status 
quo of Chosun and indirectly criticized Neo-Confucian state ideology 
through highlighting the anomaly of the little-China theory under the broad 
framework of a distinct new state, Qing, for the Chinese world. However, 
many of them were unable to further develop their criticism outside of the 
grand framework of Neo-Confucianism. As Kim correctly argues, this is 
because their critical views were still produced within the confines of the 
Confucian intellectual paradigm. This meant that they maintained a rather 
dualistic attitude: strong criticism of the dominant political voice in the 
state and the incompetence of central bureaucrats in dealing with 
socio-economic agendas, together with an advocacy of CHU Hsi's ethical 
stance. In chapter 1, I introduced their ambivalent attitudes, in respect of 
praise for Qing(^jf|)'s advanced economic situation and a critical 
evaluation of its rather degraded ethical condition.
Compared to Japanese intellectual history, the historical development of the 
critique of Neo-Confucianism in Chosun follows a quite different path. 
MARUYAMA Masao (1974: 39-40) argues that Japanese thinkers in the 
Tokugawa period had already begun to distance themselves from
Neo-Confucianism since at least the 1660s and began to advocate the 
return to ancient Chinese classical texts a half century later. Also, Mark 
SETTON (2001, 1997) compares the critique of Neo-Confucianism by two 
major thinkers in the Tokugawa period; Japan's ITO Jinsai (1627-1705) and 
Chosun's CHONG Yag-yong (1762-1836). If I follow Setton's comparative 
perspective for identifying both the degree of the challenge to the relevancy 
and orthodoxy of CHU Hsi's li-ch'i system itself and the proposal of
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alternative philosophical systems to Neo-Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan 
and Chosun, for the time being I shall accept his indirect view that 
Japanese intellectuals systematically doubted Neo-Confucianism earlier than 
their Chosun counterparts.4 Interestingly, however, Maruyama acknowledges 
that the development of Neo-Confucianism in Japan was distinctive in the 
Tokugawa period and that it was accelerated under the influence of 
Chosun's Neo-Confucian thought.
While on the subject of comparisons, it is worth adding that no study 
of Tokugawa Confucianism can possibly neglect to consider the 
Neo-Confucianism of Li-dynasty Korea [Chosun], and particularly the 
scholarship and ideas of Yi Hwang (Toegye) The
tendency to belittle the intellectual history of Korea and to limit 
scholarly attention chiefly to Japan and China is, I fear, quite apart 
from all the excuses that one might offer about the availability of 
materials, a genuine blind spot, and one that I shared by and large 
with most students of traditional intellectual history in Japan (1974: 
xxxvi).
Thus, it seems arguable that whereas Neo-Confucianism in Chosun since its
4) One might criticize me here for failing to introduce philosophical works 
from the early sixteenth century, Hwadam SEO Gyeong-Deok (A1 ^  '¿O and 
his school, for example, but Korean studies has itself barely considered this 
topic worthy of réévaluation. Rather, it seems fair to say that early critics 
mainly focused on their own interpretation of li-ch'i system, within the 
context of their participation in the enduring national debate among the 
Confucian literati. The North Korean historiography of the history of 
philosophy in Chosun has interpreted the debate on the li-ch'i system as a 
Korean version of the debate on idealism versus materialism (JUNG 
Sung-Chul, 1988) in the history of European philosophy. I rather doubt the 
validity of the orthodox Marxian interpretation of the historiography of 
European philosophy, on the one hand, and the mirroring of the Korean 
debate to fit its European counterpart, on the other.
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contribution to the emergence of Chosun, was deeply rooted in its political 
and intellectual world and lasted significantly longer, its Japanese 
counterpart had a relatively short history in terms of its intellectual and 
political influence, although the introduction of Confucianism in Japan was 
also protracted. This may also mean that the critical Confucian literati in 
Chosun had much more difficulty in distancing their philosophical 
perspectives from the dominant li-ch'i system of Neo-Confucianism for 
intellectual discourse. This also reflects the different position of the 
Confucian literati in politics and state affairs in Chosun and Tokugawa 
Japan. Whereas Confucian thinkers in Tokugawa Japan took directions for 
their advisory roles for the state elite of the warrior class5, their 
counterparts in Chosun developed an overall political culture in which they 
functioned as state bureaucrats and became actual power holders. In other 
words, a philosophical knowledge system was deeply implicated in politics 
in Chosun, with philosophy and politics being inextricably intertwined with 
one another in determining the literati's political and philosophical 
orientation. This explains why an alternative philosophical formulation to 
Neo-Confucian metaphysics appeared in Chosun relatively later than in 
Tokugawa Japan, in spite their having been a long tradition of 'internal 
critique' of the li-ch'i system.
S) Eisenstadt (1996a, b) clearly points out the particular nature of 
Confucian influence in Japanese history, compared to Chinese, Korean 
(Chosun) and Vietnamese counterparts, even though his view on 
Confucianism in Chosun wrongly sees it as an aristocratic setting. 
According to Eisenstadt, Confucianism and Buddhism in Japan neither 
changed the central state structure nor challenged the structure of the ruling 
elites. Rather they instrumentally contributed to advance the existing power 
structure and own cultural characteristics.
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CHONG Yag-yong was an exemplary critical Confucian thinker in late 
Chosun. He has been generally accepted in Korean Studies as a distinctive 
Confucian thinker who produced his own moral and philosophical paradigm 
beyond Neo-Confucianism, as well as a wide range of socio-political 
reformist ideas (Setton, 1997; KIM OakSook Chun, 1994). Interestingly, his 
major writings - Kyongse yupyo in 1817, Mokmin simseo in 1818 - are 
works produced during eighteen years in exile', following the political 
suppression of catholic expansion at the end of the eighteenth century. His 
double intellectual orientation, suggesting policy-oriented political agendas 
that at the same time looked to overcome Neo-Confucian philosophy, was a 
compromise that reintroduced the implications of the administrative structure 
of an ancient Chinese state, on the one hand, and looked to revitalize 
ancient Chinese classics against Neo-Confucianism, on the other. Chong 
emphasized the role of the king for state affairs, rather than criticizing the 
monarchy system itself. For him, the problems of Chosun were caused by 
a rigid network of central bureaucrats dominating the state, who politically 
utilized Neo-Confucian doctrines. However, his politically motivated 
philosophy did not develop into an alternative political force in Chosun 
politics in the nineteenth century, largely due to his exiled status: he was a 
politician and thinker who had already become isolated from the state.6
6) The contextual evaluation of the intellectual direction of some critical 
Confucian or (semi-) Confucian thinkers in the nineteenth century through 
the identification of their socio-political backgrounds, is common in Korean 
Studies. Even though analysis of the knowledge-creating process in 
individual intellectuals must not be limited to the single investigation of the 
socio-political and economic situation by which their intellectual range was 
arguably determined, it does seem plausible to sketch the personal histories
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2.1.2. The Limits o f  the People's Collective Movements: On the religious 
ideas o f the new world
If I accept the conceptual dichotomy between expansions of political 
influence from above and from below, the contribution of the Confucian 
yangban class that dominated the state and intellectual world must be 
classified as the former. The political contribution from below that shook 
Chosun's Neo-Confucian socio-political system, emerged only in the 
nineteenth century, when the long-term development of socio-economic 
transformations that had been taking place since the seventeenth century - 
after the wars - began to conflict with the state and societal ideology and 
became manifest in collective protests and uprisings. The impact of the 
wars was more significant in the economic sphere than in the political and 
tended to promote a critical attitude from the people towards the rigid 
social hierarchy. The economic reform of the early Chosun period, in spite 
of advancing Koryo's economic system, began to run into problems, due to 
its lack of understanding of ordinary farmers' interests. The increased power 
of the yangban landowners more and more exploited farmers, with only
of the protagonists 'philosophically' challenging Neo-Confucian doctrines and 
criticizing the Christian ideas of ethics in late Chosun, or at least it 
provides a clue for understanding the complex of intellectual flows. While 
CHONG Yag-yong was an exiled thinker, SHIM Dae-Yoon (1806-1872) 
and CHOI Han-Gi (1803-1877) were also proto-types of the outsider to 
central politics (HAN Hyung-Jo et al., 2000; KIM Young-Oak, 1990; Lim 
Hyung-Taek, 1996). This means that intellectual renovations from Confucian 
literati and the possible emergence of alternative knowledge systems were 
conceived in isolation from any reformative political programmes of the 
state political elite.
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gradual recognition of their private property rights. Many commoners, 
including farmers, were engaged by the state for public works, and forced 
to contribute special local products. The wars enabled commoners to escape 
these duties, both thanks to a lack of full administrative control, and as 
consequence of slaves' and commoners' escape from the lands and local 
community. In its post-war economic policy, the state increased and 
encouraged land for cultivation and changed the method for gathering taxes, 
so as to decrease commoners' burdens. For example, the submission of 
special local products to the state was replaced by rice and cotton. State 
merchants visited local markets to purchase the local products, and this 
process helped to develop both government logistics and commercial 
production. The farmers themselves introduced more productive methods for 
farming, planting a partly-grown rice rather than directly planting the seed. 
The subsequent increase in productivity made farmers wealthy and aroused 
the landowners' interest. Consequently, tenant farmers found themselves with 
more complicated and exploitative contracts. Economic diversification among 
the commoner and yangban class, found resonance in the conflictive 
political voices of the eighteenth and nineteenth century (LEE Ho Choi, 
1997).
The economic development of late Chosun, from the middle of the 
seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, has been a 'hot' theme for 
Korean Studies (RHEE Young Hoon, 1996). Clearly, this is related to the 
intellectual legacy of Japanese colonialism; this dimension will receive 
considerable attention in chapter 3. The general assumption of the colonial 
intellectual world, was that Chosun did not have a proper feudal economic 
system and thus was unable to internally produce a capitalist economy. 
Intellectually and politically, this was related to a Marxian paradigm that
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applied the five economic stages of history to its understanding of the 
political and economic nature of Chosun society. With regard to the 
policy-making process, the claim of an underdeveloped economy and the 
lack of an autonomous capacity for economic development was utilized by 
the colonial state in order to justify Japan's colonization of Korea. For 
Korean economic historians, this assumption and its supporting evidence 
seem altogether too 'dogmatic'. They have located some points of ambiguity 
in the theory of capitalism and sought to identify significant economic 
elements that could be regarded as the embryo of capitalism in Chosun, 
and which would thus make it comparable with some of its European 
counterparts. In relation to the economic development of South Korea, the 
theme is more narrowly shaped by the question of the historical origin of 
capitalism in Korea. I will discuss these debates, in terms of the 
development and the change of historiography, in the next chapter.
In the later Chosun period, the yangban class expanded in relation to all 
other classes. Under the social circumstance in which family backgrounds 
determined peoples' socio-political positions in society, passing the higher 
examinations was an initial requirement for promotion in the state, and the 
title given by the state became a prestigious symbol in ordinary life. The 
introduction of the sale of titles as a temporary relief measure in 1593 - 
following the Japanese invasion - and its openness to commoners and 
slaves at the end of the seventeenth century, became a method through 
which to obtain a 'paper1 career. Wealthy commoners could promote 
themselves with documents that were perceived as an entry into the 
yangban network in several ways: marriage with economically down-at-heel 
yangbans; the enrollment of their sons in local state schools; and the 
production of a good family record. While local functionaries and
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discriminated descendants of yangbans (-H'SJESli) extended their
administrative roles locally, yangbans generally withdrew more and more 
from direct influence in local affairs (Deuchler, 1997). The local 
functionaries, who had mediate roles between the head of the local office- 
sent by the state- and the commoners and local yangbans were heavily 
criticized by CHONG Yag-yong (1817), in that they only sought their own 
economic interest, and were often targeted by the peoples in collective 
protests. However, as the intermediate elite group for local affairs, they 
also suffered from a poor social rank below that of the yangban class. 
Later, many of them and their descendants would enjoy roles in the 
colonial state, while others actively participated in independence movements 
(LEE Hoon Sang, 1994).
The idea of the state in the traditional Korean context has no
counter-equivalents in power relations: here, there is no tradition of 
separating the state for politics from the Church for morality and ethics, as 
in European history. Politics was always in the moral sphere where
practical matters should be interpreted with the means of moral judgments. 
Such an orientation derived from the Confucian literati's distancing from 
Buddhism and Taoism and its restoration of ethics for human beings in the 
making of a moral politics. If Buddhism, Taoism and shamanism had 
developed their own ethical codes against Confucianism and Confucianism 
had inaugurated religious rituals at the same time, there would have been a 
serious conflict between politics and religion. One of the reasons why the 
Jesuits were persecuted in the nineteenth century, while other religions, up 
until then, had received a less harsh reception, was because only
Christianity contested the rigid Confucian ethics and family rituals which
were regarded as an extension of political life. Confucianism and other
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religions in Chosun to some extent maintained a balance, in the sense that 
while Confucianism highlighted the moral discipline, ethics and an overall 
social relationship, Buddhism and other religions were mainly concerned 
with cosmology and eternal human life beyond any claim of 'this worldly' 
values. Of course, this could also be taken to mean that the power of 
Confucianism in politics excluded other religions from participating in 
politics. Many Western observers in the nineteenth century were confused 
by this particular phenomenon in Chosun and often failed to understand 
peoples' religious life beyond their own conceptualization of religion and 
politics constructed upon their own societal knowledge (KIM Chong-Suh, 
1994).
The ideological frameworks of two major peoples' uprisings in the 
nineteenth century, the HONG Kyungnae Rebellion (1811-1812) and the 
Donghak Movement (-f-®)-^^) from 1860, show an indigenous collective 
political movement based on particular religious ideas beyond Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Christianity. Given the fact that Chosun was a
highly-organized society with self-imposed social and ethical duties in the 
Confucian doctrines, it would not be difficult to extensively understand that 
the peoples' physical conflict with state armies meant symbolic neglect of 
the kingship and further, rejection of the political authority of the state. It 
was Chunggamnok - a divinatory text - that was appealed to as political 
justification of the rebellion against Chosun state authority. The main idea 
of Chunggamnok could be understood as a millenarianism that provocatively 
interpreted the emergence of Chosun and its possible collapse. In fact, 
when LEE Sung-Gye took state power at the end of Koryo in the late 
fourteenth century, his political ambition was supported by millenarian 
ideas, by then widely rooted in the peoples' view of the state. Interestingly,
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millenarianism in traditional Korean thought, as the mixed idea of the end 
of the world and the genuine opening of a new era had been politically 
galvanized to evaluate state authority. Accordingly, Chunggamnok was 
considerably manipulated and brought to bear on the problem of the 
Chosun state in local affairs (Karlsson, 2001). The Donghak movement - it 
literally means Eastern learning -, however, did not orient itself to the 
rejection of the state and kingship. Rather, its politics requested a wide 
range of reforms, for the people from the state. However, at the same 
time, it criticized major religious ideologies - Confucianism, Buddhism,
Taoism and Christianity - with its own religious doctrine emphasizing 
Heaven's way, focusing on the idea of the human being in general, beyond 
the individuals mapped in the social hierarchy (CHOI Je-Woo, 1999; 1973). 
Donghak quickly came to influence peoples' religious and political 
consciousness and developed into a political movement, both against local 
administrators and the yangban class and against international external 
powers. After defeat by the combined state and Japanese army in 1894/5, 
its collective political force was dismissed and its leaders looked to instead 
develop Donghak as an institutionalized religion in the colonial period 
(Memorial Committee of the Donghak Revolution, 1995). In other words, 
the people who could not find proper practical justifications for collective 
political protest in Confucianism sought ideological foundations from
religious world views.
Donghak as religion and its political clash with the state, though without 
denying state authority, have been significant features of Korean Studies for 
several reasons. First of all, Donghak presented an indigenous alternative 
political response from below at a time of state crisis in the face of an
international threat to sovereignty. This is why the modem history of
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collective political movements in Korean studies normally begins with the 
Donghak movement, whose characteristics included the nationalistic idea and 
a claim for reform-oriented political agendas for domestic affairs. When 
state sovereignty became a hot public issue under the intervention of a 
foreign imperial power and again when the authoritarian state and 
democratic movements engaged in confrontation, the Donghak movement 
historically aroused great intellectual interest. Secondly, the political 
movement was founded with the help of religious doctrines that were 
themselves created by a new type of cosmological interpretation of the 
human conditions beyond Confucianism and Buddhism (KIM Sang-U, 2000). 
This element has been particularly highlighted in the philosophical 
interpretation of a genuine Korean thought, or in more moderate tone, the 
Korean world view, which persisted, despite an influx of foreign thoughts. 
In particular, there was a rather creative formulation of the relationship 
between God and human beings and the related substantive question 
concerning the relationship between heaven and this world, on the one 
hand, and their own understanding of western thought, Christianity, and 
eastern thought, Donghak, as particular forms of universal teaching for 
human affairs - merely differentiated due to geographical locations -, on the 
other hand, that were reintroduced into philosophical discourse (CHOI 
Je-Woo, 1999; 1973). Accordingly, Confucianism and Buddhism were 
classified as non-Korean thought, whose influences had already been 
exhausted. The third element of Donghak is its political development, in 
which many works in Korean studies have shown significant interest, 
by-and-large interpreting Donghak in terms of its never fully realized 
potentiality in the transformation of Chosun into a modem state. 
Suppression of the Donghak movement in 1894 by the allied army of 
Chosun and the Japanese state, and then later, the collapse of the Korean
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State under colonization, allowed no room for Donghak's cosmological and 
political contribution to the modernity of Korea at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Rather, Donghak's disappearance and replacement by other political 
and religious programmes paved the way for a significant conceptual 
rupture between modernity and its pre-modem counterpart, where the 
indigenous paradigm for modernity began to be treated as a non-modem 
trajectoiy.
2.2. Conceptualization of rupture
2.2.1. The debate on the epochal origin o f  modernity in Korea
In the semantics of the Korean language, which shares the meanings of a 
number of words, especially nouns, with Chinese and Japanese Kanji, all 
meanings of modernity in any sense are linguistically interpreted as 
characteristics of the modem age - For this, the location of
the epochal idea as the foundation for thinking about modernity, rather 
unavoidably demands the epochal rupture between modernity and its 
counter-parts - the ancient the pre-modem
post-modernity or whatever - in order to
concretize meanings.7 Under the influence of this epochal orientation to
modernity in Korean semantics, two events in 1876 and 1897 are 
essentially contested dates in Korean discourse as to beginning of the 
modem age. In 1876, ending the policy of seclusion that had caused war
between Chosun and a French squadron in 1866, as well as an American
7) Even though the conceptual difference between modernity and 
contemporaniety should not be dismissed when different historical 
transformations within the modem age are discussed, the investigation of 
the conceptual interplay between them is beyond the purpose of this thesis.
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one in 1871, Chosun made a treaty with Japan, opening its three ports for 
international trade and commencing diplomatic relations for commercial 
trade with some European countries and the USA from 1882 (Deuchler, 
1977). Accordingly, 1876 has been widely regarded in Korean studies as 
the genuine start of the modem era for Korea. However, for twenty years 
after 1876, Chosun faced serious economic and political instability. 
Economically, it was the sharp rise in grain prices caused by an increased 
export to Japan, and the demise of domestic cotton goods that were 
undercut by the importation of cheap foreign ones that wreaked havoc. 
Politically, a divided national reaction to the rapid introduction of western 
civilization and to Japanese and Chinese interventions in domestic politics, 
produced both a rebellion from a conservative army demanding 
improvement of their working conditions in 1882, and a coup by a radical 
elite group in 1884. Nationally, the uprisings of the farmers' army 
demanding reformative policies and the punishment of corrupt local 
administrators in 1894, were suppressed by the allied force of the state and 
Japanese army. The Sino-Japanese war, precipitated by this event, ended in 
Japan's victory. The British occupied an island (> !§ -£ ) in the territory in 
188S, Russia then began to intervene in domestic politics, while a leading
conservative with Japanese help, killed the queen in 1896. Under this
'emergency', the king tried to overcome political instability by way of 
symbolically announcing Chosun as an independent empire, the Empire of 
Great Korea (cfl and by introducing a number of
reformative policies in 1897. This is regarded as more or less an
autonomous response to the arrival of the modem era (Cumings, 1997).
It would be argued that both ways of dating the beginning of the modem 
era seem meaningful for different reasons. 1876 is monumental for
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Chosun's entry into an era of international trade and diplomatic relations 
beyond China, while 1897 is also significant for the political nature of the 
state that changed. However, both are one-dimensional. The former fails to 
factor the meaning of subjective practices in modernity for orienting the 
expansion of political autonomy, as fundamentally illustrated in the 
European experiences and the American Revolution. Whereas some 
economic historians, with acknowledging 1876 as a watershed, argue that it 
is the development of the capitalist economy hence, with the accumulation 
of capital in commercial agriculture by the great land-owners, later used to 
develop major textile enterprises in the colonial period, that was crucial 
(Eckert, 1991), others still, argue that the economic trend of small farming 
units in Chosun had its own force for developing economic systems 
different from the European experience (RHEE Young Hoon, 1996). The 
former idea faces the criticism that it explains no more than the business 
history of a few enterprises (SUH Yong-sug, 1992), while the latter idea 
simply focuses on a sudden entanglement of two different economic 
systems at the time of economic rupture. The understanding of the 
beginning of modernity that emphasizes the event of 1897, also highlights 
the institutional character of modernity, focusing on the change of state 
structure and the introduction of reformative policies in the economy and 
politics. The emphasis on modernization from above since 1897, however, 
is unable to appreciate the wide-spread willingness of people to engage in 
the further development of policy agendas. Such an example can be found 
in the new emperor, who refused to accept both the parliamentary system 
and the constitutional monarchy. Besides, both events of 1876 and 1897, 
economically and politically interpreted, are not enough to be reflected in a 
wide philosophical interpretation, as happened with major political and 
economic events in Europe and North America. This seems partly due to
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the lack of committed involvement from diverse Korean actors, who could 
be regarded as the driving force of modernity, in these events, despite their 
remarkable consequences.
2.2.2. Facts, counter-factual claims and the subjective meanings o f  moder
The debate in Korean studies on the historical origin of modernity in the 
sense of an epochal rupture could have two implications for 'multiple 
modernities' beyond the European and North American context. These, in 
turn, are the possible claim of 'imported/implanted modernity', and that of 
the 'failed project of modernity'. Let us first look at a typical economic 
historian's argument, that the origin of capitalism in Korea is 'the offspring 
of the [Japanese] empire' which forced Chosun to open its domestic 
economy to international trade and propelled economic development later in 
the colonial period (Eckert, 1991). It would then seem possible to say that 
the Japanese empire is the subject, or at least, a main subjective actor in 
Korean modernity, especially if modernity is based on the idea of grand 
economic transformation, the capitalist way, with a reorganization of society 
based on the rules for expanding economic activity. A number of debates 
in economic history in the pre-colonial era and the colonial period directly 
and indirectly concern Japanese contributions to the Korean economy at 
that time, in order to evaluate whether they were positive or negative for a 
specific field, or indeed overall. But how are we to evaluate the effect of 
enforcement, exploitation, and racial discrimination on the economic nature 
of modernity? How are we to judge a Japanese empire forcefully 
transforming the native economy for its own economic interests and its 
imperialist purpose? How also to weigh the effects of a colonial state that 
suppressed the workers movements, and even conventionalized the unfair 
treatment between Korean and Japanese workers? (CHUNG Tae-Heon,
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1997; KIM Dong-no, 1998; SHIN Yong Ha, 1997) Any possible answer to 
the concept of an 'imported/implanted modernity' cannot avoid a subjective 
interpretation of modernity from a normative perspective. Whether 
modernity in general has positive or negative meanings in the normative 
sense, or whether each aspect of modernity - for example, political 
democracy, a rationalized knowledge system concerning institutional affairs, 
or a market economy - has separate value-orientations for different thoughts 
based on experiences and justification would seem to be moot. Modernity 
appears to possess certain characteristics that allow it to be judged by any 
subject of modernity. However, the normative evaluation of modernity is 
hardly objective for every participant. Rather, it must be subjective, in that 
interpretation of situations and responsive practices would not go beyond 
actors' judgment with self-imposed values - the implication of Japanese 
involvement in the economic transformation during the colonial period will 
be dealt with in chapter 3.
The word 'failed' could have an important meaning in the Korean context. 
Observing the disappearance of state sovereignty under colonialism, one 
could say that the Korean project of political modernity failed at that time, 
'we ... conclude that Korea failed to modernize' (HONG I-sop, 1963; 16). 
Above all, it is Koreans' self-recognition of failure that becomes a 
foundation for a strong national identity. When a project of modernity is 
said to have failed, there must be many explanations for it. Many highlight 
the intervention of external powers in domestic politics as the main reason 
of failure. Incidentally, it was the involvement of foreign powers in a 
series of political events, and the sovereign power's vulnerability, that 
produced an overwhelming reaction in the rise of nationalist movements. 
Whatever the individual actor's political purposes were, they found
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justification in a nationalist argument. Lastly, the concept of a failed project 
of modernity from above, from the elite groups and intellectuals, or from 
below, from the peoples' organizations, widened its compass to include the 
failed project of modernity of 'whole members of the political community', 
finally producing the 'myth' that all Koreans fought against Japanese 
imperialism, which is wrong in fact (Cumings, 1984)! Unfortunately, the 
development of the social sciences in Korea has also been affected by 
intellectual nationalism, an internal and overwhelmingly nationalist sentiment 
that becomes externally manifest in the public sphere.
Besides, the meaning of 'the failed' seems to be easily garnered from 
contraposition to its other, 'the successful'. 'The perennial question of why 
Korea has failed to achieve modernization requires us first of all to seek 
conditions necessary for modernization rather than the causes that arrested 
Korean modernization' (HONG I-sop, 1963: 16). A strong military power, 
an advanced technology and science, a 'developed national economy', 
so-called western democracy, rather than 'Confucian values', and so forth, 
have always been illustrated as qualities that Korea did not have at that 
time. It would not be incorrect to conclude from the historical experience 
of colonization, the division of the nation and the Korean war, that Korean 
projects of political modernity had failed to maintain the long lasting 
sovereignty and political stability, and failed also to keep the (unified) 
nation-state in the modem age. However, one could produce two types of 
counter-arguments by means of provocation: firstly, what could be deemed 
the successes o f the project of political modernity, commonly assumed, so 
to speak, from the late nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century? 
Were imperialist states that had overseas colonies, really successful 
examples of modernity? Or those states that had carved Korea into two?
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Or those that had survived as independent nation-states?; Secondly, what 
would Korea have become, if it had not had such a shameful experience? 
Would it have joined in with imperialist parades, actively participated in 
the pacific and the second world war, or merely maintained a hermit-like 
sovereignty? Thus, a dilemma of political modernity for the Korean 
experience, comes from the tension between the factual evidence, that 
makes it possible to argue that Korea and the Koreans failed to achieve 
autonomous political modernity, and the uncertain alternatives of the 
counter-factual imagination.
2.2.3. Modernizing conceptual frameworks
While the modem rupture in the realm of politics has been basically 
understood through a few major events relating to state affairs, the 
intellectual and conceptual ruptures between traditional thought and the 
modem, have received scant attention in Korean studies. It is only recently 
that some major concepts have been reevaluated, despite the recognition 
that some thinkers in the transitional period were engaged in precisely this 
activity of identifying the intellectual rupture in theorization or certain 
overlapping elements between traditional views and the newly constituted 
paradigm. CHOI Han-Gi, for example, has been identified in Korean studies 
as a distinctive thinker of the first half of the nineteenth century, who tried 
to produce a grand perspective on cosmological, epistemological and ethical 
themes, by using creative conceptual tools that were beyond the binary 
differentiation of 'Eastern thought' and 'Western thought' (CHOI Han-Gi, 
1996; HAN Hyung-Jo et al., 2000, KIM Young-Oak, 1990). However, most 
intellectual accounts highlight political activists who were deeply involved 
in political events in the second half of the century and many of whose 
intellectual backgrounds had been shaped under policy issues for
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modernization and state sovereignty. By the way, it has been said that 
Korean translations of major concepts - the economy, politics, art, literature, 
philosophy, society, religion, individual, nation, for example, all of which 
are widely used in contemporary Korea - were coined at the end of the 
nineteenth century when Japanese translations of them into Chinese were 
introduced in Chosun (see, JANG Suk-Man, 1992 for 'religion'; Park 
Myung-Kyu, 2001 for 'society'). How did the new concepts contribute to 
epistemological rupture, in the sense of helping to interpret an emerging 
new world and suggesting alternatives for the future of Korean politics? 
The intellectual transition, from the mobilization of traditional vocabularies 
to new terms for dealing with social, political and ethical matters, 
accelerated the quest for alternatives based on new world views, for 
modernization of state affairs, provoking radical intellectuals into political 
revolts against state authority. A coup by young intellectuals in 1884 (^-¿1 
3!’A), the Independence Club movement in 1890s 3] £-§-), the
planning of a new coup in 1898-9, all of these occurred on the basis of 
an affinity with the modem idea of making a strong nation-state, on the 
one hand, and of the abandonment of traditional political options, on the 
other. Given the fact that Japan and USA became reference states for many 
new political intellectuals, who welcomed radical modernization of the 
Chosun state and society, and given that their intellectual sources were 
highly dependent on American, European and Japanese intellectual 
backgrounds- in the Enlightenment tradition, Darwinism and Calvinism - it 
becomes a truism that the idea of epochal rupture and modernist solutions 
had already been powerfully absorbed into Korean modernists' political 
practices by the turn of the twentieth century.
Religious studies - rather than being classified as theology - in Korean
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studies have particularly focused on the epistemological rupture by way of 
investigating the introduction of Catholicism and Protestantism and the 
concurrent discourses on the separation of State and Religion.8 One could 
argue that Korean history has no significant conflict between the state and 
religious power in the European sense. I have previously mentioned the 
historical reason for this, which was that religious power outside the realm 
of politics was unproblematic for state power. In another sense, it may also 
have been the case that state power remained intact, so long as a religious 
group could not argue its superior authority over the state.9 One thing 
which should be stressed for the historical relationship between the state
8) The themes of most interest to Korean studies have largely been its
religious history since the nineteenth century. These include: firstly, the 
separation o f religion from politics; secondly, the (re)emergence of national 
religions beyond Buddhism and Confucianism; thirdly, the conceptual 
relationship between Christianity and (the new) civilization; fourthly, the 
rearrangement of religions in the contemporary (South) Korean situation. 
For example, see JANG Sukman (1990); KANG Don-Ku (1992); CHO 
Hyun-Beom (2001) K“nig(2000) for perspectives on each issue.
Additionally, research on primitive religions, the relationship between 
politics, religion and modernization in South Korea and the reciprocal
relationship among religions have become highlighted in Korean studies.
9) The existence of an ancient form of the separation of religion and
religious actors from politics and state power is normally mentioned in the 
historiography of the three Hans ( 'th tt) in southern Korea. Regrettably, 
however, due to the lack of historical sources, this has been rarely 
highlighted in Korean religious studies. It could be understood as a lost 
religious tradition, because the head of state in many of the later states 
became the chief organizers of certain religious ceremonies.
and religions is that there was no autonomous realm for religion in 
political actors' perception. In other words, when any religious activities 
were understood as contesting state authority through serious political 
intervention, major political actors immediately suppressed these. The 
political tension at the time of the introduction of Buddhism (KIM 
Suk-Geun, 1998), the linkage between the Mireuk Belief (U1 ■Sj-'t] “y-) as 
radical thought and collective political movement (JUN Gyeong-Ok, 1998) 
as the clash of politics and religion, were followed by the suppression of 
Catholicism in the nineteenth century. Until the two final agreements in 
1899 and 1901, the Korean state intended to prohibit Catholic activities, 
whereas French Catholic missionaries and the French state tried to extend 
Catholicism and its political pressure. The realization of 'the separation of 
Church and State' for the Korean context, initially meant making the 
religious realm autonomous from political intervention, rather than a politics 
freed from religious influence.
One interesting element in the discourse on the separation between State 
and Religion is the highly focused policy implications of religions for 
politics around which 'Religion' in general and each religion in particular, 
were interpreted as a conceptual distanciation from politics and the natural 
world. By comparing political histories with civilizational achievements and 
through identifying the diverse developments of religions and their 
characteristics, policy-oriented thinkers could reconsider whether Religion in 
general was affordable or whether a specific religion was more affordable 
than others for accomplishing the historical tasks given to East Asia. For 
this reason, discourse on religion went hand-in-hand with the discourse on 
civilization (JANG Sukman, 1990, 1992; CHO Hyun-Beom, 2001). At the 
same time, the differentiation of two realms accelerated many Koreans'
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disenchantment with the traditional way of interpreting the world and their 
enchantment with a new religious life. Flourishing religious activities were 
not solely limited to Catholicism. Firstly, in the situation under which 
Western religions were spreading fast and Confucian influences significantly 
declining, several religions were 'created' (KANG, Don-ku, 1992; KEUM 
Jang-tae, 1998). Secondly, while some Neo-Confucianists wanted 
Confucianism to evolve into an institutionalized religion, they were 
challenged by a Confucian thinker who established a new religious sect 
within the Confucian framework criticizing Neo-Confucianism (SONG, 
Young-bae, 2000).
When the extension of religious activities was initially motivated by doubt 
of the value of politics itself and was oriented toward 'something like 
religious teachings', in many cases, it was Protestantism that, seeming to go 
hand-in-glove with 'civilization' and 'modernization', appeared attractive 
(JANG, Sukman, 1999; CHO Hyun-Beom, 2001). For many Korean 
political intellectuals and an attentive public in the 1880s and 1890s, the 
political wish for making Chosun a strong state and the idea of 
enlightenment for achieving civilization was widespread, with exemplars - 
often the United States and Japan - providing role models. While many 
missionaries from America tried to convert through their preaching, it was 
their medical and educational services and the prosperity of the United 
States that became highly motivational resources for the Koreans who 
accepted Protestantism as their new religion. Given that western religions 
were welcomed by many Koreans as expedient for Korea's political and 
social necessities, or for their own personal interests in social life, this 
should be understood as an instrumental and purpose-oriented rationality, 
rather than a communicative rationality. Such an instrumentalism was later
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to block the development of rational communications among competing 
actors in South Korea. Supplementing their critique of other religions, many 
Korean believers also came to interpret their own problematic past in the 
light of the comparison with the puritan way of life. Accordingly, the 
development o f religious thought and related socio-cultural changes, 
occurred under Western influences that became part of the overall climate 
for Korean intellectuals and socio-political actors. The religious actors - 
whom it is impossible to conceptually categorize in Chosun - in the 
colonial period made every effort to secure the religious realm as an 
hermeneutically constructed autonomous sphere, sealed from the desperate 
political situation, in which they could reinterpret the necessity of Korea's 
independence through religious vocabularies. Later, the religious leaders of 
major religions organized the political independence movement of 1919 and 
members of a nationalistic religion became the protagonists of political 
terrorism against the colonial state (KANG, Don-ku, 1992).
Conclusion: Korea as an inoperative political community
The gravest and most painful testimony of the modem world, the one 
that possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must 
answer (by virtue of some unknown decree or necessity), is the 
testimony o f  the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration o f 
community (Nancy, 1991: 1) (Italic added).
The Empire o f  Great Korea disappeared in 1910 with the annexation by 
Japan after five years of protectorate status. The young empire, which had 
just announced itself as empire in 1897, became a colony, denied the 
opportunity to enjoy its independent sovereign status in world politics. 
Around the series of political events of that period, many interesting 
questions arise: Why did the king of Chosun, Kojong, want to be reborn
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as emperor and why did Japan curtail this status in 1907? Why did some 
Korean modernists in the state want the handover of their sovereign state 
to Japan that was deeply involved in the assassination of their queen in 
1896? Why also did major international powers, who prided themselves on 
their role as guardians in civilizing peoples, ignore the Korean envoy's plea 
for international help at the Hague in 1905? Such questions are the staple 
fodder of historians in Korean Studies, concerning the collapse of Korea 
and the emergence of the colonial state, as well as being questions that 
attracted foreign diplomats at that time (see, the institute of German 
Studies, 1992 for the diplomatic reports of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
between 1885 and 1913).
Insofar as Korea was colonized, comparison became inescapable for 
evaluating the new life. For agents of the colonial state, the comparison 
between previous national culture and the state, and 'the new epoch in the 
advanced civilization' had to be emphasized as a countermeasure to peoples' 
reluctance to embracing the new state (see Tsurumi, 1984 for the 
difficulties for introducing the public education system). The difference of 
perception between 'the degradation from the people of the empire in the 
civilized world to the people colonized in the barbarian state' and 'the civic 
change from one vulnerable and poor state to another great empire with 
strength and advanced civilization', proved divisive. This line between 
sentiments and the bounded political attitudes towards colonial authority, 
constitute the Koreans' own legacy of the colonial period. In spite of the 
overwhelming memoirs of many old Koreans that Koreans always resisted 
Japanese agents and the colonial state in order to protect national 
sovereignty, in actual fact Korea, as a political community, was never 
unified in its opposition to the invader. There is no empirical evidence for
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the popular saying, 'united we live, scattered we die', being reflected at the 
national level in order to protect or restore sovereignty, even though Korea 
has often been argued as the most tough and contentious colony in the 
extended Japanese world (Myers and Peattie, 1984). How is it possible to 
explain the fact that when an individual fought against the Japanese armies 
in Manchu, another pursued him as the secret agent of the colonial police? 
Why did Koreans fight each other as workers on the one hand and 
employers, on the other, over the racial discrimination instigated by their 
Japanese counter-parts? One could argue that it is the problematic nature of 
the Koreans themselves that ultimately led to their colonization. Did they 
really deserve to be colonized? It is not difficult to link this type of 
political rhetoric to a widely observable mode of theoretical inquiry on 
national identity and the particularities of collective behavior based on a 
strong idea of the political-cultural community. If the fragmentation of the 
Korean community is explicated on the basis of the national culture of 
Korea, then this conjures to a deterministic view of collectivity and its 
cultural resources in an ultimate sense.
-  120 -
3. Living in mastery and the desire to have new visions: modernity 
and the colonial condition
Introduction: A path to modernization under the colonial experience
In the previous chapter, I introduced the high scholarly interest in Korean 
studies in understanding the post-1876 era, before Korea's annexation to 
Japan, as the period of Koreans' autonomous responses to modernity. In 
spite of the indisputable theorem in the social sciences that factual evidence 
should be free from any political manipulation, the research trend for the 
post-1876 period can be clearly understood as a concrete example of 
Weber’s inescapable dilemma with regard to the objectivity o f the social 
sciences. The social scientists' research interests and questioning, through 
which their research begins to take shape, could not be fully subsumed 
under the concept of objectivity. I also indicated that one of the 
underpinning assumptions - or sometimes the loudly proclaimed reason - 
for this historical research is deeply related to the counter-factual 
imagination of the colonial experience and of the Japanese involvement in 
modernization at that time.
It is not too difficult to imagine the intellectual responses at that time, 
shaped as they were by the political impact of colonialism. Korean and 
Japanese intellectuals and academics had to embed the meaningful - both 
negative and positive - differentiation between previous Korean history, its 
cultural heritage and the state, one the one hand, and the emergence of the 
Japanese colonial state that introduced modernization policies, on the other, 
unless they could prefer new alternatives, such as socialism, that castigated 
both the before and the after. Contemporary Korean studies could never
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free itself from its historical legacy. For some social scientists, Korea's 
colonial experience is regarded as a fruitful source for clues to answering 
their research questions. At the same time, the issue of colonialism and 
development in Korea is also linked to Korean economic history or 
business history, to some extent covering the economic and policy history 
of the Japanese empire in Japanese studies, and colonial history in 
Taiwanese studies. There was, for example, a debate between political 
economists on the contribution of Japanese colonialism to Korean economic 
development. A critique of Kohli (1994)'s paper entitled, 'Where do high 
growth political economies come from? The Japanese lineage of Korea's 
developmental state' (Haggard, Kang and Moon, 1997) and Kohli's reply 
(1997) can be seen as part of this trend. This debate unfurled amidst a 
marked academic interest in ways of understanding the Korean economy 
and the peculiar manner in which the state mobilized resources, and 
precipitated conjectures as to whether or not this could have policy 
implications for other developing countries. While some critics problematize 
Kohli's deterministic view, by introducing counter-factual economic data and 
historical evidence, it remains an unavoidable fact that Japanese 
involvement plays a significant role for a historical understanding of the 
development of the Korean economy, a role that in any case needs to be 
explained.
Thus, social scientists in Korean studies necessarily face the colonial 
experience (1910-1945) and its heritage/legacy. The purpose of this chapter 
is firstly to identify the economic understanding of modernity underpinning 
research questions relating to the colonial experience, although it will not 
directly be concerned with the claim of some political economists who 
argue the existence of certain continuities of what the Japanese colonial
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state did, with contemporary Korea. Rather it will focus on the legacy of 
the colonial experience for Korean social scientists and their overall 
projects, and on what is often deemed by foreign observers to be the 
crucial aspects for understanding the Korean economy in general. 
Modernity, for economists in such debates, generally seems to be identified 
with the performance-oriented re-organization of society by the authoritative 
state.
3.1. Economic transformation: disputes in the interpretation of the role of 
the colonial policies
3.1.1. On the cadastral survey and the new legislation o f  landownership
The debate on the cadastral survey (jE.A|iEA).A}.<y) and the consequent 
rearrangement of landownership, is one o f the most sophisticated debates on 
modernization in the colonial period. In 1910, the colonial state began an 
investigation of landownership in Korea, analyzing geographical information 
pertaining to agricultural land and ending up in 1918 with new legislation 
for landownership. The debate among economists, historians and sociologists 
focuses on the meaning of this survey and its consequences. The 
investigations stimulated by the debate, however, are invariably fuelled by a 
value-orientation towards the nation, class-interest, or modernization itself.
The durable intellectual disagreement over this issue was again inflamed by 
the critique of the statistical datum, recently quoted in the textbook of 
Korean history for high school students
The Japanese empire appropritated for the colonial state not only 
these unregistered lands, but also land for public authorities, 
agricultural lands and forests, the grassy plains, and the uncultivated 
land that belonged to local communities. Thus, the illegally wrested 
land from the cadastral survey comprised about 40% of national land
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(2000: 137).
In contradistinction to the nationalist voice prominent in several paragraphs 
of the textbook and the bias of its suggested statistical data, an economist 
criticizes and refutes through different statistical data, historians and 
sociologists who have in general argued for what he calls, 'the exploitation 
theory' (t1 !)■§•) of Japanese colonialism. Further, he concludes that one 
consequence of the survey was its contribution to capitalist development in 
colonial Korea, enabling 'modem landownership to begin to take root, with 
its replacement of the 'pre-modem' relation of receiving' (CHO Seok-Gon, 
1997).
This revisionist perspective provoked a serious counter-critique from 
nationalist circles, as expected. SHIN Yong-Ha (1997) first brings to 
readers' attention the fact that the revised view is no different from 'the 
theory of colonial modernization' advocated by Japanese intellectuals and 
bureaucrats in the colonial period and by Korean collaborators who praised 
the cadastral survey as the 'generous gift' of the Japanese Emperor. He also 
refutes the orientation of Cho's case studies, focusing as they do on the 
result of the cadastral survey and peoples' responses at the local level, by 
insisting on statistical data at the national level. He thereby argues that 
although the colonial state took nearly 5.8% of agricultural land, it 
appropriated nearly 59.1% of the forests, so in total taking 50.4% of 
national land. Another historian points to Cho's rather neglectful 
understanding of the complexity of 'colonial modernity' which cannot be 
disregarded in any economic approach:
They [Cho and his fellows] ..........deconstruct the issue of the nation,
which should be included in the epistemological object, and colonial
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exploitation, and ignore the fundamental contradiction within the 
colony. Because they only recognize the settlement of 'modem' 
institutions for a country's 'modem' development, the massive 
exploitation that resulted from this process is outside of their purviw. 
The colonial state is only understood as the 'modem, capitalist' state, 
and the economic space, which is 'purely' dequalified, only appeared 
by ignoring the historicity of the colonial society in which the people 
lived (CHUNG Tae-Heon, 1997).
In a third framework, as an alternative to both 'the exploitation theory' and 
'the colonial modernization theory' (-*1 Tl*] YOO Jae-Geon
(1997) argues, in a broad sense, that modernity should be understood not 
only through the legislation of private property rights for landlords and the 
bourgeoisie but also through the production of an hierarchical order in 
geopolitics, through racism, and class conflicts. He understands the Korean 
case under colonialism as the consequence of a world economic system, 
rather than being beholden to a class and a theoiy of modernization within 
a nation-state. KIM Dong-Ro (1998) focuses more on the development of a 
bipolar class division, as the overall consequence of the Japanese project of 
agricultural reform and new taxation. The introduction of legislation of 
property rights had the effect of encouraging the social perception of land 
as a commodity, thus provoking a rapid destruction of the social and 
cultural meanings embedded in the traditional inheritance system, replacing 
them instead with economic principles as determinants of the life-world.
3.1.2. On the national capitaI and nationalistic labour movement
While the debate on the cadastral survey and on the effect of the 
juridification of landownership is mainly concerned with economic 
transformation in the 1910s, the debate on the industrialization of colonial 
Korea in the 1920s and 1930s, tends to focus instead on the characteristics 
of the Korean bourgeoisie and labour movements under colonial 
modernization. The nationalist-oriented views on industrialization and
125
capitalist class-formation argue strongly for an underdeveloped national 
capital under a policy of colonial control and of violent state intervention 
in industrial relations, thanks to which the Korean workers' movements 
were seriously suppressed.
After the March 1st independence movement [in 1919], the movement 
towards establishing national capital for economic independence was 
activated. This trend, however, was visible in the founding of small 
companies rather than big ones, largely due to restrictive regulations
by the Japanese empire..........  [Moreover,] many national enterprises in
the 1930s- when colonial policies became more rigidly oriented 
toward control- disappeared, were absorbed by and merging with 
Japanese companies, an outcome promoted by means of the skillful 
suppression of the Japanese empire..........
Labour movements were mainly provoked by the terrible working 
conditions that were the hallmark of colonial industrialization. 
Subsistence pay and unendurable working condition were the focus for 
industrial disputes. The workers' strikes failed overall, because the 
police intervened without exception. Strikes took place predominantly 
in factories managed by the Japanese, so they characteristically 
displayed an anti-imperial and anti-Japanese political tenor. ... The 
Japanese empire in the 1930s expanded industrial facilities, exploited 
mineral resources and mobilized the labour force, in order to produce 
military supplies necessary for the military invasion of the continent. 
The result was to further decrease Korean workers' salaries, extend 
working hours, and to introduce several new business (Textbook II, 
2000: 165, 167 each).
The revisionist view, however, is based on different case studies. Eckert 
(1991) discovers that one of the significant entrepreneurs, KIM Yoon-Su, 
the owner of Kyungsong textile company ( ^  ^  ^*1), actively cooperated 
with the colonial state in order to promote his own economic interest in 
expanding his business. Also, PARK Soon-Won (1999a, b) criticizes the 
nationalist-oriented view in that it is too simplistic in characterizing the 
diversity of workers' responses to colonial industrialization. While Onoda 
cement factories at Sunghori and at Samchok, contributed considerably to 
industrial development during the colonial period, they also provided wide 
opportunities for employment and social mobility for Koreans: 'by the end 
of the colonial period, a number of Koreans', unlike the common images of
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colonial labor as a cheap, abundant, unskilled, and anti-Japanese labor 
force, 'had established themselves as responsible, independent, and skilled 
workers and reached the top layer of the labor hierarchy' (PARK 
Soon-Won, 199a: 188). In fact, the overall achievements of Korean
economic actors in the 1930s and 1940s were the consequence of the dual 
colonial effects that encouraged/enforced participation in war-time economic 
expansion, thereby providing economic actors with opportunities to gain 
industrial knowledge, and through the requirement that more and more 
Koreans participate in industrial activities with their Japanese counterparts, 
saw a growing number being promoted to management on the shop floor. 
It is clear that while nationalist historians and sociologists mainly explain a 
certain level of discrimination toward Korean actors by the colonial state 
and Japanese actors, thereby tending to emphasize a highly organized 
colonial economy in which the economic struggles of Korean actors were 
quashed by the colonial state, the revisionists concern themselves more with 
what Korean economic actors achieved and learnt in the expansion of the 
industrial sectors of the colonial economy.
3.1.3. The binary codes as the source o f  different interpretations o f  
economic agendas
It is impossible to identify the whole gamut of views in Korean studies of 
economics under the colonial situation, merely from the two positions 
above.1 Be that as it may, it still remains possible to grasp the basic
1) For a summary of the research activities of Korean historians between 
1987 and 1989 regarding the colonial period, see YOON Kyung-Ro (1991); 
for a proposal of a new paradigm for economic history in Korean studies, 
see AHN, Byung-Jik (1997); for the debate on the implications of Japan's 
capital export and colonial Korea's industrialization, see KIM Nak-Nyun
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intellectual disagreements between many Korean scholars, as well as 
overseas scholars in Korean studies. Different interpretations compete with 
each other, utilizing conflicting empirical evidence and theoretical 
frameworks. This situation could be understood as the consequence of 
different research directions: 'Whereas research with the conventional 
perspective took the grand theme of identifying indigenous Korean capital 
as a whole and utilized the data on companies or on factories for this 
purpose, recent research intends to investigate one or two cases of Korean 
capital' (JOO Ik Jong, 1991: 33). Or, like the revisionist critique and its 
counter-critique, this situation may have been fashioned by both a 'magic 
(of the exploitation theory) beyond economic common senses' and a 'magic 
of economics' that ignores the actual colonial historicity (CHUNG 
Tae-Heon, 1997).
At this point, I will look at KIMURA Mitsuhiko, a Japanese economist, 
whose research questioning and conclusions would provoke critical reactions 
from those working under the broad umbrella of exploitation theory 
(Kimura, 1989, 1993, 1995). Even though it is acknowledged that the 
contributions of each article should be understood under the parameters of 
the intellectual discourse in Japanese studies, in which research on colonial 
Korea occupies an important place for the evaluation of the economic 
policies of Japanese imperialism2, and it should be necessarily reminded
(1993); for nationalism, socialism and the combination of both in the 
labour movements, see KIM Kyung-Il (1991); for female workers' 
conditions and their labour movements, see LEE Hyo-Jae (1976) and 
CHUNG Chin Sung (1988).
2) His critique of economic imperialism in terms of its insignificant 
contribution to Japan's domestic economy is a good example. See, Kimura
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that his research does not fully and officially represent all Japanese 
scholars in colonial-Korean studies, his manner of introducing and codifying 
statistical data and drawing conclusions from them, is in no way 
subsumable under the critique o f  economics as magic. He illustrates that, 
compared to colonial Taiwan, the financial inflow into the colonial account 
for Korea - the accounts for the colonial central and local government - 
from the accounts for Japan Proper - the general accounts and the special 
accounts other than the accounts for the colony - is higher than the 
outflow from the colonial account (Kimura, 1989). The statistical data from 
which Kimura produced his moderate analysis seem to be rather differently 
understood by the advocates of exploitation theory in Korea. 'I came across 
statistics ( ^ # ^ * 1 3 . )  that predominantly suggested that colonial rule 
contributed to the development of colonial Korea, in that the money inflow 
into Korea from Japan was 4,322,000,000 yens higher than the money 
outflow from Korea to Japan' (CHUNG Tae-Heon, 1997). Additionally, 
Chung argues that it is absurd to compare inflow and outflow of money 
under territorial separation, and that it is necessary to take account of its 
different usages - in terms of Korea and Koreans compared with the 
maintenance cost of colonial rule including salaries and expenses for 
Japanese bureaucrats and managers.
Kimura's other article (1993), "Standards Of Living In Colonial Korea - 
Did The Masses Become Worse O ff Or Better Off Under Japanese Rule?" 
seems to be more provocative. He argues that Korean masses' living
(1995) and Myers and Peattie (1984). Additionally, for a brief introduction 
to the implications of the Korean experience of colonial development for 
Japanese studies, see HIDEK1 Takijawa (1983) and MIYAZIMA Hiroshi 
(1993).
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standards rose between the early colonial period and 1940, as instantiated 
in a growing literacy rate, survival rates, and average stature, variables, he 
argues, that were more directly related to living conditions than other 
variables, like farm income per household, agricultural real wages, and per 
capita calorie intake from staple foods, which declined throughout that 
period. Although, there was no direct criticism of this argument, it is not 
difficult to find quite opposite and alternative stories through which the 
historiography of pre-colonial Korean projects and colonial realities are 
understood. To start with, the educational reforms toward establishing what 
is called the modem school started in the 1880s (SHIN Yong Ha, 1974) 
and the national education system had been prepared by the Chosun state 
(LEE Hye Young, 1996). Besides, registration in primary schools in the 
early colonial period, was significantly and deliberately rejected by Koreans' 
strong antagonism to the colonization process, while many students and 
parents preferred traditional institutions and voluntary organizations by 
educated Koreans (Tsurumi, 1984). Additionally, an irony arises from his 
analysis of the trends in stature. According to his collection of data, 'the 
stature of the Korean masses at least did not decrease during the colonial 
period' (Kimura, 1993: 647) (italics added). Even though this argument 
seems to intend to indirectly refute the critical comment that living 
conditions during the colonial period became worse, he also accepts that 
there was a fall in average income and deterioration in diet, the latter 
perhaps suggestive of a propensity of the Korean masses' to fashion their 
own solutions for survival.
Although it is necessary to utilize detailed statistical data in order to 
extend knowledge, I cannot fully accept the revisionist arguments either. 
This implies neither that exploitation theory and nationalistic views are
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more correct, nor that revisionist critics are misguided in their data 
analysis. It is simply because the conceptual assumptions of many 
revisionists are not detached from their own normative foundation, and this 
despite their strong critique of the advocates of exploitation theory for their 
non-objective attitudes in employing emotionally or politically motivated 
usages of language that are irrelevant for grasping historical realities. In 
fact, the normative foundation of the revisionists is not derived from the 
magic of economics, but comes from the strong idea of an economic 
modernization that must be qualitatively different from the traditional 
economic structure, a difference which is a priori constructed upon the 
vocabulary of economics. In other words, underdeveloped legislation of 
property right in late Chosun is understood in the revisionist account as a 
dead-lock of the feudal economy. At the same time, an economic project, 
for them, becomes qualified as factual evidence only when it produces a 
certain level of economic influence. This must be the reason why they do 
not accept any emerging economic phenomena and the change of taxation 
policies in the late 1890s as the pivotal point of rupture. Thus, only the 
cadastral survey can fulfill their criteria for conceptual rupture, from the 
traditional feudal economy to a modem capitalist one. The normative 
foundation for them is the modem economic system itself in general and 
modem landownership in particular.
MIYAZIMA Hiroshi (1993)'s conceptualization of modem landownership 
and its adoption, as the basis for interpreting the modem Korean 
experience, for both him and his revisionist colleagues, displays a 
dangerous aspect in developing the idea of the modem in economic 
thoughts.
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"1. the Modem landow nership system (■5‘CH Jn.—] )
is that which guarantees the logic of the commodity economy
controlling modern society to pervade landownership.............  It is
necessary to deconstruct the (pre-modem) relationship between political 
rule and landownership in order to establish the characteristics of
modem landownership system............ 2. This [land-document system
(*1*| *)]£.) intends to construct a nationwide, public map detailing the 
owners of all land, incorporating statistics, locations and so forth, 
under the principle of one-land for one-owner established by the
modem landownership system............ 3. The land-registration system
(5L*|'§-7| *)].£) aims to guarantee the secure and rapid facilitation of 
landownership in the future as well as to establish a modem
landownership system does........... 4. the Modem land taxation system
(0cH 3-j |^-<-||^l]S.) is designed to reflect the modem landownership 
system. In other words, the land tax under a modem land taxation 
system is collected in monetary form, under the assumption of the 
dominance of the commodity economy, as well as the
profit-orientation of private landowners." (pp.11-13)
His definition of the modem landownership system and its related features, 
seems unproblematic at first sight, appearing to coincide with the common 
understanding of contemporary social scientists. While his conceptualization 
is firmly based on the Japanese model, which has been developed since at 
least the Meiji reform, it soon becomes apparent that his overall idea of 
the modem economic system is taken from the European experience. In 
other words, it is a logic of interpretation borrowed from the European 
intellectual tradition, subsequently applied to Japan and further developed by 
Japanese economists themselves. He himself notes the burgeoning 
intellectual trend in Japanese studies of recent times, which critically 
reflects on the theoretical applicability of Western experiences of land 
reform for East Asia, searching for a similar historical development of 
small-farm management in the region. In spite of rejecting dependence 
theory and semi-peripheral development theory, and despite acknowledging 
the need for reconsideration of the theory of the transition to capitalism 
from feudalism, his insistence on a strong rupture between the modem 
economy and its traditional counter-part remains rigid. Perhaps because the 
Japanese experience of the modem landownership system is one that
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fundamentally underlies the current Japanese economic status quo. The 
embedded values behind the vocabulary of economics is inescapably bound 
to the full economic history of modem Japan. Miyazima's assumption about 
the modem, at a conceptual remove from the traditional, is in fact not so 
easy to undermine, in that the interpretation of the modem itself for the 
social sciences necessarily requires an identification of concrete historical 
projects - for him, the modem landownership system - which are 
qualitatively distinct as reference points. When his conceptualization is 
extended to cover the Korean situation, however, Miyazima fails to 
incorporate into his theory the issue of (a) subject(s) who decide(s) to 
develop the 'modem landownership system'. Even though he could hope to 
limit his role as an economist to one outside political judgement, it 
becomes impossible to avoid this issue, which was never significantly dealt 
with in the Japanese experience. It is not because it was unimportant, but 
because it was superfluous to Japanese requirements. Insofar as Japan 
became the subject of narrative for the cadastral survey and the legislation 
of the 'modem land taxation system' in colonial Korea, rather than Korean 
actors, Miyazima's perception of the modem deserves contestation in 
intellectual discourses. For the introduction of the modem landownership 
system by Japan could be differently understood from both the Japanese 
and Korean side. From a Japanese perspective, it could possibly represent 
an extended opportunity, a benevolent gift from an earlier enlightened and 
more qualified Japan to Korea. From a Korean view, it may represent a 
lost opportunity for autonomously arriving at a modem economic system; 
Japan's pillage of the Korean project. Could this not be a basis for the 
widespread nationalistic sentiments in both intellectual worlds? Furthermore, 
could it be one of the reasons why many Korean scholars display a 
preference for investigating Korean projects in the pre-colonial period which
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were incomplete at the time of the Japanese occupation?
Regrettably, the nationalist review in general and the exploitation theory in 
particular do not have a fully differentiated idea of the modem compared 
with the revisionist view, in spite of their excessive attention to the issue 
of the subject of colonial modernization. Many scholars do not doubt the 
values of the categories of 'we/they' and 'Korea/Japan', although critics of 
exploitation theory and even some Marxists at least note that response from 
Koreans was fragmented, according to their economic and social interests. 
The exploitation theory does not doubt the negativeness of what Japan left 
as a whole, while new and old revisionists in economic history question 
this and political economists positively evaluate Japanese involvement for 
colonial Korea. At the same time, whereas some recent research focuses 
more on the influence of those economic policies - the 'shift from a feudal 
economy to a capitalist economy' -, a majority of the research takes the 
Japanese empire's violent occupation of Korea as its starting point, from 
which the intentions underpinning economic policies are revealed - 'with 
pistol and surveying instrument'. Some of this latter research dwelt on 
economic transformation, in terms of the replacement of the agricultural 
economy by industrialization from the late 1920s, under which perspective 
Koreans were always regarded as victims of social discrimination. As an 
example, 'The rate of Koreans' unemployment was more than double that 
of their Japanese counterparts' (HUH Soo Youl, 1993). However, the 
economic policies, which should be understood as the long-term effects on 
society of the colonial management of Korea, were barely evaluated for  
new visions of the post-colonial Korean economy and economic actors. In 
other words, while most evaluations of economic policies and their 
consequences have been effected under the strong dichotomy between Korea
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and Japan and an unbalanced distribution of economic benefit and loss, the 
Korean economy and economic actors in most cases were treated as the 
appendages of their Japanese counterparts. This tends to mean that, 
whatever normative conclusions are drawn, in many discourses the ultimate 
responsibility for colonial economic modernization implicitly seems to be 
located with Japanese actors. Regrettably, in spite of the risk of 
oversimplification, it is difficult to find a considered review of state- 
centered economic developmentalism, in terms of the economic vision for 
post-colonial Korea, and this applies both to exploitation theory and to 
colonial modernization theory, excepting some socialist and Marxian 
alternatives.
3.2. Divergent socio-economic goals and political visions in colonial 
Korea
3.2.1. Decline o f  the traditional social hierarchy
It has been argued above, that some of the major economic discourses on 
the colonial fieriod are at least indirectly dependent on non-economic value 
orientations, and that these discourses have inescapably political 
implications, which means that a political reading of statistical data can 
often be observed. Also, it was indicated that the ways of interpreting each 
economic issue by the participants in the debates are implicitly related to 
the intellectuals' own economic orientations fo r  Korea in the present time. 
Whatever the purposes and consequences of the economic policies by Japan 
and the colonial state might be, it must be true that they had a big impact 
on all Koreans' interpretative attitudes to the world and that they provoked 
Koreans to have stronger self-identities.
It becomes necessary here to investigate the socio-political dimension of the
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economic transformation propelled by the colonial state. If the political 
crisis in the late nineteenth century caused many Koreans to become 
uncertain of their economic relations, which were deeply rooted in a 
traditional social status, the Japanese occupation seriously destabilized 
traditional economic relations through its destruction of the political 
authority of the Korean state and its undermining of the power of 
customary agreements for the local community. The introduction of new 
legislation by the colonial state concerning land taxation, partly ignored the 
property rights of farmers and the right of cultivation, which had not 
previously been guaranteed by law, but by social agreement in Chosun 
society. The resultant loosening of fanners' attachment to particular lands 
meant that they would move from one land to another when the boom for 
rice exports to Japan occurred. The measures increased competition between 
small farmers who had to work as tenant farmers at the same time, and so 
consequently the power of landowners became stronger in relation to tenant 
farmers. Some of the big landowners, who had earned huge profits, could 
mobilize their wealth for investment in different industries, banking, textiles, 
and so on. However, surviving in the colonial economic structure involved 
cooperation with the colonial state and Japanese entrepreneurs in several 
ways (see MIN Kyung Hwan, 1991 and YOON Seok-Beom et al., 1996 
for the banking industry; Eckert, 1991 for the textile industry), a fact 
belabored by nationalist and socialist critics.
As I noted in chapter 2, the hierarchical structure of status, which had 
lasted throughout Chosun society fluctuated significantly in the late 
nineteenth century, when the people who suffered social discrimination 
began to voice their collective demand for institutional reform. Although 
Chosun and the empire o f  Great Korea ended up with incomplete reforms,
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collective behavior - in terms of organizing interest groups, establishing
religious organizations and even their own religions, continuously developed 
in colonial Korea. It is interesting to observe the change in the human
rights movements, dedicated to eliminating the strong idea o f social status 
and social discrimination in the new economic situation. The paekchong (®) 
3)'s organization of Hyongpyongsa A)-), which literally means the
Equalization Society, and its active movement for human rights and
economic interests is a good example of the changing orientation of social 
movements in the transforming period (Shaw, 1991; KIM Joong-Seop, 
1999). The paekchong was one of the discriminated under-classes in 
Chosun society, whose members’ occupations included slaughterers and 
butchers, tanners and leather workers, wicker craftmen, and occasionally 
executioners. They initiated Hyongpyongsa in 1923, following earlier 
collective actions, at a time when social discrimination was still germane to 
their situation and when their monopolization of meat processing was under 
threat from non-paekchong members - other Koreans and Japanese - 
actively involved in this industry. While the Hyongpyong movement was 
motivated by the principle of equal human rights with other Koreans - with 
regard to opportunities for school enrollment and to participating in 
community events as equals, for example the history o f members' 
politico-economic orientations toward practical agendas was quite diverse. 
And this, not only because of a loosening of the occupational tie between 
the paekchong and the meat producing industry, but also because of a 
multiplicity of complex interests derived from different regions, generations, 
and occupations. Furthermore, many members' involvement in other social 
movements that were mainly related to the anti-colonial social atmosphere, 
the introduction of socialist visions in the Hyongpyong movement and 
Japanese intervention in this situation, meant that the organizational
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solidarity among members diminished more and more by the 1930s. 
Diversification of their political, social or economic goals and practical 
differentiations were not only based on their ontological situation as a 
pre-defined status group, which had prevailed in Chosun society and which 
needed re-configuring, but also supported by a novel interpretative
framework for the emerging world, in which actors' roles were newly 
demanded, not only as a paekchong, but also as Koreans, workers, 
intellectuals, entrepreneurs, nationalists, and socialists.
3.2.2. Reformulating political alternatives under Western intellectual 
influences
Around the breakdown of the Korean state and its disappearance under
colonization, many Korean political actors felt an initial urge to identify the 
causes for the loss of state sovereignty, on the path to seeking ways to 
overcome colonial rule in an independent Korean state. Research on 
independence movements in the colonial period as a whole reveals how the 
political direction of many Korean actors changed. While political
movements in the 1910s were mainly shaped by an overarching nationalist 
idea, in which the Korean nation itself became the quiddity for political
reasoning, political practices in the 1920s began to develop diverse political
projects for achieving the independence of the Korean state. Specific
ideological preferences unveiled political tensions amongst actors within
independence movements. During the 1930s when colonial rule established 
a stable control over the colonized society through economic and cultural 
transformations, and when Korean society itself operated as a satellite of a 
Japanese empire that sought military expansion into the East Asian
continent, Korean actors in the independence movement became more 
fragmented, according to their ideological choices.
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If the grand conceptual transformation - that interpreted domestic politics 
through the critical issue of the modernization of the state and new 
religious activities within a newly shaped awareness of diverse conceptual 
boundaries - occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, its actual 
representation in Korean political actors' practices became prominent in the 
colonial period. Several flows in the cultural, political and social 
movements of the colonial period could be understood as the different 
contributions of Korean actors' to the new world; a desire to belong, both 
for themselves and more importantly, for their nation.
Even though a wide-spread and strong perception of the Korean nation was 
one of the most significant determinants for Korean actors, it is also clear 
that such a concept was highly diversely interpreted, although never 
invoking a return to the traditional Chosun. The republican idea o f state 
constitution, which was the founding ideology for the provisional state at 
Shanghai in China and the independence movement in 1919 (Kourbanov, 
2001), and the socialist visions deeply rooted in one of the major groups 
in the independence army, did not depend on an affinity to the Chosun 
state, in spite of the fact that the history of the Korean nation in general 
and of Chosun in particular, as symbols, were located at the centre of the 
new political visions. Political thoughts from Europe, America, and the 
Soviet Union, via Japan in many cases, became embedded in the political 
alternatives argued for by major political actors, alongside of the effects of 
internationalization of the independence movements, on the one hand, and 
the economic transformations and changed political structures of Korea, on 
the other.
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Two of the most important political figures of the independence movement, 
RHEE Syngman and AHN Chang-Ho, who helped organize the provisional 
state in the 1910s and 1920s and who later devoted themselves to 
diplomatic activities, lectures on cultural nationalism, reformative Korean 
civilization and the US-based independence movements, had carved their 
political orientations for Korea's independence from the observation of 
North America's broad civilizational achievements (LEW Young Ick, 2000; 
AHN Chang-Ho, 1973). Unlike many other political actors who devoted 
themselves to military independence movements, Rhee and Ahn focused on 
the role of international powers for gaining Korea's independence and on 
the education of Koreans for making Koreans a civilized people. They can 
be understood as an example of the modem intellectual, individuals heavily 
influenced by modernist ideas in the transformation of state and society 
towards advanced civilization, and a type of young intellectuals that had 
been spreading since in the 1890s and 1900s. Their confidence in 
identifying and promoting the merits of Western civilizational achievements 
for Korea, including Protestantism, thus, became the basic political 
orientation for their political activities in the colonial period and determined 
the substance of practices for the independence movements. JIN Deok-Gyu 
(1985) has investigated the ideological foundation of right-wing nationalism 
in the 1920s, in terms of the westernization of interpretative modes, later 
the foundation for the strong anti-communist political actor of the post­
liberation period. Ideological development of right-wing nationalism, faced 
with the strong challenge from socialism at that time, was dependent on 
enlightenment thought, for development and modernization in general, for 
homogenizing the Koreans with the Japanese in societal development and 
for civilizing Koreans for the independence of Korea in the future.
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The introduction of Marxism had two sources: a political source and an 
academic one. It is a well known fact that the political actors involved in 
independence movements in Manchu and the Far East, were aware of
socialism in the 1910s and even had significant communications with the 
Russian Red Army in the 1920s. Besides, many members of the 
independence armies shared socialist and communist ideologies, often 
becoming important political actors in the post-liberation period. However, 
the development of Marxian thought among academics was influenced by 
the circulation o f socialist thinkers' works in the imperial university 
established by Japan in Seoul, and many works by Marxian thinkers,
translated in Japanese, were imported from Japan. SHIN Nam-Chol, one of 
the early Marxian thinkers, for example, learned his philosophical 
interpretation of Marxism at university, and later extended Marxian 
methodology into Korean studies (KIM Jae-hyun, 2000, 1999), under the
influence of BAEK Nam-Un's teaching, who had himself learned Marxism 
in Japan in the early 1920s (BANG Gi-Jung, 1992). While their 
interpretation of colonial Korea and even traditional Chosun, and their
suggestion of political alternatives under a Marxian framework, should be 
interpreted as part of a critical response to a scholarship supported by the 
colonial state, the ways of distancing themselves from colonial ideology 
were indelibly shaped by the grand framework of European intellectual 
projects.
The impact of Western thought on Korean actors is significant in three 
ways: firstly, critical reflections on the past; secondly, strong ideas of the 
future, with which the present situation is interpreted; thirdly, critical 
attitudes to the other, especially the internal other among Koreans. The 
critical interpretation of the past does not simply mean that the Korean
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past was fully negative. It also includes the identification of an internal 
process of overcoming contradictions and problems which had prevailed. 
This precisely means that the way of understanding problems as problems 
and the way of accepting alternatives as alternatives, which are irreducibly 
based on a new epistemology after conceptual rupture and a cosmological 
shift, are provided with the help of comparative examples from the West, 
that also provide new vision. Their situation, then, was understood as a 
point of departure for an enlightenment vision, which seemed to be 
supported by the systematic interpretation of the past and a logical 
expectation of a prosperous future (see Chakrabarty, 2000 on eurocentrism 
in Indian society). The well-prepared visions for the future, necessarily 
included practical agendas for the present. As socialists, communists, 
nationalists, newly civilized Protestant intellectuals, modem entrepreneurs, 
journalists or 'new women', many Koreans presented their political goals 
and new social ideas during the colonial period, with their own mapping of 
the new Korea of the future. However, in the fragmentation of Koreans 
into several and even opposite orientations, including some taking the 
Japanese side, they began to be critical of other Korean groups. A strong 
perception of other Koreans in the political sphere as 'the other1, or even 
more seriously, as 'the enemy', finally led to conflicts between Korean 
actors in the post-liberation period.
Conclusion: Making alternatives in learning a new civilizational framewo
The colonial period can be understood as the main stage of an 
epistemological shift, which had begun in the late nineteenth century. 
Wherever Korean actors were located in the political spectrum of that time, 
their practices were shaped by a certain recognition of a new world, in 
which Korea and China-centered ideas had broken down. More
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significantly, their recognition of a new world and their embedding in new 
worldly processes, necessarily required a critical evaluation of their own 
cultural and intellectual resources, on the one hand, and of the political 
failure of the Korean state, on the other. Strong nationalist programmes 
reemerged in a colonial environment where political practices were 
necessarily intensified under the influence of political control and 
socio-economic transformation. It was in this environment that Korean 
political actors sought to initiate alternative political and economic processes 
for themselves.
The dichotomy between activists in the independence movements and 
collaborators with the Japanese empire, which has rigidly structured many 
political discourses, does not seem to be persuasive for understanding the 
overall transformation of conceptual frameworks in which political projects 
and their realizations are mapped. In terms of the catégorial distinction of 
Korean actors, many political and economic actors emerged and disappeared 
through the colonial period. Needless to say, while some Korean terrorists 
had no doubt of the value of their patriotic acts for the nation, the Korean 
secret policemen of the colonial state must have had recourse to justifying 
their betrayals of the nation in several ways. While the independence 
armies outside of the Korean peninsula did expect the liberation of Korea 
and the collapse of the Japanese empire, the Korean officers in the 
Japanese and Manchurian armies could not have doubted their roles for the 
greater good of Japanese prosperity. The conventional dichotomy also fails 
to explain the reasons for the positional change of many Korean leaders in 
the peninsula, who had actively organized and participated in the moderate 
reform movements in the cultural sphere and humanities, only to become 
advocates of Japanese policies later.
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4. One nation and two states in Korean politics: modernity and war
Introduction: The broken dream of building a new nation-state
The liberation of Korea from colonization was achieved on the 15th of 
August 1945 when Japan finally surrendered to the allied powers. For both 
the USA and the USSR, the Korean peninsula had become an international 
strategic point for security. The security fears in East Asia against further 
expansion of the socialist bloc, enabled the USA to suggest the division of 
the Korean peninsula at longitude north 38. For the international powers 
the Korean people were regarded as the uncivilized who could not afford 
to build their nation-state.1 Unlike the international powers, Koreans viewed 
the defeat of Japanese colonialism as an opportunity to establish their own 
autonomous state, which had been their foremost desire since the 
experience of the colonial period. The situation in Korea, however, 
militated against this, despite the ongoing activity of independence 
movements in the Korean peninsula, China, Manchu, and other regions and 
an increasing interest in proposals for the governance of the new state. The 
problem was one of lack of unity among the fragmented groups when 
liberation occurred. There were socialists who had an allegiance with the 
Soviet Union or the Chinese communist party, nationalists siding with 
America or the Chinese nationalist party, independent center-left nationalists, 
and collaborators with the Japanese empire. These divided political positions 
and different orientations shaped post-liberation politics in a conflictive way. 
However, for all Korean actors, the liberation of Korea truly meant the 
restoration of the sovereign state, an issue that was neglected issue by the 
USA, at least.
1) See the historical note at the end of this chapter.
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The emergence of the two-state system after 1948 fundamentally determines 
the direction of societal development in the South and North. As 
symbolized enemies, the two states have negatively influenced each other in 
their opposition. Antagonism between South Korea and North Korea is 
more than that between two states and their elite groups, even though it is 
normally manipulated by the states. It also thrives on peoples' different 
perceptions of the other side, based on experience, political orientation, and 
a grand historical philosophical bent of the Korean nation, according to 
which the other side deserves criticism. This chapter will mainly concern 
itself with post liberation politics, in which political actors began to form a 
rigid position against their counter-parts, both before and after the initiation 
of the hostile two-state system in the peninsula.
In order to correctly understand the particular Korean situation - the 
emergence of two states after colonization -, it is necessary to rethink the 
meaning of the concepts, the nation-state and modem nation-state, in the 
Korean context. In chapter 1, I tried to introduce the characteristics of 
Chosun as a nation-state that was quite distinctive, not only in its 
administrative structure, but also in its political and intellectual resources. 
When the institutional difference between Chosun and previous states - the 
emergence of a strong central state and the disappearance of provincial 
powers - was introduced, I intended to make Chosun a compatible mirror 
of the nation-state in recent European history. The unique power 
relationship between the kingship and the Coniucian bureaucrats and literati 
was introduced in order to illustrate how Chosun's state formation differed 
from the absolute monarchy system in Europe. I used the term 'the colonial 
state' to investigate the socio-economic and political transformation that
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influenced Korean actors' political orientations, without indicating the 
existence o f  the hermeneutical contradiction in conceptualizing 'Korean' 
political actors without Korean citizenship. While many social scientists do 
use the term, the nation-state, in order to identify its distinctive
characteristics compared to its traditional counterparts and thereby implicitly 
acknowledge the existence of an epochal rupture between the modem age 
and pre-modem political systems, I do not intend to treat the
institutionalization of the new state in South Korea in this way - i.e., 
comparing it with Chosun and the colonial state. Such a differential 
qualifying o f  the new state does not help to recognize the nature of the 
state in the long term political process. Rather, the two-state system within 
which the South Korean state has hewn its path in contradistinction to the 
North Korean will be the object of inquiry for this chapter. In terms of 
embedding any meaning for either state as a characteristic modem 
nation-state, neither of them could be understood thus, so long as their 
elites argue their supreme and ultimate legitimacy over the other.
4.1. Bi-polarization of politics and political antagonism in the post­
liberation period
4. 1. 1. The political legacy o f the colonial experience in the emergence 
of the two-state system
Some works on post-liberation politics have focused on the chronological 
events and procedural problems related to the issues of the US military 
occupation o f the South and the Soviet Union similarly in the North, their 
international proposals for a temporary trusteeship of Korea, Koreans' 
divided responses to them and the election for a constitutional assembly. In 
addition, the Korean war was seen as an sudden event that came from out
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of the blue. However, given the fact that major political actors in the 
post-liberation period had developed their own political visions and different 
political agendas for the new nation-state throughout the colonial period, the 
conventional perspective can hardly explain how the bipolarization of 
post-liberation politics was accelerated by Korean actors themselves.
Among the uncovered political issues produced by the colonial experience, 
at least two issues - the independence of Korea and the punishment of 
pro-Japanese collaborators - were normatively accepted in public discourse 
by most social and political actors. Political actors considered the 
independence of Korea as the goal of their resistance to the colonial state 
and the Japanese empire thereby became the source of the power for 
political movements and militaiy struggle. Besides, independence was 
regarded as the only way to open a new era in which all social conflicts, 
that had occurred in a societal transformation driven by an organized 
modernization through colonial policies, could be solved. In other words, all 
political actors anticipated the successful presentation of their wills in the 
new independent state, which, they expected, would be inaugurated with the 
defeat of Japan in the second world war. The expectation of an immediate 
rebuilding of an independent state, however, was shattered by the 
international agreement on trusteeship for Korea. Nonetheless, political 
actors were not so easily disencumbered of the issue of the future of the 
Korean state. It is because the public could only identify themselves with 
those actors who clearly advocated the immediate building of an 
independent state. All political groups, in the early stage, expressed strong 
opposition to trusteeship, which they manifested through jointly organizing a 
national protest. However, this unity eventually split into two blocs, siding 
with the different attitudes expressed by the US and the USSR in the Joint
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Commission.2
Nationalism was widely utilized as a panacea against communist ideology 
at that time. While its usage had become firmly rooted in political 
discourse at least since the 1920s, for indicating non-socialist and
non-communist groups, the setting for the relational formation of 
counter-concepts between communism and nationalism in post-liberation
politics contributed certainly to the construction of clear ideological
orientations for each. However, within the bi-polarized understanding of 
politics, the verbal expression of 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' itself and the 
self-labeling as nationalist by some political actors, tended to the 
enlargement of their political influence. Important political and economic 
figures who were often considered leaders, preferred the label of 
nationalism and nationalist to that of communism and communist. Through 
the colonial period, any nationalist activity in the peninsula was easily 
uncovered by the colonial state and was directly interfered with by political
2) Faced with the USSR's insistence that political groups and parties who 
did not agree with the decision of the Moscow Conference in 1945 would 
not be allowed to participate in the compromise talk, some communist
groups decided to accept the decision, whereas the right-wing bloc 
continuously rejected the procedural development of trusteeship. In this 
situation, the US representative insisted that all social and political 
organizations should be included in the compromise. For communist groups, 
participation in the Joint Commission was regarded as an assurance of their 
hegemony. For right-wing blocs, conversely, it meant political defeat. For 
the US, the exclusion of right wing blocs was not acceptable, because it 
would have threatened their international security strategy. See SONG 
Gyon-Ho (1985) and YANG Ho-Min (1993).
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suppression. This consequently led nationalist actors to be less radical and 
to either become reformative cultural and political movements or 
institutionalized economic actors. In a sense, the maintenance of political 
and economic leadership itself under colonial control, could be understood 
as a certain cooperation with the colonial state (JIN Deok-Gyu, 1985). For 
this reason, many nationalists - even in their own subjective interpretation - 
were accused as pro-Japanese collaborators by the former independence 
movement groups. When the issue of the punishment of pro-Japanese 
collaborators was highlighted in post-liberation politics, the images of 
pro-Japanese collaborators - who had been portrayed during the colonial 
period as traitors of the nation - became more amplified.3 Even though 
punishment for collaboration acquired normative justification and was 
widely supported by the people, its concrete practice provoked serious 
political conflict, affecting the future of Korea in relation to its 
independence. One year after liberation, former Korean bureaucrats, 
policemen, even army officers in the colonial state, and many entrepreneurs 
enjoyed an economic status built around their support by the US military 
government as anti-communists, and further extending their political power 
as nationalists. Many became supporters of a politician, RHEE Sung-man, 
who paved the way for a bi-polar politics of the state between right and
3) As soon as he had returned to Korea, KIM Gu, the leader of the provisional 
state of Korea, ordered his followers to assassinate one of the main collaborators, 
SONG Jin-Woo (see Cumings, 1981). This episode seems to clearly indicate how 
censorious nationalists in the independence movement abroad were to Koreans 
who took the Japanese side. Ironically enough, Song was a major member of a 
new party, Hankook Minju Dang (?}"=i'?] ^  <3 )  - as were other influential actors 
on the Japanese side - which was regarded by the Americans as a group of 
well-educated democrats. Song was finally killed.
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left, and who received political support from the US military government. 
Through a series of political agendas to which most Korean actors were 
opposed, the state authority lost its political neutrality and fell into criticism 
from the left and many former anti-Japanese nationalists.
The division of Korea by external powers, the intention of these powers to 
practice trusteeship, and a tangible ideological confrontation between the 
USA and the USSR, goaded domestic Korean actors to look for an 
amicable bloc in which to secure their socio-political positions. During the 
political fluctuation caused by trusteeship in 1945, and armed conflicts until 
1948, most political actors found themselves on one side or another of a 
bi-polarity. In addition to the disappearance of intellectual influences from 
the centre-left and centre-right perspective (BANG Gi-Jung, 1992 for BAEK 
Nam-Un's case; CHUNG Yoon-Jae, 1999 for AN Chae-hong), the death of 
two political leaders, YEO Un-Hyung and KIM Gu, could be symbolically 
regarded as the collapse of political groups who were not supported either 
by the US military government, or by the new state under RHEE 
Sung-Man's power.4 Interestingly, their political orientations were both
4) Most of all, the American military government seriously misread the political 
tension that had resulted from the colonial experience. Under the guidance of 
anti-socialist and anti-communist policies from the USA, it initially ignored the 
political authority of the committee for the preparation of establishing Korea - 
"id 3] which had maintained public order until the American
militaiy arrived in the South. The leader, YEO Un-Hyung, was a centre-left 
nationalist with a Christian background, who was recognized by the colonial state 
as a moderate intellectual who could take over the state without provoking 
political chaos. He was assassinated by a supporter of Hankook Minju Dang. 
Moreover, the military government prohibited nationalists in the provisional
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nationalist, even though Yeo could be classified as centre-left, and Kim as 
radical rightist with terrorist proclivities against Japan. For both leaders and 
their political supporters, political ideologies and their differences were not 
the primary issue fueling their political desire. Building a new nation-sate 
that was independent from any international power was the first political 
goal, for which end they could include all political actors. Yeo's case is an 
example of how Korean intellectuals, confronted by colonization and the 
introduction of Christianity and socialism, became reformative Christian 
nationalists with a loose idea of socialism (PARK Yong-Gyu, 1997), 
whereas Kim's case shows how some nationalists differentiated their 
positions from those of communists by expanding the idea of a nation 
beyond class relations. Even though these nation-centered political actors 
finally lost political power within post-liberation politics, their political 
orientations, as inexhaustible intellectual resources, have gained prominence 
in the formation of a strong nationalism as a third political alternative 
beyond the rigid state ideology of the South and North. In South Korea 
especially, where political tension has emerged in the conflict between state 
and counter-state actors, the nationalist perspective has dominated public 
sentiment and has been combined with democratic movements against the 
authoritarian state.
government of the republic of Korea - who had organized in China - from 
returning to Korea under their organizational banner. Influential activists and 
militants, therefore, had to come back as individuals rather than as representatives 
of a symbolic political organization. The leader, KIM Gu, who had an intense 
dislike of former Japanese collaborators and who did not want the separation of 
Korea under any circumstance, was assassinated by an army officer of the new 
South Korean state.
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It is no doubt problematic to generally characterize all members of the new 
state elite in the South Korean state established in 1948 as anti-communists 
and anti-socialists; as collaborators with the colonial state. The first 
president, RHEE Sung-Man, was known above all as a well known activist 
for Korean independence. In spite of this, it should be remarked that many 
personnel of the new-born state had gained their professional knowledge in 
administration, bureaucratic affairs, public security and military affairs 
through participating in the institutions of the colonial state (Henderson, 
1991). Its place in the Japanese planned economy meant that Korea's public 
administration structures were also well-organized by the office of the
governor-general. On the one hand, the bureaucratic structure was expanded
considerably: the number of government officials increased from some 
10,000 in 1910 to nearly 87,552 in 1937. On the other hand, local 
administration was also expanded under centrally-administered state control 
(Eckert et al. 1990: 257-8). Even though their professional contributions to 
the new state have not been dealt with in depth in Korean studies5, at
least the political contribution of bureaucrats to the formation of the
authoritarian state is visible. Above all, they were hostile to former political 
activists and militants who opposed the colonial state and Japanese 
militarism. Given that the colonial state and the Japanese empire since the
5) One could introduce two reasons for this: firstly, the American style of 
managing state affairs had become accepted, ever since advisors from the USA 
had helped establish the new state; secondly, new South Korea hardly had enough 
time to introduce stable state policies, before the war with North Korea and its 
post-war effects. However, it does seem important to understand how state 
institutions have been organized and developed by Koreans, the participants in the 
colonial state in the post-liberation period, in order to comprehend the periodic 
mediation between the colonial state and the contemporary South Korean state.
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1930s increased its suppression of leftist groups, it is then hardly surprising 
that ex-collaborators failed to embraced leftist perspective. Furthermore, 
many leftist groups denigrated the politics of colonial activities and
supported the elimination of ex-collaborators, making their political position 
diametrically opposed. With the mutation of the collaborators' political roles, 
from rightist groups to the state elite, their anti-leftist violence became
more pronounced and flourished under the justification of state activities.
When the South succumbed to political chaos and finally the new state 
was established in line with American foreign policies, the North went in 
the opposite direction, favoring the Soviet Union. However, the domestic
confrontation between different political actors in the North was not so
serious as in the South. Here, socialists and communists did not face 
powerful political challenges from ex-collaborators and rightist groups, but 
enjoyed a certain autonomous political responsibility for domestic affairs 
under the Soviet Union's tutelage instead. However, with the emergence of 
two separate states and the introduction of the communist management of 
state and society, many landowners, former civil servants in the colonial 
state, and Christians turned their backs on the new North Korean regime. 
With the war of 1950-1953, many of them decided to move to the South, 
where they became yet another source of anti-communism (KANG In-Chul, 
1992; KANG Jeong-Gu, 1992).
4. 1. 2. The beginning o f  the legitimation crisis in the South Korean State
Two Korean states emerged in 1948. The constitutional assembly in South 
Korea effectively plumped for a two-state system, through its unilateral 
establishment of the South Korean state. North Korea reacted to this 
process by establishing its own state in the North. During the divisive
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period between 1945 and 1948, the political struggle among actors resulted 
in the dominance of anti-communists in the South and the establishment of 
a socialist coalition in the North. Unlike the North Korean path to building 
a socialist state, the anti-communist state in South Korea faced strong 
political resistance from several groups. While many works on the 
liberation period in Korean Studies have highlighted the problematic process 
of the emerging South Korean state in terms of the settlement of the 
political sphere based on violence, exclusion and enforcement (KANG 
Man-Gil, 1985; PARK Se-Gil, 1988; SONG Geon-Ho, 1979) and the 
problematic nature of the US policies for reintroducing the colonial legacy 
into new South Korean politics (Cumings, 1981), it seems necessary also to 
highlight the nature of anti-communist ideas in the South, that were 
instrumental for the reorganization of right-wing political actors.
The ideological fragmentation of Korean political actors in the colonial 
period occurred over the question of how Korean independence could best 
be achieved. The wide political spectrum of nationalist groups included 
different types of socialist and communist alternatives. In spite of an 
increased ideological tension among nationalist groups, the basic political 
clash took place between advocates for the independence of Korea and 
Korean collaborators in the colonial state, rather than as nationalism as a 
right-wing perspective versus socialism on the left. The recognition that 
even many right-wing nationalists in the independence movement were 
hostile to Korean collaborators with the Japanese, is crucial for 
understanding that ideological preference was secondary to the question of 
independence. Accordingly, there were two nationalist groups coded together 
in the binary code for independence. In fact, the grand category of 
nationalists together with anti-communists in post-liberation politics, was one
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significantly manipulated by former Korean officials of the colonial state, 
while nationalists with experience of independence movements were 
rendered impotent when their organizational power collapsed after the 
failure to prevent the emergence of separate states.
The legitimation crisis of the South Korean state in the 1940s is 
inescapably related to the problematic treatment of the colonial legacy, 
especially of the Korean actors who had entertained a hostile relationship 
to political actors in the independence movements. While the North Korean 
state proceeded to enact its own economic programmes with the help of 
the USSR, South Korea was forced to follow the American programmes. 
However, whereas the socialist programmes, that were introduced under the 
guidance of a new state elite who had made their political careers in the 
independence movements, were widely welcomed in North Korea, the 
capitalist programmes instituted by ex-colonial bureaucrats, provoked strong 
challenges from political dissidents. For the nationalists with pro-Japanese 
experience and their supporters, the anti-communist ideology was, as a 
negative campaign, the only way they could retain political power. Political 
projects were never presented in their own right, but always in reference to 
demonized others. Only within this tension with other hostile political 
actors, could they secure their own political influence. The spread of anti­
communism in Korean society since the 1940s was the successful result of 
the manipulation of this tension. In a sense, increasing the legitimacy of 
the newly established state on the basis of a strong critique of communism 
and socialism, would have faced serious challenge if the division of Korea 
had not occurred. The overriding socialist influence in the North 
consequently helped to reorganize Korean actors under the banner of 
nationalism. The groups that benefited most from the ideological battle of
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bi-polar politics were the nationalist groups. The second problem of anti­
communism as a negative campaign, was that as a result of strong 
antagonism and political conflict, South Korean society was exposed to a 
highly organized modernization, that later became appropriated by the 
authoritarian state. Anti-communism has lasted in Korean society, nourished 
by an illegitimate state elite - this will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
The South Korean state, however, began to come to grips with the 
legitimation crisis during the Korean war.
4.2. The Korean wan The driving force of state formation in the 
post-liberation period
4.2.1. The Korean war as the shadow o f post-liberation politics
It has been said that sociology and social theory have concerned
themselves less with war as part of their theoretical work, than with many 
other socio-political and economic issues, in spite of the fact that modernity 
as a research object has been considerably shaped by the influence of wars, 
as has been undermined by those thinkers who have developed their own 
intellectual alternatives within the experience of war (Wittrock, 2001). 
Traditional modernization theory, for example, which hardly considers war 
as within its remit, has indubitably and ironically been involved in the
process of societal change related to war (Joas, 1999). While war, as the
major form of collective violence, has been one of the predominant
political tools for inter-state and international affairs, even applicable to 
economic transformation (Mann, 1988; Tilly, 1993), the implications of war 
on the process of state formation, in terms of determining certain political 
characteristics rather than introducing a change of policies or
democratization, have been largely ignored in the social sciences. Whereas 
it is rather easy to find historical examples of war leading to the collapse
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of a state and the building of a new state, war as an instituting tool for a 
young and unstable state seems to be hardly evidenced. The Korean 
experience empirically fits the latter case: a state authority in South Korea, 
which failed to persuade contending counter-state political actors, finally 
gained its hegemonic power by controlling the political sphere through war. 
The Korean war, as the military event between 1950 and 1953, was a 
political medium that genuinely contributed to this political process of state 
formation and the relationship of the state to Korean society.
The fact that the Korean war occurred only two years after the separation, 
at least indirectly indicates that the new states had not had enough time to 
establish stable institutions. What are the contributions of the Korean war 
to the South Korean state?6 KIM Young-Myung (1993) argues that the 
Rhee regime overcame the financial crisis of the new state with the help 
of American aid for military and economic resources motivated by the 
occurrence of the Korean war, while at the same time making progress on 
the road to long-term occupation of the state by eliminating counter-actors 
from politics. However, I would like to focus on the role of the Korean 
war for the state formation process itself, in which the South Korean state 
finally acquired its legitimation, on the one hand, and in which counter­
state actors finally lost political power in post-liberation politics, on the 
other. Put otherwise, the Korean war was the event in the process by 
which the state and counter-state actors finally arrived at an asymmetrical 
relationship of influence for their own political visions. The common 
problem in properly understanding the Korean war, ironically, comes from
6) GOH Byung-Chul et al. (1992) investigates how deeply the Korean war 
influenced not only the socialist programmes in North Korea, but also the 
particular political structure around KIM Il-Sung.
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its one-dimensional conceptualization as an international war between 
independent states.
- A schematic understanding o f the Korean war
The Korean war was begun on the dawn of 25 June 1950. The North 
Korean army invaded South Korea along the breadth of 38° parallel with 
powerful artillery and a number of tanks. It was a sudden attack, without 
the declaration of war, for the 'Redification' of South Korea by the 
communist state.7 The North Korean army, which had superior military 
power over the South Korean, occupied Seoul after three days of warfare 
and finally reached the Nagdong river which flows to the southern end of 
the Korean peninsula in early July. The USA immediately called a meeting 
of the UN security council on 26 June. The UN accused North Korea of 
invading South Korea and organized a UN army for the first time in its 
history, whereby sixteen member states sent their armies to the Korean 
peninsula in support of South Korea. The US, as the major military force 
in the UN army, changed the course of the war with the disembarking 
operation at Incheon, near Seoul, on 15 September in the same year. Seoul 
was liberated on 28 September from North Korean occupation. The allied 
armies of South Korea and the UN crossed 38° North latitude on 1
7) The North Korean story of the Korean war, however, denies the initiation of 
the war by North Korea and asserts that they crossed the border in a 'counter­
attack' of the South Korean army, after having successfully repulsed their initial 
attack. But, as far as the majority of archival and empirical research in the fields 
of politics, international relations and military history are concerned, the 
culpability for the Korean war rests squarely with the North Korean side. In this 
thesis, I follow the assertion of North Korea's initiation of the war as outlined by 
the main stream of research in the social sciences.
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October, entering the northern zone. They were forced to retreat south, 
however, by the intervention of the peoples' army of China in the front at 
the Northern end of the Korean peninsula. Seoul was re-occupied by the 
North Korean army on 4 January 1951. Since the early summer of 1951, 
the war witnessed no further significant territorial movement and settled 
near the current de-militarized zone, which is a slightly modified line from 
the 38° parallel. The Soviet Union proposed armistice talks in the UN. 
After a further two years' combat, finally, the US, as the representative of 
the UN armies, and North Korea and China, together signed the treaty for 
armistice on 27 July 1953. The Korean war produced enormous damage for 
Koreans and other participants, as well as a high number of casualties: 
990,000 South Korean soldiers, 40,000 US soldiers and 30,000 other UN 
soldiers, 510,000 North Korean soldiers and 500,000 Chinese soldiers were 
dead and several hundred thousand soldiers were injured (HAN Young-U, 
1998 (vol. 3)). The treaty for armistice in 1953 is still in operation today, 
even after 'the cold war1 has ended in Europe.
4.2.1. Conceptualization o f  rupture in time: The subjective position 
interpreting the event
The debate on the historical origin of modernity in the Korean context was 
introduced in chapter 2. I argued there that, in spite of a significant 
rupture, to some extent, from durable institutional customs, none of the 
novel forms is sufficient to be regarded as the event from which modernity 
- as the new epoch - began in Korea. Further, I asserted that as soon as 
an event was singled out, the emphasis of its essential elements for 
modernity tended to overshadow or ignore other essential elements of other 
events. When the debate concerns the dilemma of the historical adaptability 
of a concept under empirical scrutiny, then the notion of the time-scale,
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from beginning to the end, becomes a basic requirement for evaluating an 
event.
- The illusion o f beginning
The short summary of the Korean war above neglects some important 
aspects, as it is based on the premise that 25 June 1950 is the day that 
the Korean war began. The political process, which was illustrated 
previously, revealed that South Korea was already engaged in a sort of 
civil war, since at least 1948. As soon as one fixes the period of the 
Korean war as beginning on 25 June 1950 and ending on 27 July 1953
and insofar as one searches for its independent meaning, then politics in
the post-liberation period in general and the civil war between the South
Korean state and the extreme-right groups, on the one hand, and other
nationalist, center-left and communist groups, on the other, lose their 
significance as factors of war.
The problem of how to cut and measure the time-scale of the Korean war 
should not be treated lightly. The periodization of an event is not a purely 
objective method with an indisputable factual claim. Periodization itself is 
irreducibly a way of reflecting the event: why did it happen? Who was 
responsible for it? What consequences followed? While acknowledging 
several limitations in the defining of the event, one could still argue that 
the Korean war happened on 25 June 1950: there was a different legal 
status between the state army and the guerilla force; the scale of warfare 
lead to more serious consequences and required different political measures; 
Foreign armies were involved; there was a change of major political actors 
and their political methods, and so forth. Needless to say that the three 
years of warfare exhibited distinctive characteristics crucial for an overall
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understanding of the Korean war. Is it not also necessary, though, to 
identify the political conflicts regarding the building of a new nation-state 
and the political processes in South Korea, even if only to interpret the 
distinctiveness of the time when war broke out in 1950? Ignoring post­
liberation politics or an unbalanced interest in highlighting the three years 
of warfare, restricts the understanding of political modernity in the Korean 
context.
If the particular implications of the Korean war for Korean politics are 
investigated, the war's contribution to state formation should be paramount. 
As illustrated in the previous part of this chapter, the emergence of two 
republican states was neither the peaceful product of a consensual 
agreement between several political actors, nor the simple consequence of 
strong enforcement by a few exclusive political groups having gained 
hegemony. Several political actors who had grown with different ways of 
responding to colonial politics, were unable to produce an unified view on 
a number of political agendas for the new Korea. More seriously, the 
American preference of anti-communist politicians in southern Korea and 
the Soviet counter-response of giving preference to communist groups in 
northern Korea, caused many nationalists and center-left socialists to be 
fragmented through divisive political campaigns. During the process of 
state-building, antagonistic attitudes towards other political actors intensified 
and further produced physical conflict. To sum up, the South Korean state 
was not the representative of the conglomeration of political actors in the 
post-liberation scene: it was simultaneously a defensive and offensive 
apparatus for a few political anti-communist groups. At warfare in June 
1950, the South Korean state (and also its northern counterpart) - which 
was just two years old and seriously contested - extended its political
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powers by means of a violent closure of anti-state sentiment, on the one 
hand, and with the imposition of military service, on the other. Anti-state 
actors finally lost political power when the civil war extended into an 
extensive warfare with several states involved. It is arguable that political 
groups who were involved in the state ultimately received benefits from the 
acceleration of the war in terms of the legitimation of state violence. The 
interpretative shift, from conflicts between political actors, to those between 
the state and anti-state groups, which had been intended by the actors who 
occupied the state, was finally accomplished through the military conflict 
between the two states.
Insofar as the Korean war is understood as a war among sovereign states - 
two Korean states and their political neighbors - or merely as a symbolic 
event representing a serious hostility between South and North, then the 
reflexive attitude towards the beginning of the Korean war would become 
marginalized. This would also be the case for any research that neglected 
the implications of the war for domestic politics in South Korea by 
concentrating on its inter-state characteristics. If the researcher wants to 
understand the political process through which conflicts between political 
actors resulted from the emergence of the authoritarian state in South 
Korea, the inquiry concerning the beginning of the Korean war, or, 
extensively, on the origins of the Korean war, is inescapable: how did the 
Korean war, as a symbolically constructed event occurring on 25 June 
1950, impact upon power relations among political actors.8
8) The confusion as to the beginning of the Korean war remains even 
when its inter-state characteristics are the sole object. If previous military 
conflagrations between the two Korean states in 1949 and 1950, over 
borders and terrain, are introduced into the discourse on the Korean war, it
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-  The illusion o f  ending
If what is called the Korean war is understood as another political phase 
for post-liberation politics in general, and for state formation processes in 
particular, in which counter-state political actors in South Korea lost their 
independent political voices due to a remarkably extended warfare which 
enforces a conceptual reformulation of current politics, then the end of the 
war should also be reflected in the possible reconstruction of the 
historiography of the Korean war. While one could argue that the war is 
over, based on the observation that there have been no significant military 
conflicts since 1953, the necessity for considering the whole picture of the 
Korean war, militates against its ending with the cessation of military 
conflict in 27 July 1953. Though practically persuasive, there are at least 
two conceptual problems with such a view. Firstly, the South Korean state 
did not sign the armistice treaty at that time.9 The Rhee regime in the
would provoke further disagreement as to the day the war began (Cumings, 
1997; 1990).
9) For the purposes of the armistice treaty, the counterpart of the 
commander-in-chief of the North Korean army and the commander-in-chief of the 
Chinese army, was the commander-in-chief of the UN army, a role assumed by 
the US. This procedural issue became a hot item for military communication 
between the related states and provided the North Korean state with a tactical 
opportunity for excluding the South Korean state from the compromise talks after 
the armistice had been signed. The right of operation command for the South 
Korean army had been subordinated to the USA since 8 July 1950 when the Rhee 
regime abandoned its autonomous control of the South Korean army at the onset 
of the war. This military devolvement lasted until 1 December 1994, when the 
South Korean army reassumed the responsibility for ordinary military operations.
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South did not want the end of the war, but hoped for its continuance until 
the unification of Korea had been accomplished. The bellicose manner of 
the Rhee regime lasted until its collapse in 1960. Even though later 
regimes abandoned the policy of belligerent military parades, they 
nevertheless continued to prepare for the expected reoccurrence of war - in 
the strict sense, the continuation of the Korean war backed by the 
assumed promise of American military support. Thus, the treaty drawn-up 
for the cease-fire does not guarantee peace in the Korean peninsula, in 
which, since 1953, the two Korean states and the US have maintained a 
semi-war situation. Secondly, there is a reluctance amongst major players, 
for whom the war served to legitimate the separate states, to acknowledge 
that the situation has changed for peace. Above all, the political voices that 
argue that the Korean war occurred on 25 June 1950 still maintain an 
aggressive attitude for a sort of 'revenge'. The North Korean state also does 
not willingly reduce its hostility to the US and the South Korean state, 
retaining its ultimate justification in the idea of the peoples' liberation from 
imperialism. Thus, not only in the contract-based understanding, but also in 
the subjective interpretation of the political actors in the state, the Korean 
war remains an on-going process.
The general periodization of the Korean war - the background of the War 
(1945-1950), warfare (1950-1953), and the consequence of the War (1953-) 
- which is widely accepted in Korean studies, could not properly address 
the asymmetric relationship between the event - modified in the conceptual 
reconstruction - and the situational resources and consequences. Insofar as 
the time-scale of the Korean war is fixed from 25 June 1950 to 27 July
See the appendix in GOH Byung-Chul et al. (1992) and ROH Jung-Seon (1996) 
for more detail of this process.
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1953, the fundamental reasons for the war, on the one hand, and the 
maintenance of strong military tensions between the South and the North, 
on the other, are not identifiable. Even though reasons for the breakout of 
war could be investigated in terms of its background, new research 
knowledge is prevented from going beyond the end of warfare. At best, it 
may furnish an excuse for North Korea, which, as initiator of the war, 
must be liable to moral criticism. In order to better understand post­
liberation politics and to identify the complications of political direction in 
a Korea divided since 1946, which has its roots in the development of the 
two states, it may be necessary to extend the historical time-scale of the 
Korean war from 1945 to today.
However, the historical extension of the Korean war is not without 
difficulty either, as it generates a different set of conceptual problems. 
From the various political processes since the end of the second world war, 
the identification of the decisive point in time for the conceptual rupture 
from which war can be said to have been generated, is difficult to 
pinpoint. Not only is there a continuously accumulating process, but there 
are also changing political issues and actors who come and go. Under the 
general understanding of the Korean war, these changes, shifts and 
disappearances are barely considered. If there were a theoretical implication 
of the Korean war for social theory, it would be the recognition of the 
ambivalence between the interpretive certainty and the uneasiness in finding 
a relevant heading for the series of events. This may suggest, in reverse, 
that the ease of naming the event is necessarily followed by a 
de-contextualized interpretation in which the major characteristics of the 
event are ignored.
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Date and memory
The common way of memorizing historical events in the Korean style - 
more accurately South Korean style - is to name the event with the date. 
The Korean war is generally known as the 6.25 War or 6.25 catastrophe, 
in the sense that the event occurred on 25 June 1950. This becomes 
abbreviated, in many situations to the simple '6.25'.10 In this manner, what 
has been argued as the problem of periodization of the Korean war is 
more seriously exposed. For it implicitly or explicitly produces a strong 
impression of the 'abrupt or unexpected' occurrence of the war. One could 
argue that it is more appropriate to indicate the serious psychological shock 
from the war situation for ordinary peoples who had no deep interests in 
politics. In fact, the three digits, 6.25, instantly evoke the dreadful imagery 
of warfare. However, initially, it still enforces peoples' distance from the 
experience of what happened in the emergence of the state and its 
subsequent political violence. Secondly, the conceptually induced situational 
rupture around 6.25, constructs different political qualifications in the 
separation of two political phases. One of the observable problems in the 
conceptually driven separation, is that it superimposes value-judgements 
based on the post-6.25 viewpoint, on the pre-6.25 situation. This becomes 
serious, especially, when the evaluation of the war has already been 
embedded in the mode o f naming 6.25. Thus, in the history of modem 
Korean politics, the evaluation of post-liberation politics has been heavily
10) It is pronounced as "six two five" in Korean. Like 6.25, some major political 
events follow this convention: the day of nation-wide protest against the Rhee 
regime on 19 April 1960 is simply 4.19; the military coup on 16 May 1961, 5.16; 
the democratic protest in the Kwangju area in May 1980, 5.18(the first day of 
uprising); the statement after the meeting of the two leaders of South and North 
Korea on 15 June 2000, the 6.15 statement.
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influenced by state ideology that manipulates the meaning of warfare 
between 1950 and 1953 to the maximum level. Ironically, this mutes and 
creates indifference to the problems of the state elite in the first republic 
and American foreign policy in South Korea.
4.2.2. A state that becomes the moral subject o f  war
The Korean war, whatever it specifically indicates - three years' warfare or 
a broad name for a series of political conflicts since 1945 or since 1948 -, 
on reflection, has provoked such significant and serious consequences as to 
determine the direction of the political development of modernity in Korea: 
the rise and fall of political actors; the emergence of political dictatorship; 
long-term maintenance of ideological hostility, and, most of all, the 
development of the two-state system. Concerning a number of discourses on 
the Korean war, the states deeply involved in the event have been 
introduced as subjects of responsibility. While there are several connotations 
for the concept of responsibility, it normally refers to blameworthiness, 
which is deeply linked to the recognition of consequences rather than 
linked to the decision process at the time of engagement. In fact, the 
concept of responsibility, in many European and American discourses, had 
been largely devoted to identifying the source of responsibility for the 
actions of individuals who are supposed to belong to a moral community 
(Smiley: 1992). The Holocaust, though, and contemporary catastrophes 
since, have changed the direction of moral discourse, now becoming more 
anxious toward the mobilization of moral justification in actions that have 
potentially devastating consequences.
The conceptual problems of moral discourse on the Korean war include: 
firstly, that it ignores human rights, while it is commonly accepted as the
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conflict between several political communities or states, the symbolic 
representatives of communities; secondly, the Korean war is not closed, an 
event merely accessible for its utility in preventing the occurrence of 
similar events and similar repetitions by different actors. In as much as it 
is assumed that there is more than one community in the Korean war, it 
becomes very difficult to develop universal moral codes for evaluating the 
activities committed by the participants. Unlike the discourse on human 
rights, the Korean war has mainly been a source for discourse on state and 
policy agendas undermined by the states' power relations. At the same 
time, given the fact that none of the states accept the Korean war as a 
closed event, they are not free from possible criticism for their overall 
evaluation of the event. One could understand this situation in reverse: 
given that they are well aware of their moral culpability, none of the states 
could accept closure until the hostile counter-part becomes unable to 
continue criticism. In other words, the states have become subjects of 
responsibility according to their own political interest.
For example, insofar as the claim for North Korea's initiation o f warfare 
on 25 June 19S0 is highlighted, the North Korean state has faced the 
criticism that it should admit its mistake as one which precipitated military 
conflict. Though it may be expected to mobilize justificatory statements for 
military activities, the enormous casualties of war, including countless 
civilians and soldiers, should be reflected in its responsibility. This 
judgement comes from the counter-factual hypothesis; if North Korea had 
not invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, the Korean war would not 
have occurred. If post-liberation politics is seriously considered, however, 
for a more accurate understanding of the Korean war, the angles o f  moral 
criticism would be extended. The irreducible responsibility of dividing
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Korea into the South and North must devolve on the US and the Soviet 
Union, the two subjects in the division of Korea. The claim that, if they 
had not divided Korea, there would have been no war, is also possible, as 
the subjects of military violence, two Korean states, would not have come 
into existence. The 'moral' question of how to judge the US role in post­
liberation politics in South Korea should be considered as an issue of the 
state as moral subject. Is it a relevant justification for the US, in an 
imaginative situation, that in any case it did not start the War? Even 
though it must not be criticized as the initiator of the Korean war, its 
problematic role in constructing the political theatre in which war occurred, 
cannot be excused.
If the United States had not occupied the south of Korea, there would 
have been no war on the peninsula in 1950, the United States would 
not have had such a good case for rearming against both the Soviet
Union and China, ........  The division of the Korean peninsula led to
the Korean War; without that division, there would have not been a 
north to invade a south. And the Korean War had consequences 
beyond Korea itself. ... it intensified the Cold War (Hawthorn, 1991: 
28, 88).'1
The moral critique of the subjects of war, seems to measure, relatively, 
whose moral position is higher than others. While the South Korean state 
and the US lay moral blame at North Korea's door, it is questionable 
whether they are morally qualified to do so. On the opposite side, of 
course, it is also doubtful whether the North Korean military initiative 
could be justified, even under the condition that the division of Korea and 
the problematic emergence of the South Korean state are prima-facie 
evidence of blameworthiness. The relativistic idea of comparative moral
11) Hawthorn sees that many historians of US policy in Korea in the post­
liberation period have these counter-factual premises as the ground for their 
research.
170 -
standards, ironically, relies on two problematic assumptions: firstly, if the 
other subject deserves blame in any way, then one's own mistakes might 
be excusable, in that the other subject would be unable to take the moral 
high ground in apportioning blame under the condition of guilt. Secondly, 
and connectedly, the degree of blame becomes the measure of innocence: 
moral innocence would thereby be a by-product of the other’s greater 
reprehensibility.
Since I have investigated the positions of the states through the
identification of their relativistic justifications, it remains now to unravel the 
political course of the US. While the South Korean state succeeded in
dominating domestic politics throughout the duration of the War, the US
avoided wide criticism of its chaotic post-world-war-two planning for
Korea. The latter enabled the US to acquire a stable military base in 
North-East Asia, as part of its policy to curtail the expansion of socialism 
in the region. Insofar as the US cannot be classified as a victim of post­
liberation politics and the War in Korea, there seems no basis for the US 
to bring moral accusations against North Korea. How, though, is it possible 
that North Korea should charge both the US and South Korea and at the 
same time be charged by South Korea of moral responsibility? Needless to 
say, it depends on how one understands post-liberation politics and previous 
military conflicts over the border. If all three committed serious mistakes in 
different spheres, the moral positions of all three actors must be ambivalent 
in that they are open to criticism from the others, and at the same time, 
are capable of directing criticism towards the others. None of them could 
be both judge and jury, because of their own crimes. If the South Korean 
army's occupation of some areas in North Korea in 1949 is historically 
true, as an example of the ambivalent position of South Korea, and if it
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provided motivation for North Korea's extensive military operation, it should 
also be treated critically. The antagonistic attitude to the other, since the 
treaty for armistice, has been sustained by the moral tension.
This does not mean, however, that all 'the three players' are so innocent as 
to have only defended themselves. If each could successfully defend its 
moral position, this does not indicate the absence of mistakes or fault, but 
problematic others whose roles are not innocent enough to escape criticism. 
It is clear that the moral defence is possible only 'within' the relationship 
of the three states. Without the others' problems, none of the actors in the 
War could avoid explaining their own mistakes and culpability. They 
simply depend on a state-centered idea of morality. Thus, it is necessary to 
question whether or not the state is the relevant category for moral 
evaluation, in addition to the historical evaluation of what the three states 
did. If the state is understood as the major political apparatus for political 
actors, rather than the independent subject of politics, it is clear that the 
symbolized character of the state as representative of the political 
community, must be deconstructed for the moral interpretation.
There would be two exceptional conditions in which the state should be 
regarded as the moral unit per se: firstly, when the state is recognized as 
the political actor by other political actors; secondly, when the state is 
firmly based on the consensus of the political community. An historical 
example of the first condition is the US case in Korean politics. For all 
Korean actors, the US military state in South Korea until 1948, and the 
US since the declaration of the Korean state in 1948, was the most 
powerful political actor. While the US indulged the diversity of the 
political spectrum, identifying and treating Korean actors differently, Korean
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actors were unable to identify the existence of diverse political groups in 
the US. This does not mean that there were no internal disputes among US 
officials. Rather, it indicates that US citizens in Korea would not have 
been able to make any political voice, without the uniform of the US army 
and the status of US officials. Thus, the US can be considered as a 
unitary political actor in this context. In many cases of international politics 
prosecuted for a national issue, each foreign power could be accepted as a 
unit, or political actor. If the political direction of the state is welcomed 
and supported by the people, the state could be eligible as the unit of the 
political community. However, this second condition is rather idealistic, and 
rarely found in history. It tends, rather, to be subjectively constructed by 
the major political groups and through peoples' desire to make a self- 
satisfied memory o f events- the Korean experience of colonialism proves 
how the myth of all Koreans' antagonism to the Japanese colonial state has 
been devoted to the formation of a national Identity. This is frequently 
discovered in many other international cases, where emphasis and omission 
in interpreting national history are 'intentionally' constructed by the subjects 
of the narrative. Who, then, could claim to be a victim of the events? In 
post-liberation politics, the civil war and three years' warfare, the victims 
are the peoples who were killed, injured, lost families, and who are still 
suffering from the series of events. The individuals who occupy the dual 
positions of victims and killers should be excluded from making voice. The 
soldiers especially cannot be moral subjects, accusing other people, insofar 
as they know their part in war, though they may be legal subjects for 
compensation.
The distance between ethics and law should be acknowledged here. These 
spheres are not synonymous for at least two reasons: firstly, law is
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implicitly and explicitly not only defensive, against accusation, but also 
aggressive, for accusing others. Any judgement in the legal system 
necessarily requires the premise that the legal system 'correctly' reflects 
moral values. Secondly, although law is generally understood as a part of 
the moral world, 'law as supplement of morality' (Apel, 2000b), this should 
be taken as referring to the legal system as entrance-point to moral 
evaluation, rather than its end. The trial process is meaningful, not as the 
arrival at moral discourse, but as its acceleration. Moral space includes 
something that is beyond what is resolvable through the compensation and 
punishment of the legal system.
Jacques DERRIDA'S approach to interpreting 'responsibility' enables us to 
notice that there are several spheres for dealing with it: responsibility 
within the religious framework (1995b); responsibility in the individual's 
decision process (1995a); responsibility for the emerging political agendas 
(1992). While the Christian idea of responsibility is evaluated in terms of 
its a priori foundation, which imposes religious judgement on particular 
contexts, responsibility in the individual's decision process, for Derrida, 
unveils the complications of responding to others who are already expecting 
a response in a certain way. For Derrida, the emerging situation for 
European integration necessarily requires responding, but in a new way 
based on a critical interpretation of previous European history.
The way of dealing with responsibility for the Korean war has nothing to 
do with the philosophical spheres in which Derrida extends the meaning of 
responsibility. Above all, the event, the Korean war, is not one anticipated 
for the future or one beginning to emerge in the present time. It is, as 
event, one that has already occurred in the past, and which proceeds to the
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present. The time to decide to respond to it or not, before the occurrence 
of the event, has already passed. If I paraphrase with respect to the 
Kosovo conflict, a recent event, it would be thus:
The air raid from the NATO had finished. The peace-keeping forces 
arrived in Kosovo to protect the Kosovo Albanians from possible 
clashes and to maintain public order. Finally, Kosovo Albanians who 
had escaped to Albania and other regions returned to their towns. 
They began to more seriously realize the whole situation: their 
destroyed houses, the lack of food and the death of some relatives, 
friends, neighbors and family members.
Which side is responsible for what happened in Kosovo? The Serbian side, 
the NATO or Albanians in Kosovo themselves? Who could charge whom 
with not only the crime against humanity, but also with the destruction of 
all living conditions? The way of understanding the Korean war in order to 
'charge' responsibility for it, is similar to the attitude that looks for subjects 
that produced the disaster in Kosovo. Thus, responsibility for the Korean 
war means neither the self-imposed right or duty to make voice to the 
event, nor the accessibility of the event on the reactionary level. Rather it 
necessitates admitting and acknowledging mistakes and problems, after the 
investigation of causes and consequences, which require apologies for the 
victims. When an event happened and produced victims, they and only 
they, can ultimately decide whether or not the apology from the offender is 
acceptable and whether the act of the perpetrator can be forgiven.12
12) This needs clarification: some offenders occasionally acknowledge their 
own mistakes before the victims' critical claim becomes recognized in the public 
domain. With the passing of time, it could be accepted by the majority of the 
political community and could be developed as an indisputable argument for a 
moral evaluation of self-critique. Within this situation, offenders in the past could 
voluntarily apologize to victims for the consequences of their mistakes, in order to
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While the debate on the NATO's involvement in the Kosovo crisis was 
fuelled by its disregard of international law, the Korean war by no means 
suffered from an illegal intervention by the UN. Rather its fundamental 
characteristic as a civil war is dimmed by an interpretation from the 
juridical angle. The two-state system in Korea had not taken firm root, but 
was in the process of being formed since 1948. The declaration of the 
state in the South, guided by the UN, could be understood as South 
Korea's entrance into the order of international law. The conflict in Korea 
that led to war, however, originated in the dispute as to whether the South 
could join the international law system as a sovereign state. The question I 
hope to raise is whether or not international law could be practiced with 
regard to a state when participation in that system is doubted by many of 
the peoples o f that state.
Conclusion: A contribution of post-liberation politics to the political 
tradition of 'strong state versus insubordinate political movement'
As many scholars in Korean studies argue, Korea, in terms of political 
history, has had a strong state tradition (Koo, 1999, 1993; CHOI Jang-jip,
be reconciled with them. This situation seems to indirectly suggest that offenders 
could be subject to approbation later. However, if the victims are not inclined to 
accept their proposal and apology in any way, they should not be regarded 
reprehensibly. This would be a regrettable and shameful situation, for both 
offenders in the past and their victims, deriving from the prematurity of 
reconcilability. It may mean that the victims are still suffering emotionally from 
the event. In such a case, both offenders and the people who feel guilty about the 
event, should wait for the victim to recover, for his/her attitude to change. There 
seems to be no other way.
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1993, 1991). State authority was regarded as an uncontestable dignity in 
the traditional kingdom states. In the colonial period, the Japanese Empire 
protected state authority with police and military force, leading to a violent 
and authoritarian image for the state. Incidentally, an anti-state political 
tradition was also popular amongst Korean intellectuals, who even 
developed anarchist political groups in the 1920s. Some of them produced 
the terrorist-style independence movement - assassinations, bombings. 
However, many anti-state political movements themselves maintained a 
strong desire to build an alternative state for Koreans.
Ever since the new state emerged in 1948, political conflict has developed 
along geographical lines. The political groups who dominated the state tried 
to utilize state authority to brand protesters and other political groups as 
anti-state. They portrayed counter-political actors and their activities as a 
dangerous rebellion against legitimized state authority. For the opposing 
political groups, the new state was not what they had wanted as 
replacement for the colonial experience: many state officials were former 
members of the Japanese colonial-state, who were prone to vicious 
suppression of these groups in the name of the state. The political 
characteristics of the South Korean state were developed in warfare with 
North Korea, eventually metamorphizing into the dictatorship of the Rhee 
regime, with a violent police force, and the enactment of anti-communist 
legislation. Anti-state political groups were excluded from any participation 
in the institutional politics of the parliament.
Even though the origin of the 'red complex' in Korea can be traced to the 
introduction of socialism and communism, if two major causes can be 
found, then these are, in turn, the colonial state's extreme dislike of these
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ideologies and the Korean war. Many ex-state officials, such as the police, 
or soldiers, who were trained by the colonial state, had virtually no 
initiatives to intervene in the new political situation of the post-liberation 
period. However, the Rhee regime's active inclusion of them, through the 
creation of new roles for them in the state, together with the steamrollering 
of ideological conflicts, provided them with opportunities to overcome their 
problematic past. With anti-communist sentiment rife in the state, they 
intended to get rid of their most serious critics- the left political groups. 
Finally, after three years' warfare, conventionally known as the Korean war, 
they had cemented their survival in the state and Korean society.
The need for democracy in Korean politics started in a weak version, as 
the need for democratic institutionalization of parliamentary politics. The 
Rhee regime, as the center of the authoritarian state, was widely criticized 
for its undemocratic practices in state affairs and Parliament. Party politics 
in the 1950s also shows how fragile was the Rhee regime in maintaining a 
majority in parliament and how undemocratic it was in managing this 
situation. The emergence of opposition parties, after several fragmentations 
of center-right nationalist groups, was a significant consequence of the 
regimes' illegitimate activities. Disputes in parliamentary politics was the 
main business of political agendas in the 1950s, while democratic political 
actors outside of Parliament were hardly organized enough to present their 
own political visions.
<Historical Note>
1. In a meeting held on 27 March 1943, the US President, Roosevelt, 
suggested the trusteeship of Korea to the British Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden, unlike its previous indifference to the occupation of Korea
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by Japan - the USA had given its blessing to Japan in 1905. Dealing with 
Korea in the new international power structure after World War II, was 
regarded as one of the key elements for securing America's international 
position against the emerging communist powers, mainly centered on the 
USSR. According to Cumings (1981: 105), however, American planners 
elaborated their purpose by arguing the need for a more civilized Korean 
people and the promotion of international interest.
The trusteeship powers ... would "prepare and educate" the "dependent 
peoples" for self-government; they would "protect them from 
exploitation" and "promote their economic development and social 
justice." In addition, the following would be done by the trustees "in 
the interests of the world": the powers would maintain 
"nondiscriminatory commercial treatment," "promote equal economic 
opportunity," and "contribute to general security."
From this position, the USA drew the normative statement that 'Korea shall 
become free and independent' while adding the significant phrase 'in due 
course', at the Cairo Conference on 1 December 1943 with Great Britain 
and China. Through the meetings at Yalta on 8 February 1945 and 
Postsdam on 3 July 1945, America gained the agreement on trusteeship 
from Stalin, and finally suggested the line of the 38th parallel to the USSR 
on 10-11 August 1945 as the cornerstone of trusteeship. On 8 September 
1945, the first US troops arrived in South Korea. General Hodge, the 
representative of the US troops, and the US politicians began to intervene 
in Korean domestic politics by refusing the authority of the governing body 
of Korea composed of several social and political groups, thus posing the 
dilemma in answering the question of who was the primary representative 
of the new state.
General Hodge and the US troops, who had to organize the trusteeship
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process, did not have sufficient information on Korea and Koreans when 
they arrived in Korea. They had to depend on a few sources of knowledge 
and information in order to identify the Korean domestic situation and take 
charge of governmental organizations. Among the main sources were 
Japanese officers and bureaucrats and members of the Korean Democratic 
Party (henceforth KDP). Hodge announced, on 9 September that the 
colonial Japanese Government-General would continue to have a role with 
all of its Japanese and Korean personnel. "...From the beginning many 
Americans simply liked the Japanese better than the Koreans. The Japanese 
were viewed as cooperative, orderly, and docile, while the Koreans were 
seen as headstrong, unruly, and obstreperous". (Cumings: 1981: 138-9) Even 
though Hodge's official use of Japanese was overruled by the State 
Department in Washington and by MacArthur's critique, this did not stop 
him from relying on Japanese as unofficial informants and advisors. On the 
other hand, leading members of the KDP contacted US officers. Most of 
them were entrepreneurs, journalists and high-level officers who had close 
relationships with the Japanese ex-govemment. With their help, the US 
military regime (henceforth MG) acquired knowledge of Korea and its 
major political groups.
The USA, the UK, and the USSR discussed the issues of post-war 
problems in Moscow on 16 December 1945. As during the war, at Yalta 
and Postdam, the USA proposed a multilateral trusteeship for Korea. The 
proposal included the establishment of a joint administration of Korea by 
US and USSR military which would be replaced by a four-power 
trusteeship (the USA, the UK, the USSR, and China). The trusteeship 
would operate as the government, the legislative, and juridical body for 
five years. In addition, there was a provision for an additional five years,
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if necessary. On the other hand, a draft by the USSR suggested providing 
'a provisional Korean government' and a Joint Commission from the USSR 
and the US commands in Korea. In this, the Joint Commission offered 
assistantship in building the Korean government. The final draft of the 
agreement in Moscow produced an agenda for Korea, implicitly and 
explicitly, which was very sophisticated. The working out of an agreement 
concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for up to five years would be 
considered only after forming a government, and only after it had consulted 
with the Joint Commission.
The agreement showed the USA's changed attitude to Korea. The period of 
possible trusteeship was shortened, from twenty or thirty years to 'five 
years'. Then, the request of immediate independence, a self-established 
government of Korea, became to some extent acceptable. The USA came 
to realize that ignoring Korean political groups and the opposition was 
impossible. The early policies of the US command and the amicable 
dealings with Japanese officers provoked a social antagonism against the 
USA. General Hodge had claimed that Washington had to abandon 
trusteeship. Driven by the security strategy, one o f the major policies of 
the MG was to identify the ideologies of Korean political groups. To 
facilitate governing the Southern part of Korea, MG officers classified 
political leaders and groups as their supporters, or as pro-Russian 
Communists. Under this classification, the place o f the KPR was clearly 
not that of supporters. The KPR's authority as a governing body was 
denied, it was downgraded to a political organization. The MG formed an 
advisory council of the major political groups, to help its governance. This 
decision was a big mistake, because in the council, the hostility among 
groups was rather intensified.
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By means of the policy that denied the major groups' governing authority, 
a certain public place was guaranteed for pro-Japanese collaborators, and 
through its inefficient management of the economy, the MG caused much 
social resentment of its authority. Moreover, a national demonstration for 
immediate independence forced the MG to give up its trusteeship strategy. 
Finally, the MG had no choice but to prove its friendship to Korea by 
changing its policy from trusteeship to independence.
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5. Post-war developments of modernity in South Korea: modernity 
and power
Introduction
The history of the South Korean state became problematic in post-liberation 
politics. Since inception, it faced serious political challenges from domestic 
political actors. The so-called Korean war was a boon for the state in 
helping it to get rid of counter-state actors from the political sphere. 
However, counter-state actors did not thereby disappear from politics for 
good, but were later reborn as radical political groups; in students' 
movements, workers' movements, and other forms of democratic movements 
outside of the parliamentaiy framework. Ironically, the state's excessive 
suppression, itself a reflection of its lack of legitimacy, is enough to 
provide infinite resources for the counter-state actors' resurrection.
While chapter 4 showed the initial formation of the historical antagonism 
between the state and counter-state actors, this chapter will deal with the 
development of post-war politics in terms of the extension of the 
antagonistic interplay between them. Post-war Korean politics conclusively 
reveals the dual developments in the political sphere, of the state's 
capability and that of counter-state actors at the same time. This political 
tension has been deeply influential for the development of the economic 
sphere as well: firstly, the scale of the South Korean economy's rapid 
growth and its content in terms of the change of industrial structures; 
secondly, the emergence of very strong and aggressive economic actors in 
conflictive relationship, which is rather unique in the Asian context.
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This does not mean, however, that actors in the Korean case - the state, 
and counter-state actors - are equivalent in terms of their political power, 
social influence and economic capacities. Counter-state actors have always 
suffered from an asymmetric power relation, and in many cases were 
eliminated from politics. In spite of this, the conflictive relationship 
between them and the state continued to the 1990s. In order to develop a 
comprehensive picture of modernization, from the post-war years at least up 
until 1987, the state should be the focus o f inquiry. For there is no doubt 
that it encouraged and provoked Korean society to respond to a state- 
guided modernization project. In this chapter, I will not simply argue the 
importance of the state for understanding a non-Westem style of societal 
development. Nor will I merely assert the problematic influences of the 
state on the political sphere and economic activities. Rather, the aim of this 
chapter is to clearly show the overall manner in which the state, mainly, 
and counter-actors, partially, shaped their political and economic visions for 
modernization 'within an antagonistic relationship with critical responses to 
the alternative from the other1. In other words, I aim to identify the 
developing process of actors' value systems and their representation in the 
framework of an inter-dependent relationship. Without the other actor, who 
is critical of the first's modernization project, none of the two political 
actors' major characteristics could be properly understood.
5.1. The state as the organizer of modernization
5.1.1. The slate and class relations in the Korean context
One could question the categorical validity of the state as an independent 
political and economic actor, especially from a class perspective. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the theme of the autonomy of the state as an 
independent actor has mainly been developed under the influence of
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Marxian traditions. Arguments have been mainly introduced in order to 
either support or criticize Marx and Engels's statement in the Communist 
Manifesto that: 'the executive of the modem state is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (Marx and Engels, 
1998: 37). The statement, it is said, clearly defines the fundamental 
character of the state in class conflict, focusing on the development of new 
economic conditions in Europe in the nineteenth century. However, many 
later social scientists have identified through historical observation that the 
relationship between the state and classes is a complex of coordinations 
and disputes, rather than a direct relationship of the state to the 
bourgeoisie. Despite arguments focusing on the instrumentality of the state- 
which has been taken by many social scientists to mean that the place of 
the state is subordinated to the bourgeoisie as a whole-, many states 
including the South Korean have enforced their autonomous, or even 
hegemonic, power on classes (CHOI Jang-jip, 1991). In spite of this 
critique, Marxian thinkers normally accept the statement's validity by 
distinguishing between short-term conflicts and subsequent long-term 
coordination in the relationship between the state and the dominating 
economic class. This debate is also rehearsed in Korean studies. Many, 
who argue the South Korean state's contribution to economic development, 
acknowledge the fact that it guided and controlled the bourgeoisie in 
military style. For them, the main contributor to Korea's economic growth 
is neither the bourgeoisie nor the working class: rather, they see the state 
as the means by which South Korea has become a distinctive economic 
success among developing countries. However, in labor studies, state 
intervention and its repressive labor policy have been regarded as an 
example of the anti-labor nature of the South Korean state, which 
consequently has supported the idea of the instrumentality under bourgeois
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economic interest. The applicability of Marx's interpretation of the role of 
the state in class relations for the Korean context is doubtful. Firstly and 
most of all, the post-liberation situation in South Korea is so completely 
different from the European examples of economic transformation under the 
hegemonic power of the bourgeoisie to which Marx tried to politically 
respond. The bourgeoisie in the Korean context, who began their economic 
activities in the colonial period, suffered from critical disapproval of their 
collaboration with the colonial state. For this reason, they were unable to 
create a powerful political voice for themselves in determining the state's 
economic policies in their own image. Secondly, the bourgeoisie also 
suffered from the consequences of the War - the destruction of industrial 
facilities and of the infrastructure and the lack of financial capital. This 
meant that they had to depend on state subsidies for their new economic 
activities in the post-war period. Thirdly, the state, thus, took the initiative 
in major economic policies, especially in the reallocation of ex-industrial 
facilities - previously owned by the colonial state and Japanese - to the 
bourgeoisie, provoking internal competition among entrepreneurs. In other 
words, the economic sphere, just as much as the political sphere, was 
newly shaped by significant ruptures such that the bourgeoisie, despite 
being one of the main economic actors for developing capitalism, could not 
exclusively organize the economy according to their own interests.
Conversely, South Korea has been considered as an example of a state's 
successful intervention in the market by some political economists, 
especially since the 1980s and until the late 1990s (Amsden, 1989; 
Haggard and Moon, 1993, for example). Contrary to the liberalistic 
understanding of the role of the state- the 'market-friendly model'(World 
Bank, 1993), many political economists have argued that, until the financial
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crisis of some developing countries in East Asia in 1997, South Korea as 
an example of an East Asian case - the so-called, Asian NICs, or Asian 
tigers - developed its economy through the state's effective interventions 
and planning: the political elite and technocrats in the state drove private 
sectors by means of major economic planning, selective support and 
subsidies, enforcement from time to time and strategic protection of 
domestic markets (see, Wade, 1992 for a review). However, in the political 
sense, the dominant role of the state in the market has provoked a 
conflictive tension between politics and the economy since 1980. It has 
been argued that state autonomy in policy-making and the executive process 
has decreased since the nation-wide labor movements of 1987, which 
changed situation so that authoritarian rule was no longer effective. Even a 
conflict between the state and a big conglomerate, Hyundai, can be seen in 
this light as the rebellion of the bourgeoisie against the authoritarian state 
(Eckert, 1993). The big conglomerates, which had developed rapidly in the 
1960s and 1970s, came to find independent voices for criticizing the state's 
policies. Faced with several political ruptures and gradual democratization, 
the state's conventional intervention and control began to experience 
resistance and the close relationship between the political elite in the state 
and major entrepreneurs broke down. For entrepreneurs the main contributor 
to economic growth was not the state, but themselves, and they felt that 
the political elite in the state had become too corrupt However, the 
political elite in the state felt that the big conglomerates had prospered 
only with state support, which their future was still dependent upon. The 
political elite, therefore, tried to maintain their superiority and dominance in 
finance and economic sectors, by utilizing political instruments and 
institutions to this end.
187
Such an analysis, given by a number of political economists, is very 
persuasive in terms of identifying the power relations between the state and 
its political elite and the entrepreneurs of major conglomerates, the 
so-called Chaebol. Inevitably, it becomes necessary to identify the 
underpinning reasons for the state's strong intervention in the economic 
sphere and how the interventionist policy has effectively worked. Without 
this, the autonomy of the state could be overestimated through ignorance of 
its problematic history. It is the political elite in the state, rather than the 
state itself, that shapes the way in which South Korea developed a state- 
centered modernization. They could enjoy their dominance in post-war 
politics, not because of their excellence in leading the restructuring of 
South Korea, but because of the lack of stable feedback processes in the 
political and economic sphere, and their exclusion of non-state actors from 
any monitoring of state policies.
5.1.2. The relationship between the state and state elite
The state has constructed itself as the source of political power and handed 
to the state elite the responsibility for its legitimation. However, this needs 
to be clarified through an understanding of the particular historical context 
in which the Korean state developed. Firstly, distinctive political events 
after the colonial period have been devoted to constructing a new nation­
state. Unlike many cases in Europe, where political actors presented their 
orientation 'for1 or 'against' the state - so major political practices were 
designed to replace the previous state with the new one under their control, 
or at least to enforce the state to recognize actors' interests - in Korea, the 
initial political conflict, that set the trend for future politics, was directly 
related to the dominance of the state, rather than engagement with it. The 
state was regarded as an empty institution, waiting for its new owner in
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the post-liberation period after the failure of the US military government's 
planning for a five-years' trusteeship of Korea, thanks to Korean actors' 
political protest. In spite of the formal existence of the state and its 
apparatuses, the US military could not successfully transfer the political 
authority of the state to Koreans peacefully. Not only is this because the 
US military government between 1945 and 1948 could not properly manage 
the political situation in which many left-wing political actors ignored state 
authority, but also because post-liberation politics was shaped by peoples' 
overwhelming desire to make a newly independent state as well as by the 
actual division of Korea according to US and Soviet interests. With the 
identification of unsolvable ideological differences, rebuilding the state 
became the raison d'etre of some political actors' orientation for the South. 
In spite of left and centre-right groups' rejection of the idea of separation, 
some rightist groups finally achieved the formation of a constitutional 
assembly and the declaration of the new state, the Republic of Korea. As 
soon as the South Korean state had emerged, the power-holders in the state 
justified their political practices against anti-state political actors as the 
defence of state legitimacy. The usual selection process - from below or 
from outside of the state - for choosing representatives of the nation-state, 
became impossible with the emergence of two separate states in 1948. 
Besides, during the civil war in the 1940s and 1950s, the political elite in 
the state overcame their weak political legitimacy in terms of general 
support, not by 'persuading people' with their political and economic 
orientations in the public sphere, but by 'forceful execution' of their 
policies, excluding counter-partners and opponents from the political space. 
Here the state itself provided diverse functional instruments for dominant 
actors to justify their political orientations and ignore practical problems.
-  189 -
While some works on the theory o f  the elite in general and the political 
elite in particular and related empirical research on specific cases refer to 
existing socio-cultural mechanisms, or a plurality of these, as that which 
rather 'stably' reproduces a limited number of influential individuals who 
have certain privileges in dealing with socio-political and economic agendas 
and/or, could lead public opinions on these matters1, I focus in this chapter 
on the collective power-holders in the Korean state, who initiated a form 
of organized, authoritarian, modernization for nearly 40 years. As case 
studies of different nations show, it is rather problematic to investigate the 
role of the political elite for the Korean case under the assumption that the 
socio-cultural and political strata in Korea have been well-established 
through a long-term maintenance o f certain class relations, or through a 
stabilized division of social institutions which have their own independent 
rules for reproducing privileged members. When the Korean case is 
compared to the Japanese, for example, in order to identify the role of the 
political elite and their actual power in dealing with state affairs and grand 
socio-economic programmes for modernization, the difference between the 
two cases is significant. While the Japanese political elite have a balance 
of counter-actors in the administrative sphere in the state and in private 
economic sectors, and while the elites in the three spheres together have 
produced coordinated practices for economic growth (Rothacher: 1993), the 
political elite in the South Korean state did not have counter-actors in the 
state and in economic sectors. Here, the political elite were the dominant 
power-holders over the administrative elite. Especially in the period of rapid 
industrialization, from the 1960s to the 1980s, major members of the
1) Selected works include Pareto (1986, 1978, 1966), Moyser and
Wagstaffe (1987), Putnam (1976), Rothacher (1993), Stanworth and Giddens 
(1974), Bourdieu (1996), Scott (1990).
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political elite in the state had previously enjoyed high-flying careers in the 
military. Whereas the Rhee regime enjoyed dominant power in the 1940s 
and 1950s through the symbolic dictatorship of the former leader of 
independence movements, RHEE Sung-man, supported overall by the elite 
groups in the state who suffered from their problematic careers in the 
colonial state, the Park regime (1961-1979), and the Jeon (^j-r-
$■) regime (1980-1987) produced a political power based on military coups 
that controlled administrators and technocrats.
There are at least three characteristics which underscore the asymmetric 
power relations in the state. Firstly, the tensions among the agencies of 
each sphere, the political, economic, administrative, for example, whose 
professional interests seldom coincided with the dominance of the political 
elite, while the political elite in the state suffered from the counter-state 
actors' critique of their illegitimate occupation of the state and its 
undemocratic rule. Secondly, the absence of political voices from the 
administrative and economic elite, on the one hand, and their active 
participation in authoritarian modernization, on the other, are the two 
distinctive features of the 'developmental state' in the Korean context, while 
the overall political parallel was drawn between the state and counter-state 
actors in the process of modernization. Thirdly, whereas forming political 
power in the state under the auspices of the military has clearly broken 
down since the 1990s, the asymmetric power relation among several 
influential groups still remains, even though different types of political elite 
in turn have taken control of the state - this dimension will be dealt with 
in the next chapter.
Introducing the 'state elite' as the category for the overall grouping of
1#1 -
influential individuals in the state, regardless of their different positions in 
the power hierarchy in the government, the Parliament and judicial bodies, 
seems necessary for investigating the role of the state in modernization. 
They, above all, were the internal members of the state whose authority 
has been widely questioned and criticized by counter-state actors. If the 
failure of administrative branches and institutions other than the government 
to balance and monitor roles in the highly organized process of 
modernization, could be understood in the same way as organized military 
activities, as at least an indirect way of supporting an on-going problematic 
practice of state-centered socio-economic transformation through the category 
of the state elite, then the roles of several agents in the state becomes 
clearer. Secondly, the state elite themselves embedded absolute power in 
the state. In the powerful image of state authority, which was constructed 
in the process of excluding counter-actors, the state elite developed the idea 
of the absoluteness of the state which is more or less independent from the 
state elite's practical capacity. For the state elite intended to justify their 
legitimacy with the help of their political positions which were defined and 
guaranteed by the state. Neither as 'one' of the political groups, nor as the 
balancing power in the state, but as the very representative of the state,
they differentiated their status from other dissident actors outside the state.
Under a limited political legitimacy and with an underdeveloped
modernization project which could not guarantee their political status in 
democratic politics, the state elite maintained their political life through
deflecting attention to a symbolized image of the state as a building, an 
edifice, the absolute. In other words, the state elite has been protected by 
the state which was developed for their purpose. However, this absoluteness 
of the state generated hostility against the state elite, once the 
differentiation of state and state elite occurred. In the process of an
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increasing symbolization of the state, the state elite became de-valued and 
anonymous. For example, when the new state elite gained its position 
consequent to political rupture - in 1960, the collapse of the Rhee regime 
and the beginning of the second republic, in 1961, the occurrence of the 
military coup and the beginning of the third republic, in 1980, the 
reoccurrence of a military coup, the suppression of the democratic 
movement in Kwangju and the beginning of the fifth republic, in 1993, the 
emergence of the first civilian regime, and in 1998, the reformist, KIM 
Dae-Jung, government - the previous state elite faced political ruin, unable 
to maintain its political status, neither as distinctive counter-partners in the 
political sphere, nor as members o f the administrative elite. Their political 
legitimacy could only be maintained with the state's protection. Without the 
shield of the state, no political actors could survive their political 
weaknesses and practical problems. Thus, each political actor became 
obsessed with the state for two reasons inferred from the political 
phenomenon of state absoluteness: firstly, state authority itself is the main 
protector of the state elite; secondly, actors alienated from the state are 
easy targets for the state elite's political critique and repression.
If I approximately introduce the term 'objectification' in the Simmelian 
sense (1978), or 'alienation' in the Marxian tradition (Lukács, 1971 for 
example) in terms of the emergence of the situation in which the subjects, 
who initially created an overall socio-economic architecture, as rule-makers, 
become mere rule-followers later, the state in its relationship to the state 
elite in the Korean context, could be regarded as objectified or as an 
alienated source of power for political actors. While they are fully secured 
in the state as the state elite, as soon as they become isolated from the 
state they unveil their political fragility. Of course, this type of politics,
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which puts 'position over ability' rather than inverse, was the consequence 
of illegitimated actors' gaining control over the state and their justifications 
being dependent on the role of the state, as it was being molded under 
modernization programmes.
5.1.3. The state as an initiator o f  modernization
It seems useful to construct a table, in order to grasp more clearly the overall 
picture of state-guided modernization, although there are some overlapping 
elements and different levels of categorization in it.
Economic sphere Political sphere Cultural sphere
Vision -  W e a l th y  a n d  
I n d u s t r ia l iz e d  N a t io n
- D e m o c ra t iz a t io n
-  U n i f ic a t io n
• R e s to r a t io n  o f  
n a t io n a l  p r id e
Task -  F a s t  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th
- R e s t r u c tu r in g  In d u s t r ie s
- A n t i -C o m m u n is m - M a in te n a n c e  o f  
C o l l e c t i v e  Id e n ti ty
Practical Strategy -  I n t e r v e n t io n  in to  th e  
m a rk e t
-  A n t i - N o r th  K o r e a n  
I d e o lo g y
-  R e d i s c o v e r y  o f  
K o r e a n  Id e n ti ty
Government
policies
-  A n t i - l a b o r  P o l ic y
- C h a n g in g  E c o n o m ic  
S tr u c tu r e
-  U p b r in g in g  C h a e b o ls
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M o d e r n is m
Table L The state elite's modernization programmes
It is interesting to see how the state elite have represented their visionary
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modernization project and their practical legitimation process in it, on the 
extensive basis of an identification of an emergent absoluteness of the state, 
resulting in unbalanced power relations between the state elite and 
counter-state actors. These visions, a wealthy and developed nation, 
democratization and unification, and the restoration of national pride, were 
developed on the level of state policies as the form for strategies of 
modernization. For the capitalist development of the economy, the state 
elite intended to direct intervention into the market, so as to develop 
domestic industry. The result was that major conglomerates became 
established over several stages (see, Caiden and Jung, 1985 for the case of 
the Park regime). At the same time, anti-communism was concretized as 
the antagonistic policy against North Korea and as repression of domestic 
counter-actors.
Unlike the economic and political perspectives, however, the strategy in the 
cultural sphere was hardly developed for two reasons: firstly, the emphasis 
on a cultural restoration of Confucian ethics was initiated for the 
instrumental purpose of increasing economic performance and generating 
political support (KIM Kwang-Ok, 1996). Traditional cultural characteristics 
were utilized by the state where its value-systems and practical ethics could 
be harnessed for modernization. Without long-term policies, constructed 
cultural heritages provided temporary justifications for participants, although 
the tension between the adopted advanced western industrialization process 
and the maintenance of traditional culture was clearly visible. Changing the 
economic structure of a whole society has sometimes faced its biggest 
challenge, not from politics, but from people's cultural attitude. With the 
assumption that peoples' life-styles, which were tied to traditional values, 
were irreconcilable with rationalized economic behavior, the state elite
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became critical of several traditional customs, promoting instead a change- 
oriented social attitude for peoples' everyday lives. The state elite's 
contradictory attitude toward culture, meant that it was unable to develop 
an overall concrete strategy for it.2
In many political discourses, the economy weighs more heavily than 
politics itself. The Korean case be considered as the prototype of economy- 
centered politics in developing countries, where the development of political 
democracy has been suspended under the ideology advocating organized 
participation for economic growth. Most legislative issues in the Parliament 
were directly or indirectly related to economic planning and its practice, 
and economic performance was the main indicator for the success, or not, 
of governmental activity. Further, political activities and organizations were 
restricted under special laws to prohibit economic disputes. In fact, most 
parts of the modernization project consisted of a one-dimensional economic 
orientation. Adapting Hart-Landsbeg (1993)'s term, all 'rush to (economic) 
development.' Here, in terms of the state elite's involvement and its 
political consequences - the long-term maintenance of authoritarianism, for
2) KIM Kwang-Ok (1996: 217-8) investigates the changed relationship between 
the state and the advocates of Confucianism:
'The tension between the military regime and the Confucians heightened 
when Park Chung-heefthe President] criticized the literati tradition in his 
election campaign. ... he openly criticized Kim Seong-il as an example of a 
narrow-minded Confucian scholar who lacked a sense of responsibility 
toward the nation and who wasted national energy on empty theory and 
futile debate. This provoked serious counterattacks by the Confucians 
throughout Kyungbuk province, the very base of political support for Park.
... In order to solidify his political resources under the strong influence of 
Confucian tradition, Park renovated Confucian relics, including the Tosan 
Seowon, and printed the likeness of Toegye and Yulgok on paper currency. 
The government also provided financial support for local lineages to open 
private museums honoring their scholar ancestors. Local Confucians 
understood this series of actions by Park as an expression of nationalism and 
respect for the national culture and history molded by the Confucian 
tradition.'
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example - the construction of an economy-oriented attitude in politics needs 
to be questioned as follows: did South Korea have any particular 
socio-historical conditions that facilitated a ready acceptance of the 
economy-centered modernization project by the people?; what was the state 
elite's intention behind this and what were its political implications? There 
have been at least two approaches for the investigation of the origin of the 
economy-centered modernization project: one is to identify the objective 
socio-historical situation until 1961, the year of the first military coup. 
Under that approach, the peoples' condition of extreme poverty, political 
instability, and social disorder are mainly highlighted (PARK Jeong-Hee, 
1961). This situation is regarded as the very source for peoples' acceptance 
of the state elite's modernization project. The other gives more emphasis to 
the state elite's strategic justification process in order to politically 
legitimate their political coup. From this perspective, the state elite's strong 
authoritarian rule is considered as a direct instrument by which continuous 
political conflicts were forcefully stopped and people were guided to their 
economic interests. In terms of persuasion and justification, the state elite 
clearly stand as the subject, producing persuasive reasons for people, on the 
one hand, and facing the situation in which they had to justify their 
illegitimate political activities, on the other. The economy-centered 
modernization project was developed in the relationship between the state 
elite and the people, rather than preexisting as a desire of the people to 
see a strong state with clear economic vision. In the continuity of political 
confrontation between left and right, and state and anti-state democrats, the 
people recognized a possibility for political development and democracy in 
1960, after the collapse of the Rhee regime following nation-wide political 
protests. The peoples' expectations in that year were for transparent 
administrative management, the de-construction of authoritarian state
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institutions, the expulsion of the problematic state elite, the development of 
the relationship with North Korea, and the development of the economy. 
An assertion that argues that over-inflated political freedom was an obstacle 
to economic development, was not powerful in public discourse at this 
time. Even though there was a negative perception of the Rhee Regime's 
economic policies, the main cause of economic underdevelopment was not 
the regime's inability, but the consequences of the War and the unsolved 
legacy of Japanese colonialism for the economic structure. The diminution 
of politics and increased economic values in the public sphere was the 
work of the military elite who dominated the state in 1961. They forcefully 
stopped on-going political discourse, reshaped political geography into 
formal politics, and excluded collective political actions and organizations 
outside of parliament- see, the government policies in the table. Moreover, 
they produced new political issues through which they dominated the 
media, for example, many campaigns for societal reform, aimed at 
corruption, gangsters, the propaganda of state reform, and emphasis on the 
threat of North Korea. They intended to construct a reformative image of 
the state, both as transparent and a leading force for change, and as the 
absolute image of the state which forbids other actors to attack it. Thus, 
the military elite's control narrowed political activities, changing the political 
discourse into a newly shaped formal politics, through which they oversaw 
both the creation of issues and their distribution in public debate.
It was the state elite that initiated modernization, not only in the economic, 
but also in the socio-political sphere. Under absolute state authority, they 
had the plenipotentiary power to manage social resources, to utilize major 
state institutions and to produce political ideology. With an undeveloped 
institutionalization for political feedback and monitoring in the public
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sphere, most Koreans readily accepted their modernization project and 
participated without strong critique. However, in common with other 
underdeveloped political systems, the degree of industrialization was very 
low (Haggard, Kang and Moon, 1997), raw materials and resources were 
very rare, on account of the exploitation of Japanese colonialism and the
War, and skilled workers and experienced managers were lacking. One of
the distinguishing features of the state elite, in terms of reshaping the 
whole of society, including public institutional systems and the people, was 
above all its ability to provoke people to participate in the project. 
Enforcement, violence and authoritarian practices, existed side-by-side with 
the implanting of voluntary motivations and guidance for collective 
participation, under the strategy of an economy-centered modernization.
In the overall picture of the state elite's modernization project, the economy 
provided the motivation, politics served as the restraining instrument, and 
culture the persuasive tool in a diversity of practical applications. Under the 
experience of extreme poverty and the recognition of the economic 
abundance of advanced industrialized countries - the USA, the rise of the 
Japanese economy, for example -, an orientation toward economic 
development became widely accepted, but only once the political sphere 
had been shaped by the dictatorship of the military elite in the state.
However, in the context of ideological conflict, the path of economic
development was capitalist, while any type of social democratic alternative 
was ruthlessly eliminated with all its political implications. The state elite 
utilized an implanted anti-communism, in politics and legislation, to limit 
political activities critical of their modernization projects in the name of 
national security. The state elite, though, also argued for a restoration of 
national pride as its vision and promoted strong nationalist ideas in the
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cultural space of history. The embedding of national pride in cultural 
discourse displays an emphasis on the modernist tradition. As I mentioned 
in chapter 2, the discourse on Silhak was part of an intellectual 
contribution to modernization. A widely spread public sentiment, despite 
ideological manipulation, that the country had neither economic wealth, nor 
imperialist political power in world politics, nor wide territories or abundant 
natural resources, provoked a grand desire for people to distinguish their 
cultural difference, on the national level, from others. Collective behavior 
and community-oriented life styles were mobilized as the substance of a 
cultural distinctiveness, for example. Moreover, traditional social orders 
based on age distinction and the obedient attitude to seniors were 
emphasized as positive heritages from traditional culture. They became the 
method of the cultures of organized modernization.
To sum up, within the overall architecture of authoritarian modernization 
between the 1960s and the 1980s, the role of politics and cultural activities 
became instrumentalized toward achieving a certain economic performance. 
While the vision in the economic sphere has to some extent been achieved, 
the political vision has been suspended, as part of the emergency measures 
for economic growth, and the cultural vision has been dependent on 
economic performance. At the level of practical strategy and government 
policies, the state has controlled possible counter-actors and raised 
nationalistic sentiments at the same time. As the overall effects of 
state-guided societal transformation in authoritarian style, industrialization, 
authoritarianism and identity crisis respectively have occurred in the three 
spheres. One of the main causes for this situation is the unbalanced 
development of the three spheres, which did not have their own 
mechanisms for solving emerging problems, because of a lack of
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independent agents to alternatively suggest different visions and display 
practical capabilities in these spheres. In fact, when the state elite allocated 
different resources to the three spheres for modernization programmes, they 
hardly conceived the possibility of institutional divisions that could possibly 
lead to the emergence of strong counter-actors, critical of authoritarian 
modernization. However, as each sphere was shaped by the modernization 
process, counter actors against state policies arose.
5.1.4. The relationship between 'authoritarian modernization’ and the 
development o f  state institutions
Two major interpretations on the meaning of state institutions are 
considered for the Korean case: major economic and political institutions 
were positively created and managed for the purpose of modernization 
(Cheng, Haggard and Kang, 1998; KANG David, 1995); while at the same 
time, they are privately utilized to secure the state elite's political status. 
The first is certainly related to economic development, and the second is 
concerned with political problems. The balancing of these two perspectives 
provided practical justification for the state elite and critical evidence for 
counter-actors. At the same time, many social scientists keep one of the 
two perspectives for their comparative understanding of the Korean case, 
except for a new trend in which the institutional systems' inefficiency and 
irrelevance are criticized (Mattews, 1998). In order to understand the 
process that develops state institutions, we need to examine, firstly, the 
internal logic of the political elite in the state which is concerned with 
modernization, and secondly, their practical ways for accomplishing 
modernization projects.
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It is not easy to generalize the process of institutionalization of state 
organizations as a whole, of course, not only because each organization is 
designed for a specific functional purpose, but also because their 
establishment, change and disappearance are related to specific social 
circumstances. Under acknowledgement of this difficulty, however, it is 
possible to narrow the configuration, based on the respective social 
circumstances, so that if one can isolate the institution builders' intentions 
and interests, institutions' 'initial activities' and their directions could be 
identified. For institution builders, the institutions' initial activities, at least, 
are oriented toward positively furthering their own purpose. Additionally, it 
is through this purpose, that the direction of practices is decided at the 
same time. The degree of autonomy of institutions against the institution 
builders is minimal at this early stage. However, this can increase when 
agents develop their own decision-making process that is autonomous from 
external authority. In the early stage, institutions and agents are necessarily 
dependent on the institution builders' help in providing resources, for 
example, labor power, budgets, and other materials. From the Rhee regime 
(1948-1960) to the Jeon regime (1980-1987) state institutions developed 
under authoritarian leaders. During that period (1948-1987) state institutions' 
basic frameworks, work areas and human resources were basically 
constructed and prepared. A considerable adaptation of Japanese and 
American institutions, developing infrastructures, the creation of many jobs, 
and advanced higher education systems in quantity and quality were 
significant at this time. In order to acquire increased state management for 
modernization, state institutions were organized.
In fact, the influence of the political elite who had military careers in the 
state, for the making and managing of state institutions was very
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prominent.3 Political actors, as the organizers for 'authoritarian
modernization', had a big influence on the activities of state institutions. 
The formation of asymmetrical power relations in the state, between the 
government and parliament, on the one side, and the judicial body - the 
courts - on the other, enabled an undemocratic management of the state. In 
political actors' perspectives, however, the undemocratic situation was 
regarded, in practice, as a necessary condition for rapid modernization, 
rather than as a denial of democracy itself. For political actors in the state, 
political stability was a prerequisite for economic development. They 
persuaded people to accept limited democracy as much as they enforced it 
with violent and authoritative methods. Considerable economic growth 
provided a justification for the political actors, and for a certain time, 
people seemed to accept the limited political situation. Even though 
economic growth was their goal, while political stability was their method, 
the reverse is also true; economic growth was the most important 
instrument for extending state actors' political status. Under the perspective 
of political stability, none of the regimes could secure its position for long
3) The role of the army as one of the major modernizing agents in 
developing countries with colonial experiences has been an area of interest 
for modernization theory. As Pye (1996) argues, the army in the 
developing countries was one of the rare organizations which had 
institutional capability, as well as physical power, to manage the 
reorganization of the state suffering from political instability. Given the fact 
that modernization theory as such intended to find any socio-political 
resource for efficiently promoting political and economic development in 
the developing countries, it did not seem absurd that policy scientists in 
that perspective identified the army as a strong political agent through 
which development programmes could be effected.
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without people's support, except for the colonial occupation and the war­
time situation. The increased necessity of peoples' voluntary support of 
political power, based on democratic procedure, and a developed political 
openness in which all the political elite submit plausible reasons for their 
activities for maintaining or expanding their political status, are significant 
for the modem political world. What is characteristically called economic 
success, especially quantitative growth and the creation of many jobs, has 
been regarded as one of the major instruments for political stability. And 
this especially for undemocratic and authoritative political elites in 
developing countries, where the ruling elite's political lives are more 
dependent on visible economic growth. Economic development shores up 
the weak political legitimation which comes from a violent state origin and 
its arbitrary management. The Korean case is a clear example, not only 
because major political ruptures caused by nation-wide protests were due to 
economic depression, but also because the state elite's obsession with 
economic growth in modernization projects was the preferred political 
method.
However, my understanding of the relationship between the political 
stability of the state and economic growth in South Korea, does not start 
from the popular conception of the correlation between the total political 
negativity of the state elite and its economic success. The so-called 
'developmental state', has been recognized as a key term for understanding 
the nature of the state in developing countries, and its contribution to 
economic growth has generally been accepted in Korean studies. 
Accordingly, most of the literature tends to draw specific conclusions from 
the Korean case: firstly, that the state should actively intervene/guide 
private sectors' business strategies in the early stages of economic planning;
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secondly, the state should engineer social circumstances to facilitate 
competitive conditions for export; thirdly, the state should selectively 
distribute resources, finance for private sectors (see, Amsden, 1989 for 
example). Unlike its economic contribution, the state has been directly and 
indirectly criticized for its way of prescribing social and political problems- 
an undemocratic politics, the undermining of social movements, poorly- 
developed welfare, for example- and pointing out its harsh interventions in 
economic disputes between labor and capital (see, LEE Tae-Ho, 1984, for 
example). Under this ambivalent evaluation that lauded its maximized 
economic positivity and criticized its political negativity, however, a 
question remains: why did South Korea have for over 30 years such a 
significant interdependence between economic growth and undemocratic 
politics? Two ideal answers offer themselves: an undemocratic control of 
the political sphere enables South Korea to promote fast economic growth; 
its economic success consequently maintained undemocratic politics for a 
long time. Both answers seem unsatisfactory. Not only do they place undue 
emphasis on economic performance, but also the two factors in the 
correlation are simply located as independent variables in the distinction 
between 'cause' and 'effect'. In the broad social context where many 
factors are closely linked, a functional distinction between 'cause/effect' and 
'result/consequence' is less persuasive. Firstly, the distinction between the 
independent variable and the subsequent variable is quite unrealistic in the 
investigation of the relationship between economic development and 
democracy, because many components in the logic for choosing the path to 
rapid economic development also impact on political discourse. Secondly, in 
the early stage of modernization, when state institutions were 
underdeveloped, they were showing, like a human embryo in its mother's 
womb, the operating modes of economic systems and political behavior as
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more significantly interrelated. Before each institution had developed its 
own internal logic of quasi-autonomous development, the relationship 
between economic planning, and political practices was like two sides of a 
coin, rather than two independent entities. The argument that economic 
growth and undemocratic politics are related to each other in the Korean 
context, is also problematic, if the historical process is ignored, because it 
appears too simplistic, lacking a deeply-investigated explanation of the 
developing process of correlation between the economy and politics. For the 
Korean case, it is important to keep in mind that economic growth, the 
expansion of infrastructures and state institutions, political conflicts, the 
emergence of authoritarian regimes and their disappearance, and so on, 
were correlated from the beginning. In other words, each social event had 
an expanded impact on others, and likewise was impacted upon by them in 
an amplified process.
At the same time, I do not agree with the critique of the state elite that 
depicts the military elite as in total control of state institutions over two 
decades (1961-1987). Even though they were decision- and policy-makers, 
and legislators, influencing state institutions according to their interests, it is 
difficult to see state institutions as fully under their control. State 
institutions were not isolated forms, separate from political actors' 
modernization projects, but political actors were also to some extent the 
very subject of developing state institutions. Building modernized state 
institutions is also a part of the modernization project, because well- 
developed institutions and experienced officers for carrying out projects, 
were rare. State institutions and political actors developed, not in 
competitive and fully conflictive relations, but together, as inter-supportive 
supplements. The political actors in the state existed as internal developers
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of institutions themselves.
Many political actors with state power offered visionary planning ideas for 
the modernization of South Korea: the Rhee regime's 'immediate 
independence and building of the new state' in the 1940s and the 
'reconstruction of the nation' after the War, the Park regime’s 'Restoration 
of national economy' and the 'new spirit for building a new nation', the 
Jeon regime's 'stabilization of politics' and 'continuous economic 
development', and so forth. Even though there were unjustifiable political 
problems emanating from their fragile legitimacy, and exacerbated by rather 
violent closures of the political sphere, these visionary projects were not 
usually criticized, at least on the macro-level. In other words, most 
critiques of political actors in political discourse mainly focused on the 
arbitrary decisions on the practical level, rather than on the ideal basis for 
the modernization project.
A particular social phenomenon, namely, the process of a developing state elite as 
the very condition for developing counter-actors' capacities - for example, the 
more the state elite presented their authoritative modernization in an enforced 
form, the more serious were the counter-actors' resistance and critique - has been 
the basis of the argument that South Korea has a strong civil society as much as a 
powerful state, a reasoning that criticizes the idea of unbalanced power relations 
between a strong authoritative state and a naive civil society. The counter-state 
actors, however, who developed through reflexive practices reacting against the 
state in post-war politics, did not appear to have strong ideologies to match the 
state elite's organized modernization programmes, although it is still necessary to 
take account of their political power. I will here investigate the counter-state 
actors' rather ambivalent political growth, under the premise that strong
-  207
counter-actors would not have emerged if a strong authoritarian state had not 
existed.
The process, in which counter-actors' capacities increased, shows two 
distinctive causes contributing to this development: the first cause is the 
objective socio-economic circumstances produced mainly by the state elite's 
modernization projects and consequent transformation of Korean society; the 
second is counter-actors' own active critique of state-centered modernization 
and their political confrontation with the state. The first cause has been 
illustrated by way of describing the continuous reproduction of political 
problems and the weak foundation for the legitimacy of the state elite and 
state institutions, which provided opportunities for the critical practices of 
counter-actors. The second cause is rather due to counter-actors' subjective 
condition, which had an impact on their choosing a particular pattern of 
critique. Counter-state actors, alienated from the establishment of 
institutions, have shown a tendency to criticize institution builders, by 
arguing the unjust appropriation of institutions, rather than denying the 
legitimacy of the institution itself or criticizing the institutions' functionality. 
In other words, the critique of state institutions focused on their 
instrumentality for private interests, rather than emphasizing their functional 
problems. For example, when the National Security Law was
criticized in the public sphere, in most cases, it was condemned for its 
contribution to the ruling state elite's political security and its consequent 
unfairness on democrats and opposed party members, who became subject 
to political attack (PARK Won-Soon, 1993). Opposition parties and 
democrats in parliamentary politics, in particular, were wont to stress their 
idealistic view on the role of institutions. For them, institutions should be 
fair in practice, such that the outcome should have no harmful
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consequences for themselves. In the limited public sphere in which socialist 
and communist views cannot be freely discussed, counter-actors' choice 
starts with the usage of limited political resources, contained within the 
narrowed boundary of public discourse. Even though the disclosure of 
unfair execution is in principle inevitable for evaluating state institutions, 
excessive fondness of it and remaining silent about functional problems 
deriving from the initial setting of institutions, consequently helped to 
maintain the limits of the public space. The history of the National 
Security Law shows that counter-actors' one-dimensional critique was 
subsequently devoted to formal amendment and improvement of the law, 
rather than its abolition. Ever since the emergence of the state, formal 
politics in Parliament has never deconstructed the initial political setting 
that excluded any socialist or communist perspective, including the social 
democratic one, for modernization.
5.2. The contradiction between rupture and continuity in the political 
changes
5.2.1. Rethinking the relationship between state and civil society
There have been two distinctive perspectives on the theme of 'state and 
civil society' in Korean Studies. The first is to emphasize the state's 
dominance and ignorance of civil rights in practicing policies. It argues that 
South Korea has a strong state and a weak civil society, so to speak. The 
thesis of a strong state versus weak civil society, which was popular until 
the early 1980s as the critique of the authoritarian character of the South 
Korean state, seems not persuasive as an explanation for the rise of social 
and political movements since the 1980s. It can neither explain the gradual 
increase on the demands of democratic rales and the state's reforming
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process, nor account for the emergence of diverse social movements and 
their dynamic developments. The second focuses, as the critique of the 
first, on the significant development of social movements after 1987. It 
insists that South Korea has not only a strong state but also a strong civil 
society, so that both seriously clash over public agendas. The thesis of a 
strong state versus a capable civil society, which burgeoned during the 
1990s (see, CHOI Jang-jip, 1993; Koo, 1999, for example), regards the 
status quo of democracy in South Korea as significantly developed, 
although, at the same time, the authoritarian character of the state does not 
disappear completely.
Both approaches seem to me unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, their 
understandings of the relationship between the state and civil society are 
problematic in that both presuppose the separate existence of state and civil 
society under a conflictive perspective as alienated and independent social 
bodies. Secondly, none of the approaches provides arguments for the 
co-existence of political ruptures, the continuity of the authoritarian state, 
and, finally the end of the authoritarian state. The status quo of the state 
is not independent from that of civil society. The state emerged as the 
product of political interactions between actors in social spaces who were 
involved in a historical situation, as the Korean case clearly illustrates.
In efforts to highlight the significance of the state as an autonomous 
actor, analyses conducted in the statist perspective often ignore that 
the state is embedded in society and draws its essential characteristics 
from society itself. Both state autonomy and state strength are the 
products of interactions between the state and society, in which even 
a weak society finds diverse ways to influence state structure. ... The 
state must continuously compete with social groups and classes to 
maintain control over the people and their behavior, and the state's 
control many change significantly from one sector to another and 
from one issue to another. (Koo, 1993: 3-6).
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While Koo's argument correctly points out the relationship between state 
and society beyond giving undue weight to either, his thesis also needs to 
be modified in order to understand the process of how a group of political 
actors achieved state power and utilized it to maintain its political 
influence. The relationship between the state and the state elite in the 
Korean context, which I have introduced in the previous section, shows 
how the state, which was initially instrumentalized by some political actors, 
gained symbolic power over political actors. Generally speaking, through 
power struggles, compromises, consensus or their admixture, the state 
emerged, developed and changed. If a state has been maintained for a long 
time, it indirectly signals, at least, the capacity of the state to sustain the 
status quo. However, the capacity of the state does not come from the 
state itself. Rather, it comes from the social space that is covered by the 
activities of the state and the people involved in the state's activities. The 
state exists, not as rules and institutions which control civil society from 
outside, but as one of the selected resources and methods, in fact as the 
most certain and reliable resource and method, of some members of civil 
society.
How, then, should the conflictive situation in which the state seems to 
oppress social movements and civil rights in the Korean case, be 
understood? It is the social conflict between the formalized will of 
members of civil society transcendentalized to the functions of state, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the alienated will, from the state, of other 
members of civil society. In other words, the conflict between the state and 
civil society is the manifestation of the very conflict between different 
members of civil society. The state elite are also members of civil society. 
They propagate their own visionary wills, which come from lives in civil
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society, in a political space, namely the state. Under this kind of reasoning 
the discourse on 'State and Civil society' should be re-designated as 
'competition and conflict between political subjects having visionary 
modernization projects'. In the Korean case, social and political conflicts 
between subjects of modernization took shape as the maintenance of the 
strong authoritarian state over a long duration and across several political 
ruptures. Significant here was the formation and development of the 
conservative network, which had charismatic leaders at the center, and 
proposed a hierarchical shape for the state. The 'restoration of South Korea 
based on economic prosperity under a capitalist perspective, on liberal 
democracy excluding communism and socialism' was their abstract for 
modernization. They needed a well-organized state for the rapid 
accomplishment of this task and produced remarkable economic growth 
through aggressive mobilization of the state power.
5.2.2. The co-existence o f several political ruptures and the continuity o f  
the authoritarian state
As I mentioned briefly before, several political ruptures and the continuity 
of the authoritarian state have overlapped in the Korean experience. The 
understanding of these phenomena is useful for rethinking the relationship 
between state and civil society, on the one hand, and for recognizing how 
political stability has been maintained and broken, on the other. In a broad 
sense, the causes of political ruptures can be found in political problems 
and economic crises. Especially when both political and economic causes 
are inter-linked, the state of political instability is sharply increased.
For Korean politics, every constitutional change of republic occurred as 
consequence of political confrontations beyond electoral politics. The first
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republic was sunk by national demonstrations in 1960. The second republic, 
emerging directly from this, was abolished by military coup in 1961. The 
third republic, based on military power, was replaced by the fourth 
republic, ostensibly to cement the permanent presidency of the leader in 
1972. The fourth republic was abruptly destroyed by the assassination of 
the president in 1979. Then, the fifth republic, emerging from the violent 
occupation of the state by the military elite in 1980, was ended by national 
protests in 1987. Each republic failed to sustain its political authority: the 
Rhee regime (1948-1960) was attacked by left groups and their armed 
resistance to its origin; the Park regime (1961-1979) and other military 
regimes (1980-1992) were blamed and challenged by democrats, because of 
their occupation of the state based on military coups; even the first civilian 
government, the Kim regime (1993-1998), was criticized as a conservative 
alliance that abandoned democratic tradition.4 It becomes apparent, then, 
that the political fragility, which leads to the inability to maintain a stable 
state authority, comes, firstly, from the regimes' 'ontic weakness'. All 
regimes finally failed to maintain political legitimacy. Even though each 
regime tried to justify its decisions and activities as unavoidable given the 
situation of the nation, their ontic problems derived from its respective 
origins that were permanently criticized by counter-political actors and 
people. A lack of legal foundation in the genesis of the regime - the 
problem of military coup -, was followed by an undemocratic management 
of the state by the state-elite. The sudden change in the constitution, the 
violence exercised by the state apparatuses, the immoral social networking, 
corruption (HAHM Chaibong (1997) for the KIM Young-sam government), 
are all examples introduced by counter-state actors as resources for political
4) See, Kang and Moon (1995) for the implications of the military 
intervention in politics.
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critique of each regime in the state. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the moment of concrete political rupture is more or less determined by 
economic reasons. When people were unsatisfied with the economy, the 
undemocratic features of the state were regarded as an unendurable social 
status quo. Many political ruptures and abrupt abolitions of regimes, were 
produced in just such a situation. The reverse side is, that when economic 
development is clearly distinguishable, political problems are accepted by 
the people, to some extent, at least until 1987. However, nation-wide
democratic movements and workers' strikes in 1987 were not mainly based 
on economic decline. They were caused by a fundamental political concern 
with the state elite's constitutional change, and concern with the social 
transformation co-extensive with economic development. A widely spread 
confrontation between labor and capital overlapped with the raising of the 
issue of democracy. Aggressive proponents of modernization - the state 
elite, entrepreneurs, conservative intellectuals -, clashed with victims of the 
project- democrats, workers, the urban poor, students and so forth. The
demand for democracy and the redistribution of welfare could not be 
solved by the old-fashioned authoritarian management of the state.
However, what is striking is the fact that the authoritarian state continued
despite several political ruptures that anticipated an improved
democratization. In spite of democratic movements on a national scale, in 
1960 and 1979/80, which were powerful enough to destroy the authoritarian 
state, military coups rebuilt a new authoritarian state. Besides, on an overall 
estimation, the authoritarian state lasted for nearly 50 years. Here 1 would 
like to raise a question as to how authoritarian regimes could exist for 
such a long time and what is the main reason of this phenomenon. 
Through the iron rule of National Security Law? Anyone conversant with
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the authoritarian states' undemocratic and violent governing styles would 
probably cite political dictatorship as the answer. However, this is not fully 
persuasive, in that the maintenance of political power depends not only on 
passive subordination, but also on voluntary support. Here I would like to 
investigate this second aspect in the Korean case.
Until the armistice of 1953, the state elite mainly used political and 
military methods to minimize counter-actors' resistance. The National 
Security legislation of 1949 and its violent enactment was very effective in 
protecting the authority of the state from anti-state or anti-government 
groups. Ideological conflicts and the War provided further justification for 
their violent practices. Even though the initial setting of the state was 
problematic and unstable, its longevity enabled the state elite to develop 
public institutions. When the military and police as well as judicial
organizations functioned for maintaining stability in the political sphere, 
administrative organizations were charged with providing national 
reconstruction projects. The restoration of ruined infrastructures and the
provision of the necessities of life for people, were the main tasks of 
bureaucrats. The Rhee Regime distributed limited materials, social resources 
and public finances in a selective way to the private sector. Many 
entrepreneurs, who had been educated and trained under Japanese 
colonialism, and their facilities, were reintroduced as part of national
reconstruction projects. The allocation of scarce materials and the provision 
of financial support by the state elite in this period, is enough to illustrate 
a social process which can be easily identified in developing countries. One 
of the main aims of modernization projects is, o f course, to increase
economic growth in a short period by way of developing economic 
infrastructures. In an early modernization period, many more resources, for
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example, materials, finance, labor power, were needed than in any other 
period. However, the lack of materials, finance, and advanced labor power 
were also prominent in that period. At the same time, development plans 
were normally dominated by a few planners and decision makers. In other 
words, the need for rapid economic development, given limited initial 
infrastructures and social resources and a secured planning and decision­
making directorship, insulated from social feedback and restraints, compose 
the basic social circumstances in developing countries.
Corruption has often emerged in the period of developing economic 
institutions. In the Korean context, corruption has no doubt had an 
institutional foundation (KONG Tat Yan, 1996). The state elite needed
successful economic indicators to secure their political status. For them, 
visible economic growth has been regarded as the most important tool
through which their political lives are guaranteed and their problematic 
political activities are to some extent justified. Selected entrepreneurs in 
selected industries were encouraged to show economic growth and
'compensated' through the receipt of special subsidies. Helped by
protectionist policies that forbade foreign development investment and 
financial aid, the textile industry and related industries enjoyed fast 
economic growth. They also provided some black political funding for the 
ruling Liberal Party. The Rhee regime spent much money on several 
elections, from political funds which were illegally gathered in the private 
sector. One of the main critiques of the Rhee regime in 1960, was not the 
disaster of its economic policy, but the subsequent rebates between the 
Rhee regime and entrepreneurs that were depicted as problematic economic 
relations. What should be made clear in any analysis of corruption, is that 
every regime was deeply involved in corruption between the state elite and
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big entrepreneurs, although all of them had manifested a 'clean politics', 
criticizing previous regimes' corruption (PARK Byeong-Seong, 1995; KIM 
Chang-kuk, 1997; KIM Byong-Seob, 1998). It can be argued that the 
authoritarian developmental state and big conglomerates, Chaebols, are 
interdependent, for political stability and company expansion. However, 
hegemony between them was always on the state side.
As mentioned above, state institutions were dominated by 
'development-oriented aggressive modernizers', who constructed conservative 
networks. It is very interesting to understand the asymmetrical relations 
between government, legislature and the judiciary body in the conservative 
triangle. The subsequent positions of the parliament and the court, were 
due to the authoritarian and violent practices of a few political groups, 
including the military elite, expanding their political space. The
reconstruction of the state organization and the elimination of the previous 
state elite by military coups, especially, were significant enough to ignore 
criticism from other state institutions, and to get rid of critique altogether. 
This political enforcement, however, cannot effectively explain the
maintenance of undemocratic politics and unbalanced power relations in the 
South Korean state over the long term.
Political groups and a few charismatic leaders, as modernizing agents, have 
played a major role in developing a more organized and advanced form of 
the state. What is characteristic, as much as their intervention and 
enforcement in developing state institutions, is the fact that the political
groups produced a visionary modernization project which was shared by 
others in the state elite, including high bureaucrats, who eventually came to 
accept these political actors' problematic occupation of state power, their
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economic planning and their value systems for culture and national security. 
Military regimes, especially, provided a certain opportunity for emerging 
technocrats to practise their economic and industrial visions, for ambitious 
individuals to gain prominence in Parliament and for political prosecutors to 
enjoy significant political powers and high social status. As well as the 
support of the conservative formation in the state, nation-wide support for 
the state is also visible. This, thanks to the authoritarian state's 
development-oriented modernization projects, that created many jobs, not 
only in the economic sphere, but in social and political institutions geared 
to the reorganizing of Korean society and through its introduction of 
welfare policies at the basic level. Accordingly, the people's implicit 
acceptance of the problematic state that produced palpable economic 
benefits, contributed to the long term maintenance of a 'strong state', as 
much as did the newly emerging bureaucrats, technocrats, civil servants and 
other participants, who were enjoying increased activity under state 
institutions.
Conclusion: the state as organizer of strong programmes of societal 
development
While chapter 4 was concerned with the historical origin of the state crisis, in 
terms of the emergence of a state authority lacking legitimation, this chapter has 
analyzed the overall policy direction of the South Korean state and the state elite. 
The South Korean state after the Korean war - or at the stage of post-military 
conflict in the on-going process of war -, has pursued a certain type of societal 
development which could be described overall as an 'authoritarian modernization' 
in which the development of political democracy is suspended as the price for fast 
economic growth. In spite of certain political ruptures, in which the grouping of 
the state elite was suddenly replaced by a new political actor, the power holders in
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the state maintained political authoritarianism in which democratic actors were 
suppressed for nearly 40 years. At the same time, they prevented the major 
economic actor, the bourgeois class, from taking an independent stance for their 
own economic interests against the state. The economic development of South 
Korea was not the product of the combined efforts between political actors in 
general and the state in particular, on the one hand, and economic actors, on the 
other, according to a Parsonian idea o f required coordination over boundaries for 
an economic programme for modem society (Parsons and Smelser, 1956). 
Certainly, the (power) relationship between them was hardly equal under 
authoritarian modernization. In a sense, the Korean case of economic 
modernization could be interpreted as a successful example of the political control 
of the economic sphere, if economic performance were the only object of 
evaluation for modernization in developing countries where freedom of economic 
activities remains barely institutionalized.
If one intends to deal with the Korean case under a sociological perspective, 
analyzing the possible correlation between political democracy and economic 
development, the Korean experience shows, quite regrettably, that the dual 
development in politics and the economy is not achieved simultaneously, but 
occurred sequentially: democracy followed economic development. At the same 
time, the evaluation of capitalist development for the generation of democratic 
actors (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992) should supplement, from the Korean 
experience, the importance of the historical and non-economic element through 
which (industrial) workers become democratic actors, and the possible 
de-radicalization of democratic actors in the process of capitalist economic 
development influenced by non-economic factors: above all, a political 
suppression, highly implicated in capitalist economic development. The political 
process in which counter-state actors increase their political capacity for
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democratization in the Korean context shows that democratic actors have been 
merely reacting against the authoritarian state. Secondly, it shows the 
fragmentation of counter-state democratic actors in a newly emerging political 
theatre with a certain level of institutionalized procedural democracy - this issue 
will be dealt with in the next chapter.
One of the problems for the theory of democracy within the broad framework of 
modernization theory, is its overloading of the importance of institutional 
development of the (democratic) political system leading to overall societal 
transformation. While it is certainly true that the institutionalization of political 
affairs and the reorganization of political activities within the institutional 
framework are one of the crucial elements influencing political actors towards 
democracy, one of the neglected factors, or rather deliberately avoided factors, is 
the problem of the political actors who should take the role of the instituting 
agency. For example, if underdeveloped institutions and the political system in 
general are mentioned as the main cause of South Korean authoritarianism, then 
this fundamentally misrepresents Korean politics. Unevenly distributed political 
power since the emergence of the state, rather inescapably suggests the need to 
look at the previous political profile. In fact, political disputes among several 
actors could be regarded as substantial causes for the undemocratic embodiment 
of political institutions. Furthermore, the state authority itself has been the source 
of power for dealing with the utility of state institutions and the overall political 
system, with the purpose of securing for the state elite its own political status in 
the state. The political relationship between the state and counter-state actors 
began to change, not as the result of the gradual implantation of democratic 
institutions, but through the political experiences built on long-term political 
conflicts, in which particular institutional alternatives become focused and 
favored.
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6. A fte r  authoritarian modernization: m odernity and uncertainty
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I described how the state and counter-state actors 
increased their powers against the other, having previously depended on the 
problematic relationship between them. Whereas the previous political
situation had been shaped in the bi-polar tension between state and 
counter-state actors, the new situation after 1987 shows how this rigid 
political structure is gradually changing. It seems fair to say that 
institutional democracy had been achieved, to some extent, since 1987, 
encouraging political actors to freely present their own alternative
programmes for reform (see, West and Baker, 1991 for constitutional
reforms). Further, the institutionalization o f socio-economic systems in 
complementarity to economic growth began to enable actors to 
communicate with others in a more widely-rationalized manner than before. 
However, major socio-political actors immediately exposed their lacking 
abilities which did not make them well-suited to this changed situation. 
Parliamentary politics, for example, on the whole, has continued with 
unqualified political discourse that, ignoring more systematic implications 
for policy agendas, mainly focuses on the problematic aspects of politicians 
from other parties. At the same time, one of the major economic 
contributors, the Chaebols, have failed to enjoy a more liberalized
economic atmosphere, since the collapse of the military dictatorship, that 
would help economic growth. Why are they thus deadlocked?
As I mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, the most crucial element 
of modernity is the actors' creative abilities to explicate and work with the
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values which are embedded in their basic orientations. The problem most 
Korean political actors face, then, is the inability to remold values, which 
have been maintained from the previous political era, for the new situation, 
or the lack of awareness of the need for a radical reconstruction of new 
political agendas. Broadly speaking, the current South Korean situation 
since 1987 could be understood as a new crisis of modernity in the 
Korean context. The current crisis is neither a crisis of regime, nor of the 
state that has distinctively shaped current Korean society. Nor is the crisis 
exclusively limited to the economic sphere - the devastating financial crisis 
of 1997 - or to the cultural sphere- a rapid social transformation provoking 
a new type of value orientation. The current crisis has indeed something 
problematic for each sphere, in which critical problems unfurl. However, it 
is quite different from the critical situations in the previous modernization 
period, in that whereas those were mainly shaped by asymmetric power 
relations between major actors - state actors as dominant and counter-state 
actors as resistant -, the current critical situation has been caused by the 
exhaustion of those actors' practical capacities in the newly emergent 
political theatre of interplay between them.
6.1. The unveiled vulnerability o f the Korean path to modernization
6.1.1. Doubts on democratic actors in politics
Most of all, the state began to lose its power over society, if the 
conceptual dichotomy is assumed, through the changes of the state elite 
after 1987. As I have pointed out in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the nature of the 
power structure in Korean politics in the twentieth century was formed 
through an asymmetric relation between major political actors, which, after 
a number of political ruptures produced sudden changes of dominant power 
relations in the state. While the group of political actors in the state could
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be broadly understood as the state elite, the emergence of new power 
holders as the new state elite and the decline of the previous state elite 
occurred through political ruptures. Under the particular political context in 
which the institutionalization of political activities, in terms of implanting 
procedural democracy, has been considerably limited, and because of a 
certain lack of possibility for political actors in the state to change, the 
regime changes have become possible only through political forces beyond 
parliamentary politics. Besides, constitutional reforms have been followed by 
political ruptures. In spite of its short existence, South Korean politics has 
shown that different types of political actors have taken the state, whereas 
North Korean politics has remained stable with the hegemonic power of the 
political group whose members made their careers in the independence 
movements of the colonial period and in the Korean war later. The rise of 
the military elite as the power-holders of the South Korean state in the 
1960s and their decline in the 1980s, for example, should be interpreted as 
one example of the changes of the state elite. The elite based in the 
military is replaced at the beginning of the 1990s by professional 
politicians, in the narrow sense, who had been active in Parliament since 
the 1960s as critics of the authoritarian regimes. The rise of a non-military 
political class coincides with the decline of the authoritarian state and a 
redefining process of the functions of administrative branches and of the 
autonomy of the economic classes.
The authoritarian state based on the political elite with military backgrounds 
had its dominant political power curtailed at the end of the 1980s. Through 
the period of dictatorship in the 1980s, the political capacity of democrats, 
students, workers, farmers and the urban poor significantly increased, and 
they much more vigorously resisted the state's harsh political suppression
than their predecessors had done in the 1960s and 1970s. They endlessly 
challenged state authority, which suffered from a lack of political 
legitimacy due to the problematic origin of the state by military coup. In 
1987, they finally achieved the state's abandonment of its design to change 
the constitution, that would have extended the presidency of the state, 
which consequently meant a direct voting system for electing the new 
president would have been practiced. Nonetheless, however, the results of 
the presidential election in December 1987 was not a resounding victory 
for counter-state actors. A former army general, who was deeply involved 
in the military coup of 1979, was elected as the new president, while 
regionalism emerged as a powerful political instrument during the campaign. 
The new president had deep connections with the former regime and 
consequently most of the state-elite remained. In spite of the continuation 
of problematic regimes, the political experience of 1987 was very 
significant, enough to be dubbed a turning-point for political development. 
Political discourse in the public sphere, for example, developed openly, and 
many issues, which had previously been ignored or neglected, received 
attention, even though the extension of political discourse did not produce 
an instant reform of political culture.
Once the regime change was institutionalized, followed by the presidential 
election with the direct voting system, the political elite in the state could 
not treat workers' trade-union activities, farmers' protests, students' 
movement for the (re)unification of Korea with the harsh suppression that 
had hitherto been the norm. The new regime (1988-1992) had to show, at 
the very least, democratic gestures that differentiated it from previous 
military regimes, as the first legitimated government that was thereby also 
subject to political pressure from opposition parties that constituted a
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majority in the Parliament (LEE Su-Hoon, 1993). Henceforth, comparison 
between previous military regimes and new civilian governments has 
become a powerful tool for evaluating any new government's overall 
political activities, and a means through which authoritarian modernization 
has been subject to réévaluation. The major state elite as power-holders has 
significantly changed thrice since the presidency election of 1987: the 
military which took power from 1961 to 1987 was eradicated from politics 
under the civilian government; in spite of strong political reform policies, 
however, the first civilian government (1993-1997) was unable to stimulate 
economic growth and was severely criticized for the financial crisis of 
1997; the KIM Dae-Jung government (1998-2002), which began its tenure 
facing a dire economic situation, has faced wide criticism, not only from 
political conservatives, but also from beneficiaries of the preceding 
economic growth, for restructuring programmes for the economy and its 
'sunshine' policy toward North Korea.
With the emergence of the KIM Dae-Jung government and its 5 years' 
activities, however, a political transformation resulting from certain changes 
in the overall role of the state for societal development occurred. This 
means that the binary distinction between the state and counter-state actors, 
as evidenced in the authoritarian period, no longer holds, in an era in
which the latter have assumed state authority. A further implication in the
Korean context, is that the political elite were no longer able to
instrumentalize state authority for justifying their illegitimate practices,
because of the fragmentation of the symbolic power of the state. In 
addition, the rigid binary code of ideological tension also begins to 
dissolve. While the contents of political discourse in the public sphere, 
which had been stifled in the previous period, has begun to include a wide
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range of socio-political and economic issues, the political spectrum for 
pursuing alternatives has also widened. Counter-state political actors who 
had increased their influence in the conflictive political process also 
revealed their lack of preparation for dealing with issues in the new 
context: the solidarity of counter-state actors began to fragment. Most of 
all, reform-oriented conservative politicians, who had been regarded as 
democrats, betrayed their own political interests as the political class intent 
on gaining positions in the state. For example, two leading politicians, who 
later became presidents of the state in turn, competed with each other, 
provoking issues of regional identity in the presidential election, and others 
participated in their respective election camps - this phenomenon might be 
understood as 'caciquism' in Korean politics.1 Secondly, the different 
political orientations of social movement groups and students' organizations, 
which had been rather marginalized in favor of solidarity against the 
authoritarian state, became clearly visible after the presidential election of
1) Although Sapelli (1995)'s categorical container, Southern Europe, could 
not fully arrive at the generalized socio-political description for all the five 
countries in his research - Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey -, his 
description of the political phenomenon, that party politics is shaped under 
the power of 'bosses' and their networks at the local level, could find an 
equivalent form in Korean politics. While the overall comparison between 
South Korean politics and any example in his research must include the 
transformative processes of those societies and the states since the 1990s, 
particular types of the institutional development of politics under the 
influences of personal relationships, including the hierarchical order in many 
countries in Europe, Asia and South America is deserving further 
investigation, rather than being treated simply as deviations of modem 
institutions or underdeveloped institutional activities in those societies.
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1987. The initial setting for the Korean discourse on civil society illustrates 
one of the dilemmas of the recent political transformation: to reconfigure 
solidarity among democratic actors under the condition of the political 
fragmentation of the class movement and the civic movement (SOHN 
Hyeok-Jae et al., 1999; KIM Seung-Kuk, 1998; KIM Sunhyuk, 1997; KIM 
Se-Kyun, 1995).
The democratization process of Korean politics has been highlighted in 
several debates in the social and political sciences. Four exemplary debates 
are as follows: firstly, on the constitutional force of democracy and the 
role of the middle class and working class, which occurs in the discourse 
on the relationship between economic development and political democracy; 
secondly, on the limited nature of institutional democracy and the 
emergence of interest-based political disputes; thirdly, on what is called, the 
Asian values and Korean exceptional ism in terms of political culture in the 
Asian region as a whole; fourthly, on the particularity of Korean politics, 
in terms of popular political agendas and rigid political actors, under which 
many Korean scholars doubt the applicability of political theories from 
Non-Korean experiences.
While many scholars in Korean studies commonly accept the significant 
contribution of the middle class to the democratic movement in June 1987, 
Hagen KOO (1999) refutes this, arguing that most citizens who participated 
in demonstrations on the street were white-collar workers, symbolized as 
'the neck-tie squads' and supporters on the street, rather than members of 
the assumed category, the middle class. Also, HAN Sang-Jin (1997, 1995) 
doubts the active capacity of the middle class for advancing democracy and 
proposes another social category, the 'middling grass roots' as the main
-  227 -
motor for democracy in South Korea. The debate is partly based on 
different interpretations of the actualization of the working class movement. 
In several discourses, it is said that a number of participants in the 
political movement are individual citizens rather than being conceptualized 
as workers. In fact, the category of the working class in many political 
discourses was narrowly defined so as to indicate 'blue-collar' workers on 
the shop floor, rather than broadly identifying the members within the 
relations of production in the capitalist economy. Furthermore, a 
significantly increased organization of trade unions was empirically argued 
as the phenomenon which followed the political movement in June 1987 as 
the consequence of victory. While many scholars observe that workers' 
movements in their economic struggles temporally followed the political 
movement for constitutional change against the authoritarian state, they have 
marginalized the role of the working class for democratization, through the 
separation of collective movements in the economic and the political 
spheres.
The categorization of collective movements into 'political' and 'economic' 
struggles for explaining the dynamic politics in the 1980s and 1990s does 
not seem to be in accord with the transformative process of Korean 
politics. If we recall the particular relationship of the political and the 
economic under the authoritarian style of modernization, the workers 
movement of the 1970s and the 1980s could be better understood if it is 
regarded as the human rights movement for achieving minimum standards 
for workers as human beings and further civic movements for equal civic 
rights at least guaranteed by the constitution of the state. Ironically, the 
long lasting and notorious tradition o f the state's intervention in labor 
disputes since the colonial period has induced, not the conceptual
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distinction between the economic and the political, but the distinction 
between the democratic and the authoritarian, around which bi-polarized 
politics, on the one hand, and the asymmetric power balance between 
political and economic actors, on the other, have formed. Just as the state 
had taken a part in economic relations, so the workers movements in the 
1970s and 1980s - even though they normally occurred within individual 
companies and mainly concerned themselves with economic agendas and 
related institutional issues - had already entered the political sphere where 
they confronted the authoritarian state. For this reason, the typological 
separation between the political movement and the economic movement 
around 1987 should be carefully modified, not for investigating the actual 
process of political struggle for constitutional change, but for analyzing how 
the boundary distinction between the political and the economic began to 
be more sharply implemented in order to allow for further development in 
political and economic issues. The great labor struggles from July to 
September in 1987, and those that followed the workers movement in the 
early 1990s, began to have a more clearly defined economic meaning, 
while the organizational activities outside the economic sphere remain 
restricted when diverse types of social movements have extensively engaged 
with political agendas. The less the state intervenes in economic disputes 
and the more labor issues are treated with the institutional methods, the 
more does separation of the economic and political movement become 
apparent. O f course, this should not be understood as a natural process of 
differentiation, firstly because the Korean state still has enough political 
power to minimize the politicization of trade-union activities, and secondly 
because Korean politics in the 1990s was highly influenced by ideological 
conflict in which anti-communism and anti-North-Koreanism were used to 
suppress the workers movement. Further, the collective self-consciousness of
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the working class has been barely realized in dealing with political 
agendas, the parliamentary and presidential elections, for example, whereas 
other forms of social ties - regional identity, for example - emerged as 
powerful determinants for judging governmental and parliamentary activities. 
Many workers have voted for candidates other than the leaders of trade 
unions and political activists, both in presidential elections and in the 
general elections for selecting members of Parliament.
Whereas the significance of the working class as democratic actors beyond 
purely economic interests might therefore be doubted, some scholars see the 
development of the South Korean workers movement in the 1980s and 
1990s as a rather distinctive phenomenon which is unlikely to be detected 
in any other countries in East Asia. At the same time, the democratization 
process as a whole has been contrasted with situations in other Asian 
countries. Thornton (1998) grapples with the different ideas on democracy 
in the East Asian context, comparing two leaders in Singapore and South 
Korea. While the former prime minister of Singapore, LEE Kwan-You, 
rejects the compatibility of Western individualist democracy with Asian 
culture, KIM Dae-Jung refutes Lee's argument, pointing out that the idea of 
democracy has precursors in the Korean political tradition and, moreover, is 
necessary for contemporary politics. Thornton submits that the 
democratization of South Korea is the exceptional case in the East Asian 
Context.
If democratization mainly relates to the institutional aspect, then South 
Korea has significantly realized it since 1987. The Constitutional Court was 
reintroduced in order to evaluate the activities of the state in accordance 
with the constitution. The direct voting system for selecting the president is
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working well without state-elite interference. The major state institutions 
and apparatuses, which were politically influenced by the dominant power 
groups in the state, began to neutralize this impact. A number of 
non-governmental organizations are extending their activities enough to 
influence state policies, and trade-union activities have been acknowledged 
as a part of the political and economic landscape. In spite of these 
developments, however, Korean politics still has non-institutional problems 
which cannot be easily dealt with by institutional reform. First of all, 
politics has hardly shifted towards a rational structure with advanced policy 
discourse, as was expected from the democratic era. Rather, it is shaped by 
a 'regional egoism' under the influence of provocative conservative 
politicians. Regionalism, which surfaced and developed in politics after the 
1970s, becomes the decisive element, not only in elections, but also in 
political debates between politicians in Parliament. It also becomes the 
background to the corruption in personnel affairs in the state (HWANG 
Jong-Sung, 1997; YEA, 1994). A rigid old school-tie mentality in the 
higher education system is also noticeable. While many scholars praised 
Koreans' high interest in education, as a constitutive element for fast 
economic growth, a swollen interest in graduating from a few prestigious 
universities has produced serious competition between those universities and 
excluded others simultaneously. Familism emerges as one of the serious 
issues in politics as well. Many big conglomerates have been managed by 
members of the owners' family, rather than by experts in the industrial 
fields, for example. These problems normally have cross-boundary effects 
through multiple relations between diverse political and socio-economic 
positions. While most scholars criticize these problems in terms of peoples' 
underdeveloped attitudes to democracy, a few scholars argue that these 
socio-political phenomena show that the western idea of individualist
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democracy is inadequate for Koreans, who still act according to traditional 
values (LEW and CHANG, 1998).
The rapid social transformation effected by economic modernization has led 
many Korean scholars to develop criticisms of the consequences of 
economy-centered modernization. Some focus on the practical problems of 
the economic model and the role of the state for class relations, others 
have asked more fundamental questions concerning the applicability of the 
western model of development and democracy for the Korean context. The 
latter criticize not only the developmentalist view for the transformation of 
Korea, but also the critics of developmentalism. While the majority of 
intellectual debates have been produced by the developmentalists and their 
Marxian critics, the third position criticizes both of them as universalistic 
and based on Western experiences that ignore the particularity of the 
Korean situation, as well as disregarding many explanatory paradigms in 
the social sciences. From neo-conservative theorists under Confucian 
paradigms, to Buddhist perspectives to critical social thinkers, the spectrum 
of perspectives that occupy this position is rather diverse.2 One of the 
significant phenomena in the Korean social sciences in the 1990s is that 
many social scientists begin to deal with the traditional intellectual 
paradigms under the broad framework of the social sciences.3 This is more
2) For example, see the group of scholars for the journal, Tradition and 
Modernity.
3) This observation should be more carefully understood in the awareness 
of the particularly shaped academic environment in Korea. While so-called 
'Korean studies' as part of regional studies has been broadly understood as 
studies on Korea, as a whole, in international academies and their Korean 
counterparts, 'Korean studies' as an academic discipline has been hardly
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than the rediscovery of traditional thought, but rather, is part o f  a process 
that has been ongoing since the early twentieth century. The interpretation 
of traditional intellectual thought under the social scientific vocabulary of 
the current period, opens a possibility for intellectual reconciliation, between 
what has been rapidly imported since the late nineteenth century with what 
prevailed before then. Radical doubts on conventional views and methods, 
however, have not produced clearly alternative paradigms, although the 
problems of many political theories of democracy have become discernible.
These diverse interpretations of the current political situation indubitably 
reflect its uncertainties. In spite of the remarkable achievement of 
democracy, compared to the previous modernization period, the expectations 
for further developments seem to have been unsatisfactorily realized. The 
recognition of this situation as crisis is not merely the acknowledgment of 
wide-spread disagreement and disappointment. Rather it is the serious 
understanding of this situation as a de-vitalized moment in which there is 
no hegemonic actor equipped with powerful alternatives and the absence of
established within the university system. For this reason, some o f the social 
scientific disciplines, commonly classified as the modem academic field, 
economics, political science, sociology, for example, have dealt with Korean 
cases within their own disciplinary traditions. Many debates on Korean 
experiences in the narrowly defined 'Korean social science' concern the 
necessity for a more relevant methodology and reinterpretation o f traditional 
thought and their actualization in the historical context in which creative 
theoretical works beyond a sort of simple adaptation of western thought 
have been more often published since the 1990s. At the very least, there is 
an increased publication o f such thematic work by major academic 
associations.
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political actors able to persuade others, or capable of leading them to 
participate in the dynamic relation. Even though a number of policies have 
been proposed according to conventional ideas and under newly developed 
views, this has not been the parturition for a new politics. Although one 
might accept this situation as inescapable in any transitional process, rather 
than defining it as a crisis, the Korean situation shows that the actors in 
this de-vitalized moment reveal their own inability to deal with the impact 
of external influences. It was under the financial crisis and the pressure of 
economic restructuring that power relations between political actors were 
again considerably reshaped and changed.
6.1.2. Breakdown o f  the economy, its consequence and new possibility
The economic turmoil that accompanied the severe financial crisis of 1997 
becomes a decisive element in the transformation of the Korean economy. 
The South Korean state was forced to follow the strictures of the 
International Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF) for the economic 
restructuring of the Korean economy, in order to be eligible for financial 
aid to rescue the liquidity of the Korean currency. Whereas 1997 started 
with a workers' national strike against new labor law legislation, designed 
to increase flexibility in employment, the year ended with gloomy 
expectations of massive unemployment in the Korean economy for the first 
time since the developmental period. The Chaebol - the big conglomerates 
- system, which had stood at the forefront of an expanding Korean 
economy and was one of the two economic models, together with the 
developmental state, was deconstructed in the new economic restructuring 
process, so as to tackle the high debt problem. The financial sector, which 
was accused as the main instigator of the currency crisis, has also come 
under serious pressure to increase transparency in the flow of capital. All
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in all, these changes are normally understood as inescapable remedies for 
recovery towards healthy market economy.
Changes in the economic sphere have remarkable repercussions in the 
political sphere. It was in an economic crisis that the dissident politician, 
KIM Dae-Jung, was elected the president of the state. It was the first fully 
successful event for opposition parties in Korean politics. The policy 
guideline for the state, which should precede the IMF's economic reform, 
was known as the reformative programmes of 'the Washington consensus' 
(see, Williamson, 1994, 1993; Aziz and Wescott, 1997). This became a 
source of a conspiracy theory about international capital's onslaught on 
national sovereignty.4 However, the Kim government, to some extent 
succeeded in minimizing the objection of the working class to the 
introduction of neo-liberalist principles for the Korean economy. The 
representatives of trade unions accepted the current situation as the crisis of 
working conditions as well as that of Korean capital and generally 
acquiesced in the state's economic reform. While trade-union activities have
4) While the correlation between economic reforms and the political 
process is quite persuasive, the understanding of the Washington Consensus 
in the Korean context has particularly focused on its emphasis on crises as 
a fecund soil for economic liberalization, supposedly implanted by the new 
government following the IMF's rescue programmes for the Korean 
economy.
'It has often been suggested that policy reforms emerge in response to 
crisis. Crises have the effect of shocking countries out of traditional 
policy patterns, disorganizing the interest groups that typically veto 
policy reform, and generating pressure for politicians to change 
policies that can be seen to have failed. ... Crisis is deary neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition to initiate reform. It has 
nevertheless often played a critical role in stimulating reform.' 
(Willamson, 1994: 562-565)
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become significantly more institutionalized as part of economic activity, 
they have also lost their character of strong militancy against the state and 
capital. Despair of the current economic situation and disappointments for 
the new political situation of the 1990s are reflected in what is called 
'PARK Jung-Hee' syndrome, which positively reevaluates the period of 
developmental dictatorship. In spite of the fact that it was provoked by the 
conservative newspapers and politicians and its consanguinity to a regional 
egoism, the diffusion of the Park syndrome is enough to cynicize the 
current political situation in which political actors are unable to motivate 
peoples' political participation.
The so-called neo-liberalist way has been the central occupation of many 
debates in Korean studies since 1997. In several policy discourses it is 
assumed as given, as the way for the Korean economy to proceed. This is 
not only because the Korean model of economic development exposes its 
powerlessness and fragility in the 1990s, but also because there is not yet 
a clear alternative to the 'Anglo-American' model of economic growth, the 
neo-liberal economy, that gives priority to the increased competitivity of 
private companies, in the world economy. Ironically, however, the economic 
restructuring process according to the neo-liberal ist path, in Korea, still 
demands strong intervention of the state in the market. As the trainer it 
still gives orders to individual companies that exist in the new economic 
situation beyond state control, and as the promoter, it encourages new­
comers to participate in newly emerging industrial sectors including 
information and bio-technology. Especially for the reform of the financial 
sector, the role of the state is very significant. While common observers 
criticize the Korean economy as 'crony capitalism', with the state as 
morally accountable for the currency crisis of 1997, some political
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economists explain its causes differently. CHANG Ha-Joon (1998a, 1998b) 
points to rapid deregulation of the financial sector as the main cause of 
crisis. While the previous governments had strictly controlled the flow of 
international money, which had the effect of regulating chaebols as well, 
the KIM Young-Sam government abolished many regulations in the 
financial sector, so that chaebols precipitately increased short-term loans in 
order to expand with the help of huge new investments, and this eventually 
caused the currency crisis. Mattews (1998) argues that the current 
government has proceeded with economic restructuring programmes in a 
dual way: increasing the standard of economic activities to an international 
level, under IMF monitoring; and the reformulation of industrial policies, 
debated in previous governments, for establishing a proper institutional role 
for the economy, although the state's authoritarian interventions in economic 
reform are still observable (MO and MOON, 1999; Cumings, 1998).
At the same time, the internationalization of the Korean economy by means 
of the massive inflow of foreign capital and foreign ownership, has 
provoked a debate on nationalism in the economic sphere. Workers have 
been particularly worried about the take-over of their companies by foreign 
interests. For the workers equated new ownership with massive lay-offs, 
that may well be facilitated through the introduction of 'labor flexibility' 
legislation, such as had been successfully resisted by the nation-wide 
workers movement in January 1997, before the economic crisis occurred 
(see, SEONG Kyoung-Ryung, 1998; JUNG Young-Tae, 2000 for the 
analysis of the labor movement against neo-liberalism in Korea). In fact, 
many foreign capitals, acting as dominant share-holders, have demanded the 
right to decide whether to lay-off of workers, while in many mergers 
between Korean companies, workers received a guarantee of continuous
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employment. Many Koreans understood that the gap between employment- 
related company policies derived from different organizational cultures. In 
the situation in which a large proportion of national wealth was lost 
through the currency crisis and the collapse of the stock index, that 
provoked strong hostility from the international investment funds, the issue 
of continuous employment under foreign ownership, incited powerful 
nationalist reactions in the workers' movement. The line of tension that was 
drawn, between Korean workers and foreign capital in the economic crisis, 
negatively affects workers' attitudes to the KIM Dae-Jung government, 
which has to encourage foreign investment. The dilemma of the government 
came from the contradiction between its political foundation - as 
reform-oriented democrats with political support from the lower middle 
class and the underclasses - and its economic role - narrowly set within 
economic restructuring programmes guided by the IMF under the financial 
crisis.5
6.2. The research dilemmas in the transitional period
6.2.1. The places o f  Korean experiences in the social sciences 
When the actual processes of political and economic transformation in 
South Korea have been widely reflected in the scholarly debates, it seems 
necessary to gain an overview of the overall direction of social scientific
5) While the investigation of the overall roles of the IMF for the global 
scale of financial monitoring is not dealt with in this chapter, it seems 
better to view the Korean crisis within the overall economic discourse on 
the crisis of capitalism and its self-regulatory mechanism sustained by 
financial capital. For a basic understanding of the international monetary 
system and its organizational form within financial capitalism, see Aglietta 
(2000, 1996, 1994, 1993, 1979).
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research in Korean studies. This is because the critical situation of South 
Korean politics also includes an intellectual crisis. When many socio­
political actors lack any further dynamics for extending democratic 
influences and when they are further exposed to fragmentation by the 
power of agency, many social scientists find great difficulty in interpreting 
the actual processes of societal transformation, failing to respond
intellectually with plausible answers. For instance, the great debate on the 
social formation of South Korea in the 1980s, which none of the social 
scientists could have avoided engaging in, or commenting on, was not 
further developed to provide an overall, long-term perspective on modernity 
in the Korean context. Even though the post-Marxism, post-modernity, and 
civil society debates, for example, have followed the social-formation
debates, there remains a reluctance to accept that the consequences of 
intellectual debates are mirrored in the political projects of the 1990s.
One could, of course, produce different diagnoses for the overall path of 
the Korean social sciences. Initially, the social-formation debate brought to 
light many social scientists' limited understanding of some methodological 
issues; the relationship between 'universalism' and 'particularism', 'objectivity' 
and 'subjectivity', 'center1 and 'periphery' in power relations, for example, 
the problems with which tended to largely disappear in the debates that 
followed. At the same time, the totalizing character of academic discourse 
on political issues could be charged as problematic. Alternatively, one 
might argue that these debates clearly show how the Korean social 
sciences, especially the intellectual works in the critical tradition, remained 
underdeveloped under the political dictatorship of the authoritarian state, 
indicating the fact that, more or less, there existed problematic aspects in 
the theorization process among major protagonists' writings. Further, and
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paradoxically, one could view rapid societal transformation as the 
background of current academic and intellectual reality, in which 
grand-scale debate is neither possible, due to the fact that the bi-polarized 
setting of the political structure has been gradually destroyed, nor desirable 
any longer, in the sense that any strong proposal for reshaping Korean 
society as a whole would again provoke the totalitarian side-effect of 
organized modernity, the restriction of individuals' freedom under rigid 
collective goals.
While any comment on the current intellectual situation has its own 
rationale, which cannot be ignored in any theoretical perspective, I would 
like to additionally point out an extra dimension of Korean studies in the 
social sciences, through which current research dilemmas can be more 
easily identified. Whether or not Korean studies has two different research 
angles and focal points based on particularly shaped 'internationalized 
scholarly flavors', on the one hand, and 'national ones'6, on the other, a 
common characteristic appears for both the nationalist and the 
internationalist perspective: this maps the Korean experience as one side of 
the binary distinction in comparison-oriented ideas between 'we' and 'they', 
'developed' and 'underdeveloped', 'successful' and 'badly-performed', 
'advanced' and 'following', 'teaching' and 'learning', 'already-established' and
6) It seems rather difficult to find any writing exclusively deal with this 
issue in the social sciences, while many proposals for the future of Korean 
social science have been raised. However, available are some writings in 
humanities, cultural studies and education. See, Underwood (1998), CHO 
Hung-youn et al. (1996), Keith (1994) Sasse (1996), KIM Chong-Suh 
(1994).
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'required to be implanted', and so forth. For example, while the majority of 
economic discourses in Korean studies have been occupied with producing 
some sort of response to the authoritarian style of modernization, a number 
of other works have implicitly assumed or explicitly argued that the Korean 
situation is completely different from other countries, where economic and 
socio-political processes receive scholarly attention. Whether or not the 
intellectual development is classified as modernization theory, economic 
institutionalism, developmental statism, or as the broad spectrum of Marxian 
criticism of them, the ways of theorizing the Korean experience are hardly 
sustainable outside of the binary codification of capitalism. Especially in the 
case of regional studies, Korean studies has been deeply shaped by the 
universalistic idea of modernization, in which Korea seems to be regarded 
as the object which needs the implantation of universalist principles 
guaranteeing superior economic performance, the apotheosis of which is 
supposedly found in the USA, some European countries and Japan. Even in 
publications that collectively evaluate several states, South Korea has often 
been taken as an illustration of the need to reappraise the universal 
program of economic modernization to promote 'developing countries' to the 
higher level.
What is the problem with the conceptually-divided comparative research 
perspective? One might continue to be puzzled by the summary above. In 
order to identify the problem of economic research that is undermined by 
the conceptually-separated categorical understanding of comparative studies, 
it seems necessary to better identify how some economic discourses 
pertaining to European capitalism and 'developing capitalism' of the South 
Korea 'type', have been shaped in the social sciences. It is well-known that 
many scholars in European studies have tried to suggest alternatives to
-  241 -
Americanized economic liberalism, in order to secure a welfare state 
tradition that could not be separately understood from the overall 
socio-historical processes of these societies. If there is at least one 
commonality across different scholarly perspectives based broadly on 
separate academic disciplines; sociology, political economy, economics, for 
example, or wider national academic environments; France, Germany, the 
UK, for example, it would be the importance of being aware of the 
existence of particularly shaped historical and political contexts, in which 
the introduction of liberalist principles for economics provokes high socio­
political costs, that cannot be traded against the economic performance that 
these countries have experienced since the 1960s. The tradition of the 
institutionalist critique of economic liberalism in economic sociology, for 
example, clearly shows how the idea of multiply-structured capitalism in a 
socio-historical specificity has been introduced as an important argument for 
the inadequacy of economy-driven social change, while, at the same time, 
the rise of the Japanese economy has been invoked in terms of a 
culturalist response for the economic logic behind American influence. 
Needless to say, these two alternative theorizing styles have influenced the 
view on the existence of multiple capitalism for economic discourse in 
general and have suggested diverse policy implications for each national or 
regional economy (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001, for example).7
7) Although not investigated for the purpose of the thesis, it must be noted 
that there are quite different theoretical approaches among institutionalist 
tendencies. Such differences become highly visible when sociological issues, 
such as 'structuralism', 'social actions', 'contextualisin', 'analytical 
perspectivism', for example, become objects of evaluation.
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Development studies, however, has been influenced by rather different 
research interests than those governing economic discourses. Above all, 
many national economies classified as 'developing', have insisted that 
political modernity has not been properly addressed. Whereas many works 
on 'advanced industrial countries' have more or less assumed the political 
status quo of those countries as the socio-political environment for different 
economic activities, their counterparts in development studies have pointed 
to the political situation in a country as the critical aspect of any 
'underdeveloped economy'. For them, political modernization is the key 
issue of economic modernization. Even though, in some well-performing 
national cases, strong political leadership, the interventionist state and even 
limited democratic freedom have been mentioned as particular aspects of 
'Non-European', TMon-American' economies, the issue of political reform for 
economic growth under conditions of economic fluctuation related to the 
international financial situation, is highly focused. However, ironically, the 
analyses o f the direction of economic restructuring processes normally 
accept the neo-liberalist principles for the economy. While policy-makers 
and policy-oriented scholars have to deal with the imposition of the 
North-American economic model, critical actors are in many instances 
shaped by the nationalistic idea of culture against economic globalization 
and its cultural consequences (Jameson and Miyoshi, 1998), and this strong 
anti-conformist attitude quite often provokes a political clash between state 
and society in developing countries. One problem among others in 
introducing the liberalist economic model and related institutional changes, 
is that the universal principles of socio-economic modernization very easily 
provoke political instability as their side-effect, even though this is 
unintended by the social scientists and policy-makers promoting universal
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modernization.
Korean studies of authoritarian modernization, in which the Korean 
economy has been commonly symbolized as one of the successful cases of 
a strong interventionist state in economic policies, have focused on the
problems of strong political leadership and its socio-political consequences. 
Many intellectual works have further argued the necessity of the 
institutionalization of democratic rules, which should not be sacrificed to 
economic growth. However, it is rather difficult to find a research
orientation able to identify the relationship between political stability
without dictatorship and economic development, one the one hand, and the 
double process of the actualization of economic development and political 
democracy, on the other hand. One could pragmatically argue that the lack 
of discourse on the varieties of capitalism in Korean studies is simply 
because neither development, political or economic, has been significantly 
achieved to provide enough material for a case study. While this is
certainly true, questions, concerning the reliability of liberal economic 
principles for promoting further economic development in the Korean 
situation and whether it would encourage political development, and further, 
whether the political democratization process, if it is independently 
achievable from the influence of the economy, could accelerate economic 
liberalism better than any possible alternative, remain crucial.
Ironically, modernization theory and current neo-liberal economic principles 
suppose a serious contradiction between economic development and political 
democratization, that itself has political implications. When many recent 
economic writings concentrate on the socio-political conditions for 
promoting the economy, politics itself is implicitly assumed as a method,
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or useful tool, rather than as an achievable goal. Accordingly, what many 
policy scientists on economic development prioritize, is not democratic 
politics, but a politics that is economy-friendly. The view has a naturalistic 
foundation; democracy arises from economic development, a view that is 
quite often found in comparative sociological inquiries that investigate the 
correlation between economic development and political democracy in 
different national settings. More carefully motivated research questions of 
how newly developed rationalized value systems, following economic 
transformation, could positively contribute to democratization and which 
social group would conceivably have more political initiative for the 
institutionalization of democratic politics, are commonly found. One could, 
of course, criticize my stance, asking what the problem of sequencing 
politics after the economy is, if it is a practically achievable scenario in 
any case. The Korean experience under the past authoritarian experience 
and the current transformative period, however, regrettably show this to be 
an unrealistic expectation.
If any answer to these questions needs to be found in an available 
empirical case, under the accepted binary codification of categories, there 
seems more than one exemplary case in the 'advanced industrial economies'. 
However, in relation to the applicability of existing models, none of the 
exemplars could be fully mobilized for Korean studies, other than to 
illustrate that an abstract ultimate principle, like the neo-liberal economic 
one, will always be undermined. What the actual research on varieties of 
capitalism, including the US, teaches us, is that economic boundaries need 
careful coordination of institutional and human resources, and that these 
reliable socio-economic resources have been established each in their own 
historical situation.
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6.2.2. The horizon o f Korean politics: between universal principles 
and cultural-historical settings
Whereas, in the process of highly organized economic modernization, the 
state and policy-oriented scholars have widely assumed that the 
modernization of the national economy would be achieved when advanced 
knowledge and experiences from developed countries are carefully studied 
and well-adopted, the political requirements for accomplishing the economic 
task have been highly ignored. I indicated, in chapter 4 and 5, that one of 
the reasons for the belated development of democracy derived from the 
weak political legitimacy of newly emergent authoritarian regimes, with the 
result that democratization was sacrificed in the name of modernization and 
national security. Under this political condition, Korean studies produced 
many critical works on Korean politics, under three main strands: firstly, 
arguing the importance of the rule of law; secondly, criticizing some 
problematic laws; thirdly, suggesting alternative politics for the Korean 
situation.
The first orientation has concentrated on the abuse of power by the 
political elite and the governmental control of political institutions. In fact, 
the workers movement of the 1970s and 1980s very often highlighted the 
problem of workers rights that were enshrined in law and largely ignored 
by the state and individual companies. At the same time, human rights 
issues quite often came to the fore because, although they were guranteed 
in the Constitution, they were hardly respected by the state in real politics. 
In the recent political transformation of the 1990s, the problem of an 
unbalanced agential power beyond the legal framework, as evidenced by the 
state and the state elite, has been largely solved, thanks to the decrease of
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state power and the consequences of the rise of socio-political movements.
Under the second orientation, the repeal of problematic laws militating 
against political democracy and human rights, has accelerated. However, at 
the current stage of Korean politics, in which many political interest groups 
have already been transformed into agents of party politics, this process 
quite often includes serious ideological disputes beyond the debate on any 
specific article of the legal system. At the same time, the relative novelty 
of party politics, and the continuing legacy of the authoritarian state and 
that is visible in the power of regional-egoism, also influences the repeal 
process and new legislation. Social scientific research on the issue 
concerning the réévaluation of problematic laws, has been bound to the 
advocacy of universal principles of freedom for political activities and the 
narrow interpretation of these in the Korean context. The authoritarian state 
and its political institutions rigidly applied the rule of law against socio­
political movements in the name of national security, often suppressing 
democratic movements under the special law for national security, which 
was legislated by an anti-North Korean attitude of the state. Accordingly, 
the abolition of undemocratic laws has been an extremely difficult task, 
because in order to do so, the contradiction between the nominal advocacy 
of universal human rights and its limited implementation under the 
condition of the unstable national security by possible North Korean threat, 
has to be politically solved. In many political discourses the extremists in 
conservative political groups have argued that the national security law has 
to be continuously practiced until the security issue is practically solved. In 
other words, they explicitly understand that the future of democratic politics 
in South Korea is fully conditioned by the inter-state relationship between 
South and North Korea. Many political activists and critical social scientists
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who advocate an advanced democracy for South Korea, are also aware of 
this narrowly constructed situation, in which the promulgation of the 
universal principle of human rights, is powerless to change the law.
Under the third orientation, the main motive for evaluating Korean politics 
is not the universal principles of democracy. Rather, it is the careful 
investigation of what has been made by the state and the state elite in the 
historical process. The main premise, which is to a significant extent secure 
from any severe political intervention from the state from a normative point 
of view, for this approach is that the current South Korean situation should 
be understood as part of the national history of Korea, including North 
Korea. Even though there seem to be several idealized understandings of 
the Korean nation, Korean history, and Korean identity, which cannot be 
ignored in theory construction, the grand framework itself, that roams 
beyond an exclusively set South Korean political agenda is remarkably 
illuminating of the problematic aspects of South Korean politics, including 
the authoritarian tradition of the state. Above all, the state as the powerful 
political authority and the political elite as power holders in the state, are 
often subjected to a moral critique for the weak nature of their political 
legitimation. Interestingly, the historically shaped nationalist attitude operates 
as the basis for this moral critique - I have described the origin of this 
political aspect in chapters 3, 4, and 5. At the same time, Confucianism- 
based moral codes form the basic standard for the monitoring of political 
leaders and from time to time they become more influential than the legal 
system in determining public opinions (CHANG Kyung-Sup, 1997a, 1997b; 
HAHM Chaibong, 1997).
The historical and cultural aspect of Korean politics has been well
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documented in Korean studies, not only because Korean politics produces 
particular political agendas, but also because it provides a unique 
value-orientation for evaluating the economic and political agendas of 
modernization. In particular, the fact that economic-political actors, as the 
driving force of modernization, have been 'historically' shaped in the 
Korean context, means that any suggested programme for further economic 
and political modernization has to assess these agents accordingly. The 
neo-liberalistic idea of transforming the Korean economy with a view to 
the global level, so to speak, does not consider the particularity of local 
actors in economic programmes. These may still assume the implicit 
dichotomy between the rational and the irrational actor for socio-political 
and economic agendas, found in early modernization theory, in which local 
actors in the Korean context might be classified as the latter. In empirical 
observations, however, I have described how political transformation was 
initialized by the inter-dependent relationship between local actors, on the 
one hand, and the environmental pressure of political tensions, on the other, 
and how even rapid economic transformation occurred under this condition. 
In other words, the historical and cultural dimension of politics has a 
significant impact in the actual process of the current economic 
restructuring, and possibly functions as the main variable for the 
actualization of a neo-liberal economic structure in the Korean context.
Ironically, the grand project for the future of Korean society as a whole, in 
Korean studies, has its own dilemmas in seeking a compromise solution for 
universality and locality. First of all, historically speaking, the two universal 
projects of capitalism and socialism have been seriously implicated in local 
interests since they became prominent at the beginning of the twentieth 
century - described in chapters 3, 4. Besides, the two projects had
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exclusively taken their own geographical boundaries in South Korea and 
North Korea, provoking local competition between them. Further, historical 
issues, which are quite uniquely established in the Korean context, have 
been deeply involved in the projects as socio-political resources. Many 
social scientists in the 1990s become sensitized to the fact that neither of 
the two projects could be fully accepted at the expense of total ignorance 
of the other, not because of any interim judgement of the impossibility of 
deeming either better than the other, but because of the recognition that the 
drive developing any further project would be exhausted in further 
competition. Once social scientists become detached from given prototypes 
for economic projects, they try to find extra-elements in the cultural sphere 
for a more careful modification of the projects. The overall discourse on 
Asian values, more specifically on Confucian capitalism for the South 
Korean economy, or Confucian socialism in North Korean politics, so to 
speak, could be understood as part of this academic trend. However, the 
reality in the second half of the 1990s shows that an alternative theorizing i 
based on cultural knowledge is hardly sustainable in the changing 
international situation. At the broad level, the South Korean economy has 
been forced to change its overall organizational culture and human 
relationships as well as its industrial structure, while North Korean 
socialism has its very survival at stake, in terms of its state sovereignty.
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7. On the (re)unification of Korea: modernity and new polity
Introduction
The collapse of the Berlin wall accelerated the demise of the Cold war 
situation in international politics. Eventually, the (re)unification of Germany 
was realized and the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe became powerless and 
inclined to Western Europe. In North-East Asia, Russia and China, who 
had been friendly to North Korea for strategic reasons since 1945, began to 
initiate diplomatic relations with South Korea, which had shown both 
impressive economic growth and political transformation towards 
democratization, in 1990 and 1992. Other former-socialist countries in 
Europe also began to forge links with South Korea for economic reasons. 
The two Korean states, in this changed atmosphere, joined the United 
Nations and produced a statement promoting reconciliation between them in 
1991 after several meetings. However, the peace process ended without 
further accomplishments in the 1990s: the expected summit meeting 
between the leaders of the two Korean states, aimed at thawing political 
and military hostility, was thwarted by the death of the North Korean 
leader, Kim Il-Sung and the rigid political situation in South Korea where 
his death was treated as critical for the maintenance of the stubborn North 
Korean attitude.
This chapter aims at interpreting the discourse on the inter-state relationship 
between South and North Korea, which could be symbolized as the 
(re)unification discourse in Korean studies. Through previous chapters, I 
have suggested that the political concept, nation-state, should be rather 
differently understood for the two-state system in contemporary Korean 
politics compared to Europe: the rise of the so-called modem state at the
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expense of the fragmentation of the national polity into two states. Also, in 
order to correctly evaluate South Korean politics, I have argued that it is 
necessary to identify the overall political terrain shaped by the colonial 
experience, the division of Korea, the Korean war, and the adoption of two 
modernist projects by the South and the North. More seriously, in chapters 
S and 6, I have drawn attention to the obstacles for the democratization of 
South Korean politics, themselves deeply connected with the division of the 
states. In other words, South Korean politics is highly dependent on the 
agenda of the inter-state relationship between the two Korean states. 
Especially the current political situation since the 1990s - which can be 
understood as a transitional period toward the customization of democracy 
for peoples' everyday lives - might be shaken again by the rise of an 
authoritarian state under the impact of a possible clash between the two 
states. At the same time, through the (re)unification discourse, the creative 
capacity of Korean social science begins to be employed to deal with the 
particular historical setting of the Korean polity.
7.1. The reunification discourse
7.1.1 Korea as a community: Nostalgia fo r  the lost community and the 
role o f  romanticism in the unification movement
The communication channel between the South and the North had been 
exclusively set at the state level. The South Korean state, under rigid 
anti-communist ideology, controlled the unification discourse, following a 
bold agenda in domestic politics. The state regarded many democratic 
movement groups as supporters of North Korean policies towards the South 
and so suppressed their democratic claims with the national security law. 
After the victory of democratic movements in 1987, however, the students' 
association for democratic change more extensively raised the issue of the
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reunification of Korea. The extension of the public sphere that incorporated 
political voices from many more social classes, enabled the students' to 
organize the 'unification movement', demanding open communication with 
North Korea.1
Interestingly, the unification movement was based on a romantic approach 
that has become eroded by an institutional approach since the reunification 
of Germany in 1991. In order to identify the rather narrow direction of the 
students' association unification movement, it is necessary to examine the 
actual boundary of politics in the 1980s. Firstly, the political relationship 
between the two states had ossified around the Olympic Games in 1988: 
South Korea was lauded by the international community, including socialist 
states, for its economic growth, while North Korea faced accusations of 
terrorism following the explosion of a South Korean airplane. Secondly, 
active political groups intended to tackle the legitimacy of the state with 
reference to its unification policy, in which they criticized the national 
security law, and the inactive response to reunification by the state. 
Thirdly, a wide spectrum of political orientations for democracy was 
becoming apparent by the late 1980s: from conservative reformist to radical 
anti-state actors. The romantic approach of the unification movement 
reemerged in this political context.
1) The participation of a student in the international youth and student festival 
held in Pyongyang, North Korea in 1989 ignited public debate. First of all, she 
ignored the law that prohibited any private contact with North Koreans. Secondly, 
her itinerary was symbolic: Seoul-Berlin-Pyongang- (the military division site in 
the de-militarized zone between the South and North) -Seoul. She was 
immediately sent to prison when she crossed the South Korean border.
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The movement began neither with an institutional preparation for 
reconciliation nor with an interest-based proposition for economic prosperity 
after reunification. Rather, it was designed to remind the state of an urgent 
'humanitarian issue'; that there were a number of divided families in the 
South and North who had not met their family members since the Korean 
war and even since the division of Korea in 1945. The long duration of 
divided families and their pains and harts ( ®MS)2, a cultural concept, at the
2) Since the 1970s, more or less, Korean studies has discovered a cultural 
concept, hart In the face of many Koreans who suffer from adverse
socio-political or personal conditions, theologians and psychologists in 
particular have identified that Koreans conclusively explain their
psychological condition by means of the concept han. Personal and familial 
problems, even collective problems, are narrated by han, especially when 
the causes of these problems arises from outside of the individual. These 
scholars have found that han functions for Koreans not only as an 
interpretative method for the relationship between the external world and 
themselves, but also as a self-diagnostic tool for the identification of one's 
current psychological status as resulting from the unfair consequences of 
the world. The concept, han, has been translated in various ways: 
'bitterness and anger', 'unfulfilled wish', 'unrequited resentments', 'long 
accumulated sorrow and regret over one's misfortune', and so forth. When 
its several aspects are investigated in social context, han has been regarded 
as something different from 'resentment' and 'melancholy', in that it cannot 
directly trigger one's anger towards its causes, and also because it contains 
powerful energy towards the external world. The concept hanpuli 
means literally releasing han. Defining hanpuli is, however, likewise 
difficult, not only because it is related to the understanding of han, but 
also because there are many ambivalent ways of releasing han. In the
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present time provokes endlessly the desire for reunification of the nation 
(Jager, 1996). 'The questions raised of why I cannot meet my 
husband/wife, parents/children, and friends/relatives and of why I cannot go 
to the hometown in the North demanded the state to show the will to 
actively deal with the reunification issue' (p. 13). Furthermore, the unification 
movement was to some extent itself the reflection on modem Korean 
history as a whole - negatively framed - readdressing the question of who 
should be responsible for the current division of Korea. Needless to say, 
supporters of the students' movement for reunification were more serious 
critics of the US and Japan than others.3
Korean context, the ways of hanpuli include dance, music in shamanist 
symbolic ritualism, and direct revengeful actions. Many novelists, poets, and 
film directors, as well as academics, still debate the question of the most 
appropriate form of hanpuli. Sublimation in spirit, rather than revenge or 
vengeful actions, is argued as the better way of dissolving han. The 
collective forms of hanpuli in the public sphere, however, are mainly 
presented in collective practice, for example, workers movements, anti-state 
movements, and regionalist politics. Hanpuli is even illustrated as a driving 
force for economic activities underpinning fast industrialization and 
economic growth. Thus, han and hanpuli are regarded as crucial for 
understanding the particularity of Korean society. See, for example, CHOI 
Kil-Sung (1989); CHOI Sang-Jin (1993, 1991); CHUNG Hyun Kyung 
(1988); KIM Elaine H. (1993); KIM Choong Soon (1992); LEE Young-Hee 
(1994); LEE Hee-Kyung (1996, 1995); Lie (1998).
3) The post-liberation period and the Korean war have become popular subjects 
for artistic genres. A number of novels, poems in the 1980s and 1990s, for 
example, reintroduced individuals' experiences which could not be entirely 
dissolved in collective ones. Anger, sorrow, pain, unforgettableness - culturally
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The assumption underpinning the romantic approach of the students' 
movement was that many Koreans, or Koreans as a whole, wished to 
restore a durable one nation-state. More strictly, this argued a return to the 
past, rather than a new orientation for the future. It could also mean that 
the past should become the future, and the future should be made in the 
image of the past. The present situation does not generate criticism in 
itself. Rather, the source of the critical view of the present is what was 
already there and what is not available for the moment. At the same time 
and for that reason, the future is not simply suggested. Its path is strongly 
determined already by new problems in the present which did not exist in 
the past. Even though the past is certainly not symbolized as a prosperous 
time with abundant material resources for economic consumption, nor with 
the pride of being a dominant political power in regional politics, it is 
praised as a happy time for social and cultural life in the family and the 
community. At the individual level, divided Korea is ultimately symbolized 
as an essential source of pain, which never disappears, and which has 
lasted for several generations.
The unification movement in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was partly 
successful and partly failed. It was successful because the issue of 
unification and the relationship between the South and North began to be 
more considerably dealt with in state policies, on the one hand, and the 
peoples could make representations based on their own experiences at the 
individual level, which had been impossible in the period of state-centered 
modernization, on the other hand. It is important to remember that the 
reunification discourse was reintroduced in the public sphere in the period
better understood as han ($!;) - are described through historical events.
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of socio-economic transformation. It was a well-timed intervention of the 
romantic approach, when interest-based negotiation in the economic sphere 
began to emerge, and when the democratization of domestic politics was 
signalled. The triangular relation of nation, people and democracy was the 
irreducible core for understanding political and economic disputes. Thus, the 
'reunification' agenda shaped the particularity of Korean politics, even 
spilling over to other social issues, but always emphasizing the national 
aspect.
The romantic approach of the unification movement partly failed, however, 
in that it only problematized the current situation from the view-point of a 
grand perspective of the future. It could not clearly show how to arrive at 
a reunified Korea, except by criticizing the USA and the South Korean 
state. Even though it was critical, particularly of the South Korean state's 
lack of endeavor, this was not further developed to the level of a national 
discourse on political and economic reunification. One could defend the 
unification movement under the romantic approach against the charge that 
its limits can be found in its subjective character: firstly, the political 
actors; the students' association, active artists, and other social movement 
groups. Secondly, the way o f approaching the unification issue through 
individual and collective han ($H:K). Rather, one would argue that the 
situational prematurity of the late 1980s and early 1990s is exposed, in 
terms of developing a unification discourse as a preparation for policies for 
reunification. The romantic approach of counter-state political actors was 
suddenly replaced by policy discourse at the state level, without a gradual 
linkage between the former and the latter. The discursive shift, by and 
large, came from the influence of the reunification of Germany.
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7.1.2. Korea as a polity: the development o f  the policy discourses o f  
reunification and the lessons from the German experience o f  
reunification
While the political movement for reunification was dominated by 
romanticism, the social sciences - mainly in South Korea - extended their 
knowledge of the impact of division on the political situation in South 
Korea. The competition of the two Korean states for political legitimation 
(LEE Man Woo, 1993) and economic development, led to the restriction of 
political freedom and enforced a restrictive social life on individuals. The 
system of division was identified as the obstacle to democratization and 
even as the very source of major socio-political contradictions (PAIK 
Nak-chung, 1999, 1993). Many political scientists focused on the nature of 
the authoritarian state in terms of how it manipulated the political 
legitimacy of the state. The overall conclusion generally indicates that the 
state and several regimes have justified their political violence and 
illegitimate dominance of the state with anti-communist and anti-North 
Korean ideology. The confrontation and an unstable regional political 
situation have been used as resources for manipulating the crisis of the 
state and peoples' individual and social lives. The restriction of political 
activities in the political and economic spheres, suggested and sustained by 
the state and a conservative network, was justified by them as the 
inescapable self-limitation of democratic desires under the particular 
circumstances of South Korea. At the same time, a number of social 
scientists investigated the problematic contribution of North Korea to class 
movements. Just as much as the South Korean state's manipulation of 
North Korea's ready-made aggression for resuming war, the North Korean 
policies in response to the domestic politics of the South were criticized by 
some researchers of workers movements and by more theoretical analysts of
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the Juche system. The Marxian perspectives, which experienced a 
resurgence in the academic world from the 1980s, began to produce 
criticism of North Korean ideology: the replacement of the law of societal 
development in history by the 'humanist' perspective; the overloaded idea of 
the nation as de-emphasizing class conflict; the lack of conceptual space 
for the activities of the trade-unions and developing workers' movements; 
the underdeveloped and ill-fitting methodological tools for investigating the 
social formation of South Korea, and so on. Thus, not only the South 
Korean, but also the North Korean state, were subjected to critical attack. 
In fact, however, the intellectual development of a dual criticism is a 
diagnosis of problems, rather than concrete proposals for reunification.
In fact, both the South and the North had been proposing reunification 
programmes to each other since 1972. However, the procedural problems, 
understood by them both as the most delicate and important agenda- South 
Korea demanded social and economic integration, while North Korea 
indulged in political and military issues- meant that state level reunification 
programmes never got off the ground (KIM Hong Nack, 1992; M.B.M. 
Suh, 1992). The reunification discourse since the 1990s in the South, has 
significantly dealt with the programmes of economic and political 
integration between the two states in an asymmetric manner. The changed 
international atmosphere - the collapse of the former Soviet bloc and the 
considerable success of South Korea's nordpolitik • and the widening 
economic gap between North and South Korea gave more weight to South 
Korea's role, not only from a Southern perspective, but also from an 
international one, and according to the German model of reunification 
(Eberstadt and Banister, 1992; Lin, 1992; Paus, 1998). Anticipating the 
collapse of North Korea in an economic crisis, policy scientists and
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state-sponsored institutions began to estimate the financial cost of 
reunification.
German reunification, perhaps unsurprisingly, became the most valuable 
example for Korean policy makers. Analysis of the German experience, 
however, proved less than fruitful for the Korean context. The most 
important conclusion of policy scientists was that South Korea did not have 
the economic capacity to proceed the German way (Johnson, 1993; RHEE 
Kang Suk, 1993; Schmidt, 1993; SHIM K. R„ 1993). More seriously, it 
was expected that the sudden collapse of North Korea would be deleterious 
to the South Korean economy (KIM Dae-Jung, 1993).4 Thus, the analysis 
of the option for reunification by means of the absorption of North Korea 
into South Korea laid bare how unrealistic this was.
It has been pointed out that most policy scientists totally ignore the North 
Korean interest in reunification. They simply treat North Korea as the 
object of South Korean policy, rather than as one of the two subjects of 
reunification. Let us counter-factual ly imagine that South Korea has
4) The debate between economists and policy scientists on the economic view of 
the reunification of Korea, developed in four ways, by and large: firstly, the 
measurement of the actual cost of reunification in Germany - whether or not 
reunification expenses should cover the investment in the Eastern region and the 
allocation of welfare services (Noland et al., 1998); secondly, the short term and 
the long term effects of reunification on the South Korean economy (Lee K.S., 
1993; Noland et al., 1998); thirdly, the cost comparison between the immediate 
integration and the gradual one of the two economies in the South and the North 
(Eberstadt, 1997); fourthly, finding adequate means of transition for the North 
Korean economy (Shim, K.R., 1993; Bama, 1998).
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sufficient economic capacity for managing the costs of unification, say as 
much as West Germany had. Could the German model still be 
recommended for South Korea or both Koreas? Is it a viable option to just 
let the North Korean state collapse? Or is it appropriate to enforce an 
economic transformation towards neo-liberal capitalism on North Korea, as 
the condition for economic aid? Social scientists tend to critically respond 
to these questions in three ways: firstly, in the critique of West German 
politicians, as well as their South Korean counterparts; secondly, a critical 
appraisal of the German model in terms of its lack of democratic public 
discourse and consequent problems; thirdly, the identification of 'progressive 
ethnic forces' in the Korean context.
East Germany, according to Martin HART-LANDSBERG, did not collapse 
simply because of internal problems:
Rather, West German leaders, in an attempt to ensure the dominance 
of existing West German political and economic institutions in a 
unified Germany, deliberately pursued policies designed to speed the 
breakdown of the East German system. ... West Germany aggressively 
pursued the collapse and absorption of the East and the resulting 
unification has not served the interests of the great majority of 
Germans (Hart-Landsberg, 1995: 59).
Further, he argues that the absorption of North Korea would be a disaster, 
not only for North Koreans, but also for South Koreans. He critically 
investigates the extent to which the South Korean state has pursued the 
isolation of the North to facilitate its collapse, comparing and contrasting 
West German policies refusing the legitimacy of East Germany in 
international relations in the 1960s and Ostpolitik since the 1970s, with 
South Korea's rigid alliance with Japan and the USA. Hart-Landsberg 
asserts that the South Korean government has leamt an important lesson
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from Germany; that gradual unification by absorption is impossible (p.73). 
Accordingly, in order to maintain the current political and economic 
institutions and their relations, 'it hopes that economic need will eventually 
force the Noith to accept social cultural exchanges thereby leading to the 
rapid collapse and absorption of North Korea' (p.74). Finally, he concludes 
that unification by absorption is undesirable for the creation of a 
democratic and independent Korea.
Jürgen HABERMAS points to a serious problem in the German experience: 
'Because there was no public discussion o f what citizens o f the two states 
should expect o f each other, a certain discontent is now building up in the 
West, while feeling of resentment are spreading in the East' (Habermas, 
1996: 12) (italics added). An increased dissatisfaction of Western taxpayers 
with redistribution to the East, mass unemployment in the East and the 
total collapse of East German institutions - 'from the economy, judicial 
system and state administration, through the regulation of traffic and health, 
to higher education, the media, the armed forces, and so on' (p. 13) - are 
illustrated by Habermas as the mental side-effects of rapid unification. For 
him these negative experiences are important lessons for any possible 
Korean reunification.
PAIK Nak-Chung (1999, 1996) criticizes the Habermasian idea of 
separating a republican or democratic conception of the nation from an 
ethnic conception of the nation in the Korean context. 'Not only does the 
ethnic conception still have a powerful role to play in a heteronomously 
divided nation of exceptionally high ethnic homogeneity, it can serve to 
raise theoretical and practical questions of possibly global significance 
beyond providing a warning against the pitfalls of 'ethno-nationalism" (1996:
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19). He significantly emphasizes the vital role of the Korean diaspora­
numbering some four million in the strategic countries of the US, China, 
Japan and Russia alone- as the multi-national ethnic community, for Korea's 
democratic reunification. 'What Koreans should envisage ... is a new 
federative structure suited to our particular historical experience. This 
naturally includes the experience of a population with at least ten centuries 
of political unity and, even now, an exceptionally high degree of ethnic 
and linguistic homogeneity, yet already with some proto-national 
divergences due to the length and severity o f the division' (pp. 20-1) 
(italics added). His assertion on ethnic nationalism, reflects the view, 
widely-spread in the Korean intellectual world, for reunification. For him 
and many others, the nation-state in the Korean context should be regarded 
as the cultural community as well as the polity. The proposal of the 
compound state/community (PAIK Young-Seo, 1999; PARK Myung-Kyu, 
1999) and 'the cultural community of the Korean nation', including ethnic 
Koreans, arises not only from the practical awareness of the potential 
regional impacts of ethnic relations, but also from the theoretical challenge 
of ethnic nationalism in the social sciences, based on an historical 
understanding of the particularity of the Korean experience.
7.1.3. Rethinking international politics and Korean nationalism
The rigid system of division in Korea that has lasted since 1945 is now 
being undermined. The relationship between the two Korean states, which 
could only be described as 'hostile and antagonistic', is being gradually 
improved under a developing mutual recognition. The consequences of the 
historic meeting of the two leaders in June 2000 are being witnessed in 
the negotiation of political and security agendas as much as in economic 
and social ones. In spite of its significance compared with previous periods,
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the current situation is being interpreted as the beginning of a long road. 
In fact, it remains unclear whether the destination is the coexistence of two 
states in an harmonious environment, or the reunification of Korea. 
However, the general consensus is that round table talks to solve issues of 
joint concern ultimately signify the re-emergence of an unified Korea.
In addressing the interpretation of the reunification process, it is firstly 
necessary to clarify the particular aspect of the nation-state in Korean 
politics and its implications. I have pointed out in previous chapters that 
Korea's relatively durable tradition of the nation-state, compared to national 
experiences in Europe, before colonization at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, was one of the major elements of Korean politics which informed 
Korean actors' particular ways of responding to new political situations 
under the global expansionism of imperial states. Besides, the main agenda 
of the Korean war was the accomplishment of the nation-state instead of 
two separate states. As the state ideology of North Korea, the inescapable 
political agenda of the South Korean state and as the main motif of 
anti-state movements in South Korean democratic movements, the political 
agenda of making an unified country has distinctively shaped the political 
direction of modernity in Korea. Put more bluntly, a series of uneven 
political events related to foreign powers has been the motivational source 
for strong nationalistic voices for public agendas.
It has been widely pointed out by foreign scholars and even acknowledged 
by their Korean counterparts, that Korean studies has itself strong 
nationalistic perspectives, that should be investigated for any understanding 
of the reunification discourse. Let me introduce two distinctive arguments: 
firstly, that historically Korea not only never invaded other countries, but
-  284 -
also never interfered in the domestic politics of neighboring countries, while 
it has very often been subjected to problematic neighbors' military attacks. 
Despite this, Korea secured its national sovereignty against foreign 
invasions, excepting colonization by Japan in the twentieth century. 
Secondly, in relation to these historical observations, nationalism in Korea 
is neither offensive nor expansive beyond its territory. Rather, it has been 
effectively represented as defending national sovereignty and national 
culture, even in the contemporary period.
The assumption that the Korean states never invaded other countries could 
be criticized as erroneous. There was expansion in the ancient period, when 
Goguryo enlarged its territory in west Manchu and the inner-mongol region 
and territorial enlargement by Koryo and Chosun also. Many Koreans, 
however, would understand these military expansions as 'restoration' of old 
territories which had been lost under previous states. Whatever the truth, 
and however historical facts are interpreted, the genuine claim underpinning 
this issue is that Koreans in history have been less aggressive than other 
peoples in the Chinese area, Japan and the Western countries, who have 
intervened in Korean politics since the nineteenth century. In fact, when 
one tries to historically evaluate the strong assumption of the non- 
aggressive characteristics of the Korean, s/he would at least indirectly face 
the comparison between what Korea did and what other countries did. Why 
did the Korean states not undertake military expansionism while their 
neighbors did? Many adduce Korea's weakness compared to others. 
However, some Koreans do not hesitate to say that it is because Koreans 
are peaceful people, and that Neo-Confucian state ideology is not capable 
of producing an expansionist logic.
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This is not a simple debate merely concerning the past. Anticipation of the 
new regional situation in far East Asia after the reunification of Korea in 
the not-too-distant future, necessarily involves other regional powers and for 
the leaders of the Korean state, it demands the strategic preparation of 
securities and national interest (Blodgett, 1992). Hardly any regional power 
amongst China, Japan, Russia, the US expects a militarized Korea. There 
are, however, a couple of worrisome rumours regarding the new strategic 
situation.5 While a realist view takes Korea's non-aggression as a relative 
weakness, an optimistic view would be derived from Korea's relatively 
trouble-free regional politics before the twentieth century (Macdonald, 1992) 
and from the similarities with a divided Germany, now reunified. Habermas 
explains that even though 'the unification of Germany could sometimes be 
perceived by its neighbors as a danger to the precarious balance within the 
European Union', a unified Germany has regulated its own ambition for 
political supremacy within Europe, in order to facilitate its political and 
economic integration within the European Union. Further, he argues that 'a 
unification of Korea would not necessarily be felt by its neighbors as a 
disturbing factor1, because 'foreign policy becomes more directly based upon 
economics', and international cooperation in the Pacific area are would be 
strengthened (Habermas, 1996: 8).
The need for reunification as argued by intellectuals, includes a unified
5) The most sophisticated issue concerns the withdrawal of US troops in South 
Korea. According to International Herald Tribune (16, October, 2000), the US and 
Japanese worry about the possible reemergence of Chinese power in the Korean 
peninsula after US withdrawal. However, the Korean and Chinese are also afraid 
of Japanese rearmament and a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Accordingly, 
retaining US troops is persuasive for Korea and China for the time being.
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Korea's ultimate contribution to regional political stability. While a divided 
Korea distorts to a great extent democratic political activities in the two 
states (PAIK Nak-chung, 1993), military confrontation between them, that 
also involves other countries, has cast their relationship in aspic. However, 
to agree a way of proceeding with the reunification process is to 
immediately depressurize the military crisis and to engender mutual 
recognition of all the regional countries and the US, all of which is crucial 
for the economic prosperity of the region. If both Korean states were to 
renounce any plans to become a strong military power, capable of 
challenging the regional neighbors' sovereignties, and if they transparently 
restructured their armies for the reunification process, reducing personnel to 
the numbers appropriate purely for defense, then the neighboring countries 
would be more supportive of the reunification process.
Putting aside external points of view, let us reconsider the implications of 
the claim of a national pride in loving peace and having a non-aggressive 
nature for Koreans themselves: the self-interpretation of their own historical 
becoming. 1 will highlight here two aspects of the self-understanding that 
are contradictory: a highly plausible contribution to the settlement of peace 
in East Asia under a utilitarian perspective, on the one hand, at the same 
time as, on the deeper level, a critical and discriminative understanding of 
other countries' aggressiveness which must be introduced in comparison, on 
the other. Let us imagine a possible situation in which the claim of a 
historical tradition of peace-loving and non-expansionism would be 
introduced for a unified Korea's possible forswearing of territorial 
enlargement and military ambition. Is it problematic, even as a 'white lie' 
in an ultimate claim for truth? If it means that the political tradition is 
utilized in domestic political discourse for self-restraining those whose
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ambitions would aim for a rollback against problematic neighbor countries 
and the US, is it not effectively performative? Or, if regional powers could 
praise the Korean tradition and widely encourage its continuation in the 
twentieth century, leading to a peaceful coexistence between them, is this 
not a considerable 'political option' for neighboring states? The ambivalence 
between effectiveness in politics and the truth of historical evaluation 
deserves consideration.
The Koreans' self-praise as non-offensive and peace-loving, however, not as 
'one of many' in horizontal equality, but as 'better than others' in a vertical 
ordering, must be critically appraised. For, in fact, the self-evaluation of 
moral superiority over others, always devaluates the others' moral status. 
The Korean claim, which should be evaluated through historical research, 
would be essentially a comparative claim of morality. The moral 
comparison of aggressivity for those involved in Korean politics and the 
politics of the region, is provocative for philosophers and social scientists, 
in that it unveils two different understandings of collective identity and a 
holistic view of the characteristics of a people in a country.
Most of all, this warns us of the epistemological gap between several 
disciplines in the social sciences and philosophy. Whereas in many 
philosophical works the individual has been presupposed as the 
epistemological and ontological unit, for international politics and 
international relations, the state has been privileged. Presumably, what has 
been done by a state to other states is implicitly regarded as the doings of 
the people of a state to the other states' peoples. In spite of the existence 
of diverse actors in a state, once the state entered into international 
politics, the different views of their domestic actors disappeared and they
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became unified under the view of the state. In other words, the state 
became their representative. While an imposed collective identity of the 
community on the individual, or the existence of a collective identity ex 
hypothesi argued to apply to others, has been subjected to severe 
sociological criticism, the position of the state in international politics has 
survived largely unscathed. Even though non-govemmental organizations 
began to exert a considerable influence in state-centered politics regarding 
ecological, economic, humanitarian issues and so forth, their involvements 
in security issues and territorial and military disputes remain insignificant. 
Even an immediate re-questioning from foreign peoples to Koreans, "Do 
you mean that we do not like peace as much as you, Koreans?", "Are we 
more aggressive and troublesome than you?" and a further conceptual 
critique of the underpinning assumption of the holistic view of peoples' 
characters in the Korean claim, would not suffice to sway the effects of 
the Koreans' accumulated harsh experiences of strife in their country. The 
rigid idea o f 'we', Koreans, which I criticized in previous chapters, and the 
claim of loving peace and being non-aggressive are an historically shaped 
self-satisfactory justification for a problematic regional politics.
It would be doubtful whether historical claims could be justified, either 
without corroborating factual evidence at the 'ultimate' level, or without 
implicit discrimination against others in the hierarchy of moral status. 
However, the interim conclusion, that factual evaluation cannot extricate 
itself from the contextual background of historical facts and the situational 
particularity of 'claiming' something, demands a most careful and detailed 
understanding of historical facts. Furthermore, the denial of claims demands 
a better historical evaluation and a normative criticism of the moral 
hierarchy that is inescapably mapped in a context. In other words, for the
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Korean claims, the denial of their non-invasion of other states and their 
non-interference tradition, and the normative critique of a comparative 
evaluation of non aggressiveness, are also contextual responses. If these 
responses are undermined by the intention to defensively justify the 
historically evaluated aggressiveness of other regional powers with 
expansionist ambitions and further, if they still contribute to the 
maintenance of a problematic historical tradition, then the proponents of
this counter-critique must also be criticized.
The particularity of Korean nationalism, if such a thing exists, would be 
that it becomes significantly responsive to the provocative claims of state 
sovereignty for political and economic agendas, as much as for cultural 
issues. The mode of response has not only been collective, but also so 
furious as to brook no opposition. It is the collective memory of Korean 
history that has condemned innocent Koreans to suffer at the hands of
external powers, many instantly responding to national issues with a sort of 
spirit of self-sacrifice. Such an historically accumulated mode of behavior 
reflects the psychological status of han (tHfi), which is extremely powerful 
in Koreans' self-interpretation as victims, on the one hand, and the world 
as the unfair entity from which the self is suffering, on the other.
To me the worst scenario, that has ramifications for the political geography 
in East Asia after the reunification of Korea, does not come from the 
Koreans', the ambitious project of the restoration of Manchu (AHN Cheon, 
1990), or from the political payback for the colonial experience and the 
division of the Korean peninsula. Rather, it concerns the possible
misjudgment of neighboring states, oblivious to or choosing to ignore
Koreans' psychological instability, which must last for the time being, in
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dealing with any political, military or economic agenda. Extrapolating from 
historical form, it is unlike that Korean political actors would take any 
initiative in regional politics. However, they must be ready to react to the 
emerging situation, unlikely their predecessors, because nationalism is now 
so deeply rooted in Korean society as to possibly lead public discourse to 
extreme and risky paths.
7.2. The desirability of a new boundary-oriented politics and the 
remaining political dangers
7.2.1. Korean Unification: A necessity o f  a national project in the 
Post-national era
The (South) Korean debate on the (re)unification of Korea clearly shows 
the current state of the Korean social sciences in dealing with national 
issues. While the romantic way of arguing the necessity for unification 
introduces a diagnosis for Koreans who suffer under the division of Korean 
peninsula, its basic perspective is to restore the tradition of a united Korea. 
In other words, it is a past-oriented idea of dealing with current problems. 
However, some social scientists discover the necessity for unification in 
reasons other than those of cultural homogeneity or a communitarian idea 
of collective memory, that is to say, from the political situation of two 
Korean states. They emphasize the limited nature of democracy in South 
Korea within a divided countiy. As I have shown, the hostile relationship 
between the two states and supporting conservative-networks have had a 
strong impact on domestic politics towards the maintenance of authoritarian 
regimes. The democrats' position within unification discourse reflects the 
relationship between the system of divided Korea and domestic politics. In 
other words, South Korea itself is understood by them as 'the blockaded 
polity' due to the conflictive political structure firmly rooted in ideological
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tensions among political actors, where a divided country operates as a 
negative imperative on democratization.6 Another political position 
advocating the unification of Korea exists outside of unification movements. 
The authoritarian state and a rigidly rooted conservative-network also argue 
the necessity of unification. However, for many reasons, their standpoints 
exist only in a nominal way. Their hostile attitude to their North Korean 
counterparts has failed to make any significant contributions to the 
unification discourse, and they continue to propose absorption of the other. 
It could be argued that just as much as the South Korean conservatives, 
many leading political groups in North Korea have the same type of 
stubborn policy towards South Korea. Nevertheless, their different 
ideological backgrounds and different historical experiences in tension, have
6) Crozier’s (1994, 1987, 1982) investigation of the French situation in 
which many actors in several French organizational systems form a 
collective human tension with other actors, led him to coin the term, 
société bloquée. While rigid bureaucratic conditions, historically developed 
in French organizational culture as the major organizational problem for 
French society, is clearly described in his analysis, Crozier suggests an 
institutional alternative in new policy-orientations for state affairs through 
which the bureaucratic system and the problematic actors- technocrats, for 
example- are cured. For some Korean social scientists, South Korea, as the 
structurally blockaded polity - the descriptive term paraphrased from the 
Crozierian idea of the problem of social systems in a Korean political 
context - could not be fully cured - this would mean the democratization 
of politics - by any institutional consequence of the political relationships 
between the conservative network and democratic actors. Rather the process 
of unification of two Korean states is understood as one of the major 
conditions for the political development of democracy.
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fostered a quite different orientation toward unification.
This is a highly particular political discourse based on a type of 
boundary-politics directly intending to change or maintain the political 
boundary itself. Especially when the issue of democracy is tied to it, it 
cannot be classified as a nationalist claim for unification. For the 
unification of Korea itself is not put forward as the ultimate task for the 
people in Korea. Rather it is argued as the correct path for a democratic 
reshaping of politics on behalf of the people in the Korean context. It is 
supported by a realistic conclusion that deconstructing the division system 
for Korea is entirely necessary, for without it the democratic reshaping of 
South Korean politics could not be achieved- I have introduced in chapter 
S some empirical examples supporting the claim of the negative influence 
of North Korea in South Korean politics. From the problems arising from 
the existence of a rigid boundary politics and from its alternatives 
pertaining to the Korean context, the general understanding of the problems 
of the nation-state in dealing with national and international issues could be 
considerably revised. For the national setting of boundary politics under the 
European experience does not, pari passu, apply to the East Asian region, 
where the construction of nation-states has a relatively long history. For 
some political actors in Korea making the nation-state is an incomplete and 
highly urgent project of the twenty-first century, despite the historical 
memory o f the nation-state system that is deeply rooted in historiography. 
This could then be introduced as the critical example of an evolutionist 
idea for the history of political integration; from city-state to regional 
supra-national state via the nation-state.
7.2,2. European Integration: the necessity o f  a regional project beyond
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civilizational backgrounds
In terms of evaluating the problems of civilizational analyses in the social 
sciences, the discourse on the current process o f European integration could 
be highly productive, in the double sense of identifying open possibilities 
for deconstructing a rigid collective identity or enclosing it within a 
negative development. In other words, it seems impossible to avoid the 
basic inquiry on the feasibility of Europe as a civilizational boundary, an 
inquiry that is in itself enough to determine, or at least to influence, the 
beginning and the end of current economic and political integration in the 
region (see, Patocka, 2002 for the philosophical construction; Rietbergen, 
1998 for cultural development). Even though the beginning of institutional 
development for economic integration was shaped by the economic and 
political interests of some states, the accelerating process of economic and 
political integration since the 1990s has been driven by the high national 
interests of the member states.
In how many works are the civilizational backgrounds introduced for 
identifying the reasons for current European integration? While there could 
be very different perceptions on this matter among a number of states 
indirectly or directly related to the integration process, it is hardly as 
influential as current political and economic interests. The civilizational 
analysis could be understood, at best, as a marginalized approach, even 
though one could argue that it provides a mode for the reinterpretation of 
major issues in the policy-making process. However, while it is certainly 
true that many scholars are rather reluctant to investigate civilizational 
agendas in the public discourse, because they might fundamentally 
determine the pursuit of political and economic integration, it is desirable 
that the civilizational interpretation of European integration should be more
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widely dealt with in intellectual discourse. The most powerful merit and 
demerit, at the same time, of civilizational analysis as such, is its instant 
relevance for the question of what Europe is, which, although very general, 
is quite a basic question, with huge implications for 'EUROPEAN' 
integration.
The civilizational framework could have a significant impact on the current 
integration process, as a means of finding its major rationale in the 
long-term history of the region (Spohn, 2000a, 2000b; Delanty, 2001a, 
1995). The problem of utilizing a civilizational framework, as I have 
argued in the introduction, is that it exclusively sets a boundary as the 
container of homogeneous backgrounds for members within the boundary. 
The development of the nation-state system based on a grand scale in the 
enlightened political projects in the European region, has regulated, to some 
extent, the religious influences over politics and economic activities, even 
though its expansion to other regions has been partly dependent on the 
idea of a 'civilizing mission' including religion. The occurrence of major 
military conflicts in the twentieth century, including the impact of the 
Russian revolution in 1917, could be understood as the consequence o f the 
tension between national and regional identity.
It does not appear beyond the realms of possibility to anticipate the 
possible emergence of a new situation in which religious factors, cultural 
elements and any type of enlightenment projects could be reconnected, once 
the regulative power of nation-oriented politics becomes less influential. 
Although this is a very simple anticipation, it is very difficult to ignore, 
because at least in the intellectual history concerned with civilizational 
analysis, the exclusive formation of a civilizational boundary is seldom
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criticized. In other words, whereas the substance of European civilizations 
has often been critically dealt with in intellectual works, the idea of a 
European civilization has not itself been subjected to fundamental criticism. 
Recent debates on Eurocentrism (Wallerstein, 1998, 1997; McLennan, 2000) 
and Fundamentalist movements (Eisenstadt, 2000a, 1999) could be
categorized in the former trend rather the latter. Following the latter 
orientation, could one argue that European civilization historically never 
existed? It is possible to approach this question in several ways. However, 
as I noted in the introduction, any objective answers based on an atemporal 
perspective immediately face the critical dilemma, that the process of 
ascertaining the contents of European civilization could not fully exclude an 
additional construction of its counterparts. In other words, proving the 
existence o f European civilization is to unavoidably pass comment on any 
form of non-European civilization and recognizing its contents is only 
possible when its counterparts are at least partially alluded to. However, 
this also applies to the atemporality of hermeneutic critique that focuses on 
the structural formation of comparative elements. A more sophisticated and 
indirect suggestion of the contents of European civilization occurs when the 
origins of some institutional frameworks for politics and economic activities, 
on the one hand, and for cultural and religious ones, on the other, are 
emphasized, while being detached from any initial boundary of creation. 
The primary purpose of investigating the detaching/attaching process - 
whatever terms in different nuance are additionally used: 
exportation/importation, expansion/reaching, implantation, replacement, etc. - 
is not to compare boundaries themselves but to highlight the development 
of institutions from one place to another and to investigate any possible 
changes within this movement. Some comparative works in the recent 
debate on multiple modernities and many works in regional studies could
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be classified under this approach. I have argued in the introduction,
commenting on the Eliasian perception of the West, that the idea of 
multiple modernities is tied up with a boundary-oriented comparative 
sociology in which the assumption of the existence of a clear border 
between several political and cultural entities partly determines the direction 
of comparative and historical research (see, Friese and Wagner 2000b for 
the critique of the culturalist understanding of multiple modernities).
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 intended to raise the question of how the actors, who 
accept the political and economic alternatives initially developed in a
different context as their own tools for political and economic vision, 
basically understand the issue of the spatial origins of institutional
alternatives. The institutional frameworks of major Korean political actors in 
the twentieth century, as I introduced in chapter 4 and illustrated in 
chapters 5 and 6 with empirical examples of disputes and
policy-orientations, in fact have their origins in Europe including Russia 
and North America. However, the identification of the origins of the
institutional alternatives, which significantly influenced major political actors' 
practice, if not fully determining their understanding, were not entirely 
critically questioned by Korean actors themselves, unlike their predecessors' 
hostile reactions to them in the second half of the nineteenth century. Just 
as the expansion of Christianity in Korea was a political reaction to 
Japanese-style modernization at the beginning of the twentieth century, so 
many institutional alternatives were rooted in major political actors' practical 
recognition that their goals might be achieved with the help of newly 
introduced alternatives from outside. It is, of course, also true that there 
were many other actors who reacted negatively to foreign alternatives. 
However, the manner of criticizing foreign alternatives - I have introduced
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in chapter 6 some nationalist ideas of political actors and intellectuals in 
the cultural sphere - is to protect the national interest over foreign 
influences, where major institutional alternatives from outside are in many 
cases treated as an aggressive matrix of expansion by foreign actors 
backing their own national interests. In other words, many discourses 
related to the spatial origins of modem institutions and their current status 
are deeply shaped by the boundary-oriented attitudes of political actors and 
political intellectuals who differently interpret factual evidence within their 
own normative orientations.
In the introduction, I noted that the possible interpretations of what is 
illustrated in the main chapters as Korean modernity, as such does not help 
to advance the idea of multiple modernities in comparative-historical 
sociology beyond a boundary-oriented theorizing. What has been argued in 
this thesis as an important issue for any comparative-historical research 
covering long-term political processes and societal change, is that one 
should neither seek to identify any long-term continuation of a socio­
political model in a given boundary, or its sudden radical changes and its 
replacement by others, on the one hand, nor to conclusively argue Korea 
as the container of the dynamic relations between major political actors, on 
the other. Rather, what is important is the existence of the historical flow 
in which, in spite of different political orientations with different normative 
ideas, overall actors have firmly practiced their orientations. This path even 
includes the abandonment of a source for their identity, Korea, itself arising 
from the colonial experience, explained in chapters 2, 3.
The discourse on current European integration includes two important ways 
of understanding the historical flow of political actors in the European
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context: firstly, the significance of the boundary for political actors in a 
new political situation; secondly, reshaping political actors themselves in the 
changing boundary politics (see, Friese, Negri and Wagner, 2002 for new 
political construction of Europe; Friese and Wagner, 2002 for reviewing the 
philosophical dimension of the discourse). As far as the first theme is 
concerned, the relationship between an existing national boundary and an 
emerging regional one occupies a crucial place in the discourse, while the 
second theme needs to be reevaluated under in light of the change in 
political relationships between national actors in the regional boundary of a 
new politics. Behind the overall scepticism towards European integration, 
there is often the reasoning that the qualities of life for members of a 
nation-state, secured by the national boundary, would be disturbed by the 
process of integration, whereas integrationists assume that the current 
nation-state system is unable to provide better conditions, due to a 
changing political and economic situation that has ramifications for the 
national boundary. At the same time, sceptics anticipate that well-organized 
national institutional measurements, developed over a long period by the 
people, would be rendered useless by the decisions of representatives from 
extra-national communities, whereas integrationists argue that major policy 
decisions in the nation-state for the future of the nation are already under 
threat by global political and economic influences. Unlike practical sceptics 
and idealists, who concern themselves with procedural problems and the 
lack of clear normative orientations for the actual process of institutional 
development, some anti-integrationists are hell bent on fully securing state 
sovereignty from any external influence, while many integrationists intend 
to find a coordinated answer to state sovereignty in a regional framework.
What should be importantly recognized in the discourse on the current
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status of boundary politics in the European context, is that the nation-state 
system becomes more and more treated as a historically produced political 
entity (see, Zimmermann, Didry and Wagner, 1999 for French and German 
experiences), for which further roles are contested in the contemporary 
situation. The difficult point for anti-integrationists in this issue, is that 
without considerable dependence on the symbolic totality of the nation and 
its political form, the nation-state, which has been constructed in processes 
of political and economic transformation on the grand scale, they could not 
suggest any new type of political and economic ways for maintaining the 
nation-state system. Because of their impotence in suggesting new political 
and economic projects for the nation, they take the conservative position 
against European integration, allowing them to see no positive possibilities 
in the on-going integration process. In short, the conservative position in 
the discourse on European integration is determined by their self-satisfaction 
for what they have achieved rather than preparing the way for what they 
have yet to achieve. However, there is also a problematic dimension for 
some integrationists who initially identify the integration process as the 
extension of the national project. One problem that occurred in the process 
of expanding the nation-state system, was to build clear borders between 
nation-states where some cultural communities were fragmented and where 
borders became the place for tension. The internal homogenization process 
at the regional level might again provoke this fragmenting process at its 
new borders. The perception of the existence of borders, intertwined with a 
strong regional identity - in the era of national building it was a strong 
national identity • would occur when political actors interpret their 
policy-oriented practices within the normative framework of the boundary 
itself and symbolically totalized the European people as a whole. For the 
political actors who are required to justify their actions in policy discourse.
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at least partial engagement of their political vision in regional interests as 
much as national interests, is very difficult to avoid if they are to persuade 
the public and other participants in the discourse. And this, because an 
interest-based attitude plays such a big part in the current integration 
process. There is a lot of space for dealing with the issue of change; from 
national to regional politics and actors, likewise, in empirical research on 
the current stage of European integration. In a sense, it is arguable that 
becoming a regional actor could provide a good opportunity to solve the 
dead-lock of issues at the national level (Bourdieu, 1998; Habermas, 2001; 
Ztirn, 1999). In another sense, in the process of becoming regional actors 
many national actors should have additional qualifications for dealing with 
regional issues at the national level and national issues at the regional 
level. However, when political actors limit their roles to those of agents of 
the boundary - in other words, the actors self-regulate their roles within the 
political structure, once made, but later regarded as the source of
legitimacy - for representing regional interests, then boundary-oriented 
political activities would still be maintained in the actors' mode of practice.
Conclusion: Political Agendas of Modernity in Contemporary Korea
It seems fair to say that there has been a significant political
transformation of Korean society since 1987, roughly correlative to the 
political experience of regime changes, the economic experience of the 
vulnerability of risk-taking developmentalism and the cultural experience of 
the fragmentation of traditional values. It is also observable that in the 
political sphere, major political discourses have shifted from achieving a 
democratic state through abolishing the authoritarian state as the most 
urgent political task, to developing fine democratic agendas adequate for
Korean society and for achieving the unification of Korea. Within the
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observation of overwhelming uncertainties in dealing with newly emphasized 
political agendas, on the one hand, and within the anticipation that Korean 
society would be determined for the time being by the consequence of the 
totality of political actors' interactions, on the other, the current political 
situation could be recognized as a highly critical one for modernity in the 
Korean context.
When one considers that South Korea has been deeply involved in
international politics and the global economy, it is not so difficult to 
anticipate the double possibilities that the future of South Korea holds, 
simultaneously as impacted by and as impacting upon them. For this 
reason, the unification of Korea as the project of a new boundary politics, 
for example, could have an international meaning beyond the Korean
community. If modernity could be understood, without serious conceptual 
distinction between it and its counterparts, as emphasizing the meanings of 
contemporary political agendas, current Korean politics must be regarded by 
political actors as a new situation in which new political projects will 
necessarily materialize. When they present their own value orientations in
practice, this could be understood as the actors' high fidelity to modernity
in that they actively respond to modernity as problématique (Wagner, 
2001b).
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Conclusion: reconsidering the social imaginary in comparative- 
historical sociology
On the epochal idea of modernity
This thesis has been concerned with political history and relations among 
political actors in Korea from the end of the fourteenth century onwards. 
More or less six hundred years of history were investigated in order to 
undermine the widely assumed epochal idea of modernity. The question 
raised is how we can understand the strong idea of epochal rupture if the 
emergence of the Neo-Confucian state is dated at 1392. Around this basic 
question, what is striking is, even though the characteristics of the new 
state, Chosun, are highly questionable if compared to the image of modem 
institutions in contemporary Korea or of its previous states, the main actors 
involved in building Chosun had a clear idea of what they were doing 
according to their own normative foundation. They intended to reshape not 
only Chosun's state structures but also its societal elements. Chosun could 
therefore be regarded as an example of a major social and political 
imaginary for Korean history. In the regional context, the nation-state 
system became firmly established after the emergence of Chosun. Even 
though Chosun should not be regarded as the first nation-state in Korean 
history, it seems clear to me that it is a fully recognizable and 
sociologically analyzable example o f the nation-state in the Korean context. 
However, an additional observation would be that the major socio-political 
and ethical relations of that time could not be accepted as normatively 
plausible for the contemporary situation. At the same time, any intellectual 
judgement that extends from the modem age back to the earlier historical 
period is not fully realizable. Given the fact that there were inconsistent 
elements, from a modem perspective, the comparative understanding of
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political institutions for the early age as products of modernity, has rather 
limited persuasive power in dealing with the contextual meaning of those 
political products. Thus, although contemporary perspectives on the past, 
where meanings are newly or distinctively created, or dead, should be 
understood as a basic attitude for introducing 'History' into sociological 
theorizing, a conceptual confusion between 'discovery' and 'creation' in 
understanding the past appears when the meanings of previous political 
projects are embedded in an attempt to conceptually link them to their 
contemporary counter-parts.
The investigation of the actual relationship between modernity and tradition 
as the process of political and economic transformation towards modernity - 
which has been dealt with in chapter 2 - seems especially difficult for the 
Korean context. Above all, it was the colonial experience that largely 
determined the political relationship among Korean actors in the 
transformative period. Just as the emergence of Chosun could be understood 
as a cosmological conflict between emerging Neo-Confucianism and 
dominant Buddhism, in late nineteenth century, there could have been 
another cosmological conflicts among multiple religious actors; dominant 
Neo-Confucianism versus Donghak, Catholicism, Protestantism, etc. In terms 
of dealing with cosmological and religious agendas, however, the conflicts 
between major religious actors - who were at the same time major political 
actors who could have determined the Korean path towards modernity - 
were shaped by political interventions. Finally, they became mere religious 
participants of modernization, even though they assumed different roles 
under colonization that encouraged further separation between religion and 
politics. Also, the issue of the traditional kingship system and the new 
form of state was not fully resolved as an outcome of the dynamic tension
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between political actors. Rather, it became the issue subsequently solved 
through colonization and independence movements. Even though this 
demands further research, the implication of the lack of experience for 
changing the state format to build a new nation-state in post-liberation 
politics is crucial. Both the political conflicts over the state in South Korea 
and a socialist path in North Korea, lacked a strong advocacy of 
democracy and human rights as a driving force for shaping the new 
nation-state. The effect of colonization, for major political actors, was to 
place the emphasis on the creation of a new nation-state, rather than taking 
universal human rights as their primary concem(Shaw, 1991). Mapping the 
historical path to modem society in a sociological understanding - as in the 
Parsonian project of achieving 'full' modernity (Parsons, 1971), for example 
- should explain the process of dual ruptures that occurred, not only in the 
economic and political spheres, but also in the religious and cosmological 
one - as Weber's interpretation on the role of religious (Protestant) ethics 
for the rise of capitalism (Weber, 1996) and Marx and Engels's scientific 
formulation of economic and political activities for overcoming the capitalist 
mode of societal development (Marx and Engels, 1975). Regrettably, these 
two grand transformations for understanding modernity in the Korean 
context lose explanatory power consequent to the breakdown of the Korean 
polity around the turn of the twentieth century, after which the issue for 
the subjects of modernity, inescapably raised the question of national 
identity over and above economic or political positions as the class 
relations.
It is arguable that the development of modernist ideas in Korean studies 
could be understood as the most significant legacy of colonialism for 
intellectual attitudes. Whereas colonialist historicism is normally understood
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as a historiography for positively interpreting Japanese roles in colonial 
modernization, on the one hand, and for relatively ignoring Koreans' 
capabilities for achieving modernization, on the other, several debates on 
the early modernization process lead unerringly to the conclusion, that the 
deeply rooted state-centered model of development and the widely used 
nationalist narrative in modem historiography should be acknowledged as 
the intellectual legacy of the colonial experience: the development-centered 
economic model, which has dominated South Korean modernization, has 
been supported by a nationalist ideology manipulated by the authoritarian 
state. Although it is not clearly argued by individual scholars, Korean 
studies in general has been shaped by an idea of Korean modernity that 
also treats the European and North American experience as objective 
models or ideal-types. Under the comparative perspective that presupposes 
ideal-types, we can see that the social sciences in Korean studies have 
been shaped by a version of boundary-oriented theorizing (SHIN Jong-Hwa, 
2000b).
How could the two-state system since 1948 be interpreted in light of a 
historical understanding of the long-term development of the nation-state 
system in Korean history, when both the state-centered idea and the 
nation-centered one form an interpretative tension in the Korean case? 
Faced with this question, which has been dealt with in chapter 4, 6 and 7, 
I have doubted the epochal meaning of the nation-state, which is widely 
assumed for the social sciences, for modernity. I have stressed instead, the 
cultural and political motivations for building the nation-state in general. 
One could object that my position is firmly grounded in the Korean 
experience, without considering European cases for the establishment of the 
nation-state. I would immediately counter by asking how it is possible to
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draw the global history of political systems? In addition, the idea of an 
on-going long term process for state formation neither questions its origin 
nor maps its end. The Korean experience does not have any highly 
plausible theory of state formation, if the current situation is evaluated in 
the consideration of its own past as well as its contemporary counterparts. 
The problem arises from a research attitude that implicitly assumes that the 
grand theory of state formation could be built on the comparison of 
boundaries for collective political activities. The current two-state system in 
Korean politics could be introduced as one of the critical examples for 
reconsidering the conceptualization of boundary politics as well as doubting 
the meaning of the firm linkage between the state and the nation as a 
modem phenomenon. Above all, if the epochal distinction of the modem 
age is firmly based on the institutional matrix, that the current South 
Korean and North Korean state have endured since 1945, one could argue 
that the institutional development of the modem nation-state has been 
achieved at the expense of the fragmentation of the nation into two 
polities.
The need fora genealogical understanding of the state in Korea
If the history of the state is investigated in terms of the recognition of 
state authority by political actors, South Korea seems historically to have 
had at least three different types of relationship between the state and 
political actors: the peoples' collective contest of state authority; groups 
from the political elite contesting state authority; political actors' struggle 
without contesting state authority. Although these types of relationship 
would not accord to each historical time, different combinations of the 
three types of relationship could well explain particular characteristics for 
each historical period within the genealogical understanding of the state.
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The colonial experience of the relationship between the state and Korean 
political actors hardly fits with the third type. Despite the fact that some of 
Korean political actors denied political authority for the colonial state, they 
had hardly any ambition to struggle for its political power. In fact, it was 
impossible for the Korean actors to compete with the Japanese counter-parts 
due to a number of institutional limitations based on ethnic discrimination. 
The first and second types, however, are widely observable. The intellectual 
critique of the colonial state and collective organizations of several political 
struggles for the independence of Korea, indicates that many Korean 
political actors had a highly negative view of the political authority of the 
colonial state.
Through the Chosun period, the first and second types are seldomly 
identified, except in a few collective rebellions of the nineteenth century, 
while the third type is apparent. The former were infrequent, because the 
political authority of the state, which was firmly intertwined with the 
symbolic power of kingship, had a strong ideological foundation, 
(Neo-)Confucianism. The political elite of intellectuals - including the 
Confucian literati - and the people, were prone to the political authority of 
the state. Political conflict tended to be monopolized within the elite and 
thus excluded other groups from state activity, without contesting the 
legitimacy of the state. For them, the political authority of the state was 
the given condition under which their practices, undertaken to further their 
political influence, became justifiable.
In the political situation after the liberation of Korea from colonization in 
1945, all three types are clearly visible. Above all, the changes of regime
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up to the 1980s, were largely the result of peoples' collective political 
activity, through which alternative programmes to the state became widely 
promulgated. Secondly, a number of groups of the political elite contested 
the authority of the state. The occurrence of military conflicts within the 
South Korean territory in the late 1940s and the early 1950s could be 
understood as a relevant example of the second type. Moreover, the 
discourse for the unification of Korea could itself be said to reflect the 
problem of political authority for the South Korean state. Further, it is also 
true that the reemergence of socialist ideas in political discourse, at least 
since the 1980s, directly addresses the constitutive problem of the current 
Korean state. However, the most commonly observable type is the third 
one. The development of parliamentary politics toward democratic 
institutionalization, in spite of its non-linear and tension-ridden process, to 
some extent continuously transformed distrust of state authority, widely 
spread among many political actors, to dissatisfaction with the regimes 
themselves. Experiences of changes in the regimes led radical actors' 
political interests to change also, from the making of an alternative state, 
to the remolding of the existing state in order to achieve democracy. If 
both the underdeveloped institutionalized freedom of Korean politics is 
minimized, and the Sombartian (1976) reminder of the specificity of 
societies in comparison is invoked, then the historical relationship of the 
state and political actors for the Korean situation would be reminiscent 
more of many national cases in Europe rather than the North American 
experience. The existence of strong counter-state discourses with long-term 
visions in the political sphere - in many cases expressed as a socialist 
alternative to the current state -, belies a certain level of political tension 
among actors, which were sometimes represented as people's collective 
rejection of state authority, the development of independent socio-political
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movements outside parliamentary politics and so on. In other words, 
modem Korean society as a whole is a highly political one.
Why has Korean society become highly political and how could the 
relationship between political actors be the main source for societal 
developments including the economic and political process? Such questions 
necessitate a review of the historical process of political rupture concerning 
the role of the state. Radical changes in the state have been effected 
through the emergence of new political actors who often replaced their 
traditional counterparts. Interestingly, the processes through which a new 
form of political relations among actors emerged, were neither peaceful nor 
gradual. For example, the collapse of the Korean state under colonization at 
the turn of the twentieth century and the highly negative implications of 
the colonial state for political development, the emergence of two modem 
states in Korea, the military conflict between them and the post-war 
development of authoritarian modernization with its severe restriction of 
political activity, inflamed the legitimation crisis of the state, resulting in 
many counter-state political actors becoming more politically active and less 
institutionally stabilized, whereas the state became highly instrumentalized 
for the actors occupying positions within it. In terms of the increased 
instrumentality of the state, the colonial state and the new South Korean 
state- and possibly the North Korean state also- developed considerable 
political mechanisms for controlling non-state political actors. A by-product 
of this organized form for the monitoring of socio-political and economic 
activities, or the flip-side of an underdeveloped institutional freedom for 
political activity, meant that Korea experienced rapid economic growth as a 
consequence of the state's guidance and efficient mobilization of 
socio-economic resources.
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An over-powered state, compared to non-state actors in the economic and 
political sphere, has resulted in a bi-polarized politics that was highly 
determinant for generating reactions from political actors outside the state 
sphere. The independence movement in which many Korean actors took 
part, for example, was a counter-political response to the loss of 
sovereignty of the state, and the quest for the united front over center-left 
and center-right in post-liberation politics was also a political way of 
preventing the emergence of two separate states. In addition, the democratic 
movement in 1960 was a successful counter-state politics, fomented by the 
transgressions of the first republic, while the partial achievement of 
institutional political freedom since 1987, can be seen as a political reaction 
to 20 years of authoritarian modernization. In a broad sense, it can be 
argued that the political tension between the state and a newly constructed 
conservative network in each political stage, on the one hand, and 
counter-state actors and widely emerging contentious peoples, on the other, 
has been maintained since the turn of the twentieth century. If the former 
has had actual political power in the asymmetric relationship, this has not 
allowed it to politically construct a moral superiority, which has belonged 
instead to the latter, who have claimed persuasive justifications for 
anti-state activities, despite a serious lack of power. Politicized Korean 
society, thus, has been produced as the consequence of rigid political 
tension.
The rigidity of bi-polar politics began to be fragmented around the 1990s. 
The reasons for political transformation have been several rather than one 
main cause. Firstly, thanks to an economic transformation that occurred 
under the condition of political authoritarianism, changes in the economic
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sphere have impacted on the social and cultural sphere, in terms both of 
the development of modem industrial society and of its related institutional 
frameworks. Secondly, however, while these societal changes have reflected 
political problems, existing counter-state actors, who gained experience 
under harsh conditions, have been identified as the alternative political 
agent. Lastly, was the failure of the authoritarian state to maintain and 
reproduce an out-dated ideology justifying the uneven development of the 
economy and politics for the changed context. Why had the authoritarian 
style of modernization become exhausted? A basic answer can be found in 
the widening gap between the justification for rules and their lack of 
efficacy under conditions of social transformation. In the initial stage for 
the introduction of a highly organized form of modernization and its 
collective practices, a problematic goal-reasoning invariably enforced an 
'objectified' rule-following that ignores particular actors’ interests. As 
institutions became rooted in the modernization process, the temporary 
acceptance of imposed rules began to be contested, consequently resulting 
in widespread criticism of the subject of rule-making, the state. This may 
well explain why political movements began to pursue a general line for 
the execution of fair rules, why the political change of course in 1987 has 
not developed into a more radical change of state form, and why the 
fragmentation of democratic actors and counter-state actors went 
hand-in-hand with the emergence of civil society discourse in the public 
sphere.
Korean politics since the 1990s has been in transition. In spite of the fact 
that over the long-term the conventional structure of bi-polar politics has 
already broken down, the political tradition of major political actors that 
are shaped in antagonistic and hostile tension, remains and from time to
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time, resurfaces as a major influence for particular political discourse. More 
problematically, Korean politics as a whole is still sensitive to the ebb and 
flow of international politics. Historically, Korean politics has been 
fundamentally restructured by world politics and its regional influence, that 
has caused many actors' demise and prompted the emergence of others. 
One of the grand political events for Korean politics, the reunification of 
two Korean states, is inextricably connected to the world stage. Even 
though it remains unclear whether the unification agenda will be resolved 
as the consequence of world politics, as for previous major political 
ruptures, or whether it will actively instigate a new possibility for world 
politics, one thing is clear; the future of Korean politics, in terms of its 
grand historical shape, will not be understood independently of the world 
process.
The historical track to current Korean politics reveals some radical ruptures, 
around which the rise and fall of several intellectual paradigms has 
coincidentally occurred. The scale of intellectual changes includes not only 
the main objects of inquiries, but also the way of producing inquiries under 
any particular cosmological background. Any attempt to produce a 'strong 
theory' of evolutionary process for the history of the Korean state - .... 
Koryo, Chosun, (the empire of Great Han), the colonial state, (the US or 
Soviet military state), two Korean states (ROK and DPRK) -, has limited 
explanatory power. As many works in Korean studies have pointed out, the 
emergence and development of the three major forms of the state was 
supported by emerging intellectual flows that underpinned new forms and 
negated previous forms of the state and their related intellectual resources. 
How then can the historical map of the state be drawn?
-  293 -
On modernity and political actors
The overall interpretations of the thesis for understanding the Korean 
experience of political transformation, are based on the assumption that the 
historical evaluation of the political process within a given boundary should 
necessarily include the particular historical elements which are found in the 
history of the boundary. In other words, the Korean experience would be 
more plausibly interpreted when its contextuality is emphasized. However, it 
is important for me to acknowledge that the basic assumption would itself 
be problematic for empirical research, unless the investigation o f a political 
and cultural boundary was at least supported by knowledge of other 
boundaries. Without an implicit or explicit comparison with others,
construction of the political history of a boundary could not produce any 
distinctive characteristics at all. The Japanese and European experiences of 
political transformation and related issues, have here played a role for
comparison, while many works in the social sciences concerned with 
interpreting the meanings of historical events in the regions have been 
utilized in order to understand their Korean counterpart Such a
methodology could be criticized for following the same line as 'the
mirroring research' that I have pointed to in some works in Korean and 
Japanese studies and its effect on theorizing their historical experiences. 
However, so long as the purpose of this thesis is to sketch the dynamics 
of the political sphere, rather than a direct formulation of the characteristics 
of Korean politics itself, so long as it intends to build a different type of 
comparison that focuses on actors' political practices beyond the cross­
national comparison that totalizes the national subject, such criticism can be 
staved off for the time being. A second element for overcoming the basic 
premise of the contextual reading is to identify the fact that a cultural and 
political space does not necessarily have one authentic interpretation.
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Especially when long-term historical transformation is dealt with and when 
the rise and fall of many political actors are investigated for the theoretical 
argument, the occurrence of intellectual disagreements for the interpretation 
of historical events and the roles of political actors, becomes inevitable. In 
other words, interpretation includes a crucial element beyond the shadow of 
context and the factual reading on evidences.
Needless to say that the free space for interpretation, which is beyond any 
additional knowledge for a contextual reading, is the normative motivation 
through which interpretation itself is directed in its orientation. As far as 
broad historical analysis is concerned, the normative orientations could be 
revealed not only by a scholars' methodological framework, but also by 
their questions and the direction of their investigation. Even though the 
degree of embedded normative orientation would be different, the problem 
posed around questions in some ways fundamentally determines the overall 
direction of the research process. In a sense, the making of a conceptual 
space begins at that very moment of raising questions. Questions invoked 
concerning civilizational backgrounds, national traditions, and economic and 
political interests, shape the understanding of collective heritages around 
civilizational ideas, national identities and the necessities for economic and 
political achievements. Even when disagreements arise from a total rejection 
of the mode of questioning itself - the denial of the existence of such an 
entity, civilizational boundary, nation • that advocate the existence of a 
high degree of cultural and historical homogeneity and develop sophisticated 
typological comparison, the influence of such questions in the debate on 
civilizational and national identities remains influential unless and until the 
discursive mode is itself radically changed. Scholars cannot fully free 
themselves from the customized usage of the problematic vocabularies, even
-  295
when they criticize them as forms of ideology. Ironically, although in this 
thesis I negate any given homogeneity for diverse political actors, I 
nonetheless describe them as 'Korean' actors. Even though I try to 
minimize the power of verbal expression, its configurative power over 
understanding primary images cannot be fully eliminated until they become 
reconfigured with different labels. The same problem, more or less, occurs 
when current political actors, or previous actors in the European region are 
introduced as European actors, even though the idea of European 
civilization is empirically and theoretically contestable.
Theories of multiple modernities have been widely influenced by 
boundary-oriented comparison. One could argue that treating political and 
cultural boundaries as given, has its own empirical evidence and a certain 
theoretical validity. However, as I have already pointed out, the problematic 
dimension arises from the fact that the distinctiveness of boundaries has 
gained its proofs more and more from comparative-historical sociology 
rather than the customized mode of boundary distinctions operating with an 
essentialist idea of cultural power, has lost its explanatory power. However, 
there are also two different modes of theorizing for multiple modernities in 
terms of identifying the roles of actors in the political sphere. While many 
works in this field regard modernity as the societal project as such, some 
works highlight a process of emerging modem achievements in which 
political projects inaugurated by major actors have shaped modernity. Under 
the former view, scholars focus on the overall novel configuration of 
modernity, itself based on societal movement from its past to a present that 
is deeply influenced by its civilizational heritages, while under the latter, 
scholars concentrate on the question of how modem ruptures occurred 
through the contribution of new political actors and attempt to comprehend
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the interplay between actual political and economic transformations and 
intellectual responses. The advantage of the latter perspective over the 
former is that it is highly applicable for interpreting current political 
processes and could possibly open even more radical interpretations for 
dealing with prevailing political and economic agendas. The nation-state and 
its related economic forms, for example, have been investigated as 
historical projects driven by political actors, rather than treating them as 
simply given. Mutatis mutandis, this perspective becomes broadly suggestive 
of new possibilities for the emerging state system on the European level 
and its economic nature, through the historical recognition of the contents 
of its previous counterparts and their transformations.
There are several ways of defining modernity in terms o f diverse modes of 
recognizing of socio-political transformations. The institutionalist way of 
understanding modernity, as one of them, - a stereo-type for which is 
expounded in the introduction - provides weak explanatory power for 
investigating how the development of modem institutions has been intended 
by major political actors in political crises and for suggesting new 
institutional models adequate for the current situation. Under such a 
perspective, the interpretation of what happened and what emerged, are 
considerably separated from any suggestion of what ought to have 
happened.
'Modernity refers to a situation in which human beings do not accept any 
external guarantors, i.e. guarantors that they do not themselves posit, of the 
certainty of their knowledge, of the viability of their political orders or of 
the continuity of their selves' (Wagner, 2001b: 4). If 1 introduce Wagner's 
understanding of modernity for the Korean context - especially the
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contemporary political situation from the 1990s -, Korean political actors 
can be seen as genuinely located in a modernity in which they could not 
fully accept any knowledge from others for solving their particular 
uncertainties and in which they have not yet developed their own solutions 
for them. Modernity for the Korean context could also be taken to refer to 
a national situation in the global economy as the context for economic 
actors, or/and the incomplete national situation in a post-national era for 
political actors involved in the unification process. While the current 
socio-economic and political situation in South Korea is underpinned by the 
complex of actors' interests, which have been developed through the project 
of state-centered modernization, the agenda for the (re)unification of Korea 
provocatively requires a réévaluation of all knowledge devoted to building 
two separate nation-states. Making one's own values and expanding one's 
influence in order to achieve these objectives, is what is at stake for all 
political actors in the current situation.
In this thesis I have tried to show the historical aspect of the contemporary 
Korean polity - which is highlighted in Korean studies as the historical 
resources o f South Korean society - while resisting any dependency on a 
national form of collective identity. Toward that purpose, 1 have tried to 
distantiate myself from some of the conventional wisdom in
comparative-historical sociology, found both in political discourse and in the 
investigation of actual political processes. Firstly, 1 refute the presupposition 
of a certain duration of a polity over grand historical time: the polity itself 
has changed in terms of its members, major political orientations and even 
its territories. Secondly, I challenge the implicit formulation of asymmetric 
value judgements between the modem world and its counterpart, as well as 
a conceptual interpretation of the political characteristics of traditional
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society from a modernist stance. Thirdly, I undermine the introduction of 
macro historical terms for investigating the particular characteristics of the 
polity and try to escape from the possible deconstruction of political actors 
into their cultural and circumstantial backgrounds. Fourthly, and most 
problematically, I deny the applicability of a construction of the single 
collective subject for representing the polity, favoring its recognition, rather, 
as akin to narrative subjectivity.
While the historical path has been regarded as the container for a particular 
political culture in Korean studies (see, Helgesen, 1998 for example), I 
have indicated in this thesis with several historical examples that the 
treatment of the Korean polity as a whole is highly problematic. The 
identification of particular characteristics of a politico-cultural community, 
which has been the basic theme of comparative historical sociology, 
deserves a critical evaluation of its contribution to the development of the 
historical sciences in general. In the same way as grand inquiry in 
sociology has shifted from (industrial) society to modernity (Wagner, 2000, 
2001a), there is no reason to assume that the mode of investigation for 
comparative historical sociology should be unchangeably based on the 
comparative identification of the particularities of political and cultural 
boundaries. Doubting the value of the customized disciplinary boundary 
seems necessary especially nowadays when new types of boundary politics 
are suggested and new political actors sought.
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